Moderator: SC Moderators
It's possible, depending on how broadly one reads Article I, Section 8, that there is a potential conflict of interest in one person's simultaneously being a Chancellor candidate and a voting member of the RA electing that position.
If that's the case, the person would not necessarily be obligated to resign. It might be adequate for him or her to recuse him or herself from the Chancellor selection process in the RA.
[quote="michelmanen":38d9l5yf]Ah, so let's see: Moon, one the 3 current Guild leaders, freshly elected as RA member, would resign her seat in order to become Chancellor, while her RA seat would be filled by an individual whose name had not even figured on the ballot vote, to be decided upon by the 9 members of the CSDF - member who, once so "elected" would have 1 of 7 votes deciding who will be our next Chancellor???
No one is better suited than Moon to lead the Guild; and I have no doubt that she will make an excellent RA member or an outstanding Chancellor; -but from the point of view of both democratc theory and practice, this is nothing less than mind-bogling...[/quote:38d9l5yf]
I don't understand how being anything within the Guild could be a undemocratic. It would be like telling someone that is head of the local neighborhood watch group that they can't also serve as the mayor of a city.
[quote="Claude Desmoulins":27rc83ly]It's possible, depending on how broadly one reads Article I, Section 8, that there is a potential conflict of interest in one person's simultaneously being a Chancellor candidate and a voting member of the RA electing that position.
If that's the case, the person would not necessarily be obligated to resign. It might be adequate for him or her to recuse him or herself from the Chancellor selection process in the RA.[/quote:27rc83ly]By that logic, we should be prevented from voting for ourselves when we hold elections for the RA.
Pat --
I don't think that your conclusion follows. When we vote in the general election -- we are acting as private citizens. Private citizens should not be treated as if they were members of government, with the ethical obligations and expectations such office brings. (This disregard of the private is the biggest problem with MM and CARE.)
However, once a person is in government office, things change. When acting as an office holder, that person is both able to do things that she or she otherwise would not be able to do (pass legislation and the other actions of governing). With this added power comes added responsibility -- to act wisely and impartially when acting as a governmental officer (although, I believe, the person remains a citizen, and when acting in a private capacity, has no such restrictions). To avoid conflicts of interest and apparent conflicts of interest when acting as an officer of government is exactly the kind of limitation that comes from this added responsibility.
I think that members of the RA should abstain from votes that directly involve their personal interests (as opposed to their general interests as citizens). Therefore, a RA member running for Chancellor should not vote in the Chancellor vote -- just as an RA member should not vote for legislation that would provide the member with any special right or privilege.
This does produce a problem for this current Chancellor election. If Moon votes, Moon will probably be Chancellor. If Moon does not vote, the election might split 2/2/2 -- if, as expected, CARE members vote for Michel, CSDF members vote for Moon (with Moon abstaining), and SP members vote for Dnate (on the theory that the DPU is still an active party and should have some role in government). I am not sure what would happen if this vote splits this way. I presume that there would be a revote.
Personally, I think that Moon has all the personality traits to be the best Chancellor the CDS could hope to have. I would happily vote for Moon under ordinary circumstances -- but these circumstances, in which on of our most active and influential parties was excluded from office on a procedural technicality, are not ordinary.
Beathan
Beathan
The analogy is sound. The electorate for the RA is the citizenry of the CDS. Everyone gets to vote, including the candidates themselves. There is no conflict of interest in voting for yourself! That's what you would expect to happen.
The electorate for the Chancelry is the RA. Every RA members gets to vote, including Moon. The notion that she should abstain from the vote is ludicrous.
I think you and Claude are stretching the definition of 'conflict of interest' here. A conflict of interest exists when someone is in a position to exploit a professional or official capacity in some way for their personal, private benefit. If I were to propose that the Marketplatz shop owners be given their property rent free for a year, that would be a conflict of interest because I would directly benefit from the proposal. That's why we have a Register of Members' Interests so that citizens can see what the private interests of our representatives are and identify any potential conflicts of interest. This is nothing of the sort so the question does not arise. It's a red herring, nothing more.
Edited to add: The reason the DPU did not gain any seats in the elections was not due to exclusion on a technicality. They failed to choose any candidates and inform the Dean by the deadline. It's a shame that they did so, but it hardly amounts to 'exclusion'.
I disagree witth the process of Chancellor selection from the RA benches on so many levels that I wont even bother to start. Suffice it to say, I suggest we need a ruling on this from the SC as soon as possble. The isssues are:
1. Can an individual who was elected to th RA stand for Chancellor?
2. If so, can this individual vote for hom/herself?
I believe the answer to both questions is "NO".
Clearly others think both answers should be "YES".
I intend to submit a Petition to the SC asking for a ruling on this matter as soon as possible.
Michel --
I would be willing to consider significantly revising the way we do the Executive in the CDS. Specifically, i think we could go two ways. First, we could have direct election of the Chancellor by all citizens in the RA election -- and require that candidates declare for one or the other office. This would allow even nonaligned citizens a vote for a person.
Alternatively, we could move to a "Prime Minister" model -- and the LRA could automatically become chief executive, while other members of the RA could be appointed, by the RA, to ministerial posts. This would allow us to simplify our government by abolishing the "Chancellor" position completely -- but at some cost in balance of powers.
These two models reflect, I think, the best two operating democratic models in the world. I am not committed to one or the other. Howeve i think our current system is an inferior hybrid of both.
Beathan
Pat --
Unlike the election to the RA, in which citizens vote as citizens -- the selection of Chancellor is a governmental function in which only officers of government are allowed to vote, and do so as officers of government. Therefore, unlike RA elections, which are not subject to conflict of interest rules because there are no such rules restricting the actions of citizens as citizens, the election of someone to the Chancellorship does implicate such rules.
The Chancellor is a single office -- and the office has privileges and powers unique to it. Therefore, if an RA member votes to give herself that office, she is voting to give herself special powers and privileges. As she is a member of the RA, conflict rules apply -- and I think they obviously apply to prevent such a vote.
In my response to Michel, I have suggested two different possible reforms to solve this problem.
Further, with regard to the DPU -- the requirement to submit a list of candidates to the Chancellor and Dean of the SC is a procedural requirement. The DPU missed the procedural deadline, but did submit a proper list of candidates and members, albeit out of time. As a result, the DPU did not have any candidates on the ballot. Therefore, due to a failure to comply with the technicalities of election notice procedure, the DPU was not allowed to have any of its willing candidates on the ballot and the citizens of the CDS were not allowed to vote for the DPU.
I think that the DPU was excluded from the election (no candidates on the ballot) because of a procedure technicality (the DPU's failure to follow the proper notice procedure). I am not necessarily saying that it is wrong to exclude a Party for procedural technicalities. Rather, I am saying that we need to acknowledge that that is what happened here.
Further, I think that it would be appropriate in the future to allow a write-in possibility in all election. We should then allow voters to write in a Party that missed the procedural deadline -- or to write in "none of the Parties". This would allow voters a greater range of voting options -- allowing them to support parties that are not on the ballot; to support "Parties of One" such as Dianne; or to express their desire to support none of the Parties (none as first vote) while still ranking the parties on "lesser of evils" basis; or to express their desire to indicate that they would rather have no Parties than have one or more of the Parties in the election.
Beathan
[quote="Patroklus Murakami":3bu7kmo0]
The electorate for the Chancelry is the RA. Every RA members gets to vote, including Moon. The notion that she should abstain from the vote is ludicrous.[/quote:3bu7kmo0]
Actually, Pat - from a Constitutional point of view she may have the right - but it isn't ludicrous to think she may need to abstain or not vote.
This would be a typical "conflict of interest" in a voting situation.
Now, you guys may be quick to refute ANYTHING said my Michel - but come on ...
While this may be a legally allowable move - to deny that there isn't even a whiff of conflict of interest is silly. I mean we are all intelligent - does the election reduce our collective IQ by 50% or something?
I absolutely love Moon, but I do think your statement in this case smacks of hyperbole!
And to use a US slang term: "Puh-leeze!"
==
"Nenia peno nek provo donos lakton de bovo."
I agree that it does seem like a conflict of voting for yourself as a member of the RA. I would guess that had Michel thought of it before hand, it would have been somewhat easy to convince the party of electing him to the RA and then making sure that he would have gotten his own vote for chancellor.
But then this is really a question for the SC to look into. Also, it may not matter if Moon doesn't declare herself as running. So far, it seems that some people think she may want to run, but no formal declaration.
In the pre-election meeting for CARE Michel did make it clear he was not running for the RA but for Chancellor.
This might not be so important an issue as it might at first appear, however, as it seems most likely each member of the RA would vote for a Chancellor candidate from their own faction. For example, there would be little real difference whether Michel were to be in the RA and vote for himself to become Chancellor or if another representative of CARE were in the same seat and made the same choice.
In any case I believe it would be good to clarify the wording describing this in the Constitution for future Chancellor elections. That is, if the election procedure is not reconsidered entirely as suggested by Beathan.
Beathan wrote:
[quote:312koslq]I would be willing to consider significantly revising the way we do the Executive in the CDS. Specifically, i think we could go two ways. First, we could have direct election of the Chancellor by all citizens in the RA election -- and require that candidates declare for one or the other office. This would allow even nonaligned citizens a vote for a person. [/quote:312koslq]
[b:312koslq]CARE's position is to create a hybrid Chancellor's position - [/b:312koslq]with elements from US President, UK Prime Minister, French President and Roman Republic Consul, focusing on the strength of each and eliminating the weaknesses in each, as follows;
1. Direct election of the Chancellor by all CDS citizens at the same time with the RA elections (advantage: democratic legitimacy)
2. Candidates to declare at the same time as RA candidates, and run for no other office (advantage: transparency; no conflict of interests);
3. Chancellor to appoint Vice-Chancellor, PIO and Auditor General, subject to confirmation by the RA, immediately upon taking office (advantage: efficiency; checks and balances).
4. Chancellor to Chair the RA, have the right to introduce legislation; but have no vote except in cases of ties -as the US Vice-President in the Senate. (advantage: direct contact with the RA - leadership, focus, direction (unlike US president who is isolated from Congress) ; but no dominance (like in UK parliament); efficiency and dynamism (no ties).
5. Chancellor to Deliver mid-Term Public Report on the State of the Community (advantage: openness, accountability);
6. Limit of two mandates, consecutive or not (advantage: limitation of powers; renewal, innovation).
7. Chancellor to be CDS spokesperson with respect to all outside communities (advantage: focus, leadership);
8. Chancellor to delegate to Vice-Chancellor duty of enforcing all laws and regulations in CDS; to PIO all duties for organising events and creating publicity for CDS; and to Auditor-General all duties of reporting on the state of finances in CDS. Ultimate responsibily for all rests with Chancellor (advantage: efficiency, accountability).
9. Chancellor able to delegate all functions to Vice-Chancellor in case of absence, incapacity, impeachment (advantage: effciency, accountability).
10. Chancellor to occupy no other position in any public or quasi-public organiation, current-RA, SC, Guild, Political Parties, Media ownership and control- or future -Judiciary, Radio Station, etc) except on a possible Citizenship Commission (to confirm citizenship sponsorship applications from NGOs - see CARE Citizenship Act Proposal).
[b:312koslq]
Note on the LRA:[/b:312koslq]
1. To be chosen by a majority of RA members after the elections but not necessarily from the Party with most seats, so as to create a responsible majority government (advantage: efficiency; accountability; checks and balances);
2. Once elected, the LRA gives a public legislative agenda speech, outlining new government's legislative program (advantage: leadership, openess, accountability);
3. LRA to resign if budget is not adopted, or on any other matter declared as vote of confidence by the LRA (efficiency, accountabilty);
4. LRA limited to two mandates, consecutive or not (advantage: limitation of powers; renewal, innovation);
5. LRA to occupy no other position in any public or quasi-public organiation, current-RA, SC, Guild, Political Parties, Media ownership and control- or future -Judiciary, Radio Station, etc) except on a possible Citizenship Commission (to confirm citizenship sponsorship applications from NGOs - see CARE Citizenship Act Proposal).
The role of the LRA is somewhat modeled on the role of German Chancellor, in that it ensures a majority government whilst allowing parties to arrive at a common legislative agenda; note that the party with most seats is not necessarily assured to form the government or appoint the LRA (for example: in the elected LRA, SP and CARE could set up a coalition government and appoint an LRA from either party) (advantage: efficiency, leadership, accountabilty).
It also draws upon the constitution of the old Roman Republic, where two Consuls shared power, but streamlines the role of each of the two to avoid overlaps and power struggles (Chancellor would focus on executive-organisational matters, LRA on legislative - party political matters).
The relationship between Chancellor and LRA would be similar to that between French President and Prime Minister, where the French President Chairs the Council of Ministers which includes the Prime Minister, but the Prime Minister is responsible for the Legislative Agenda in the Assemblee Nationale. Critically, and different from the French model, the LRA is independent from the President, who does not appoint or dismiss the LRA, and cannot dismiss the RA and call for anticipated RA elections. This gives each of the two an independent legitimacy, power base, and function, while requiring the two to work together.
[b:312koslq]Note on the veto: [/b:312koslq] only the SC can veto legislation. This streamlines the legilsative process (advantage: accountability, efficiency), insulates it from the Executive (advantage: separation of powers, accountability, transparency, efficiency) and reinforces the role of the SC as guardian of the CDS "vision" (advantage: efficiency, legitimacy, accountability, checks and balances)
[b:312koslq]Note on non-cumulation of powers: [/b:312koslq]public and quasi-public organisations would be limited and clearly stipulated in a Limitation of Mandates and Non-Cumulation of Powers Act. Any elected public official could be a member of any truly private organisation which does not play any role in the process of governance of the community as a whole, is not under the supervision of the RA, and does not receive funds from the RA or the Chancellor. This allows all elected officials to pursue their private interests within the CDS and any other kind of activity outsisde the CDS, whilst avoiding ant conflict of interests within the CDS.
[b:312koslq]For those who ask: why?[/b:312koslq] It's new, different, creative, innovative, legitimate, open accountable, efficient, cooperative yet capable of providing leadership, includes checks and balances as well as responsible majority goverrments. In short, it focuses on the advantages of various systems and attempts to eliminate most of their disadvantages.
Michel
[quote="michelmanen":te9sxxgf]
CARE's position is to create a hybrid Chancellor's position - between US President and UK Prime Minister, eliminating the weaknesses in each, as follows;
1. Direct election of the Chancellor by all CDS citizens at the same time with the RA elections (advantage: democratic legitimacy)
2. Candidates to declare at the same time as RA candidates, and run for no other office (advantage: transparency; no conflict of interests);
3. Chancellor to appoint Vice-Chancellor, PIO and Auditor General, subject to confirmation by the RA, immediately upon taking office (advantage: efficiency; checks and balances).
4. Chancellor to Chair the RA, have the right to introduce legislation; but have no vote except in cases of ties -as the US Vice-President in the Senate. (advantage: direct contact with the RA - leadership, focus, direction (unlike US president who is isolated from Congress) ; but no dominance (like in UK parliament); efficiency and dynamism (no ties).
5. Chancellor to Deliver mid-Term Public Report on the State of the Community (advantage: openness, accountability);
6. Limit of two mandates, consecutive or not (advantage: limitation of powers; renewal, innovation).
7. Chancellor to be CDS spokesperson with respect to all outside communities (advantage: focus, leadership);
8. Chancellor to delegate to Vice-Chancellor duty of enforcing all laws and regulations in CDS; to PIO all duties for organising events and creating publicity for CDS; and to Auditor-General all duties of reporting on the state of finances in CDS. Ultimate responsibily for all rests with Chancellor (advantage: efficiency, accountability).
9. Chancellor able to delegate all functions to Vice-Chancellor in case of absence, incapacity, impeachment (advantage: effciency, accountability).
10. Chancellor to occupy no other position in any public or quasi-public organiation, current-RA, SC, Guild, Political Parties, Media ownership and control- or future -Judiciary, Radio Station, etc) except on a possible Citizenship Commission (to confirm citizenship sponsorship applications from NGOs - see CARE Citizenship Act Proposal).
Michel[/quote:te9sxxgf]
1. I think there is a definite need to debate this point. I think that it may be a very good idea to have direct elections of the chancellor. It will empower those that don't quite fit into a party.
2. Probably a good idea.
3. PIO should most likely be appointed by the RA, and approved by the chancellor, 2/3 override of a veto might not be a bad idea either. VP I can see the need, and I am not sure what the Auditor General job would be.
4. I don't like this idea. The chancellor needs to be more independent from the RA. Without the Guild to be a 3rd check and balance, the chancellor needs to have the power of a veto. Since anyone can introduce a bill to the RA, that can still be done under the current system.
5. Great idea!
6. I am still torn on term limits. Something that should be debated.
7. Isn't that what the PIO job is?
8. Shouldn't the chancellor decide how to run the office best? It is a great idea, but it may not be a good way to do it for all the future chancellors.
9. For good, or until a new chancellor is elected? If the chancellor needs to be replaced, shouldn't the VP be a temporary replacement until a new election is held? The VP could then run, but they should be elected as soon as possible. This will prevent an unelected leader leading.
10. I agree with you on the RA and the SC. I never really understood why that wasn't a rule for all the seats. Well, I do. It was put in place when we were small and it just wasn't feasible to have different people for all positions. I think we may want to look into this rule and maybe update it. But for NGOs, political parties, and the rest of the things listed, no. If I am understanding you right, under your rules, if elected you can't be part of anything else in CDS or other parts of SL? That is a little too extreme to me. The government controls the government, not the entire lives of the people.
Michel --
Your proposal seems unnecessarily complicated. I also don't favor a hybrid office -- I think we should go one way or the other. In this matter, given our size and tradition, I think I favor the UK Prime Minister Model (which might surprise folks who remember my profoundly American position on Judicial Independence).\
That is --
1. Abolish the Chancellorship;
2. Transfer current Chancellorship powers to the elected LRA;
3. Continue on as we were -- before the Chancellorship was created -- but with the benefit of having defined the executive function of the office.
Benefits: 1. simplicity; 2. consistency with the whole of CDS tradition; 3. no need to require Chancellor reports to the RA -- with the LRA filling that role, there is no need to create elaborate reporting procedures.
However, if we have to follow the American model, I agree with your points 1 & 2. I don't like point 3 -- as providing both for too much executive power and as providing for an unnecessarily complicated process (as anyone familiar with appointment and approval of offices in the U.S. will know). 4. If the Chancellor is to be a pure and insulated executive -- he or she should not chair the RA (the RA must remain independent); chairmanship is approriate only if the Chancellor comes from the RA on the UK model; 5. A good idea -- but an unnecessary formality; 6. See my previous post on the stupidity of term limits; 7. again gives too much power to the executive at the expense of the RA; 8. this delegation seems strange -- either create the offices with portfolios from the start, or allow the executive, however constituted, to create its own subordinates and subordinate portfolios; 9. again, delegation is the wrong word -- also, I don't know that I would trust a vice-chancellor appointed by an impeached chancellor to take over -- executive governments should rise and fall as a piece; 10. this is just plain silly.
Beathan