A few words on the Chancellor's veto

[Jon Seattle]

Way back when, in consultation with other members of the CSDF and the DPU, I was the person who added the Chancellor's veto to the executive bill that made it into the constitution. I see that some people are not clear on the purpose of what we did in that case, so I had better explain.

The Chancellor of the CDS is not a President in the US sense. The role was designed so that there was someone who would be effective in running the executive functions of government. At the time the RA was trying to be the legislature and also running the day-to-day operations of the CDS. My feeling, and that of many people, was that the RA was not very effective as an executive (it was far to slow and clumsy) and that these functions were getting in the way of the RA to work on policy.

The CDS has a process where people vote in the election for parties and then the parties' representatives hammer out our laws and policy. We do this because the legitimate power in the CDS does not come from above, but flows the people who turn in their ballots on election day.

The reason the Chancellor is elected by the RA and not the general public is that the Chancellor's job is to implement the laws and policy set by the representatives. A decent respect for the rights of the electorate would entail not using the office of Chancellor to set policy different from that of the RA, to impose the that Chancellor's personal opinion of the day on the elected representatives. If a Chancellor starts controlling the law making process that would mean taking away your and my right to vote and have our choices heard.

So the veto is very intentionally [u:14ye5lfq]not[/u:14ye5lfq] designed to allow a Chancellor to control the RA or to threaten to. Why is it there? Its there only as a kind of emergency break. The RA, by the way, also has the right to remove a Chancellor. These mutual mechanisms are there to be used if there is a clear case of abuse of power. In particular a Chancellor or an RA that puts her / his / its own interests ahead of respecting our laws and constitution.

We ought never to elect a Chancellor who thinks it okay to impose minority politics on the legislature via the veto. Out of respect for the electorate, the veto should be kept in reserve for only the most serious situations. This would apply just as much to a CSDF Chancellor candidate in a majority DPU assembly as to a DPU candidate in the current mixed CSDF / Simple / Care assembly. Its the principle that matters.

[Beathan]

Jon --

I agree with your analysis. However, I think that the Chancellor veto should be more freely exercised than you describe.

The SC veto exists to prevent the RA from passing laws that, in their operation or policy, infringe on or violate the Constitution. Because the SC veto already tests the Constitutionality of a statute, the Chancellor veto is not necessary to do so.

However, the Chancellor has the practical duty of the day-to-day implementation of the laws. Therefore, I think that it is appropriate for the Chancellor to veto a law just because it would be unduly difficult to implement or because its implementation would cause problems (possibly unforeseen problems) which the RA has not addressed.

Just as the majority will might favor an unconstitutional policy -- proviking a SC veto -- the majority will might favor an impractical policy. In such case, a Chancellor veto, even if opposed to the majority will expressed through the RA, would be appropriate.

While I have favored direct election of the Chancellor, rather than continuing down the appointment path, I am willing to reconsider this position. However, I think that there are benefits in having a Chancellor not so beholden to the RA that the RA gets a free pass on impractical or unduly burdensome legislation that happens to pass constitutional scrutiny. However, even if I were persuaded to continue to think of the executive as the servant of the RA -- implementing the policies enacted by the RA without daring to develop and implement its own policies -- I think I would favor the UK model more than our current one. Let the LRA become Prime Minister or somesuch.

Beathan

[Jon Seattle]

[quote="Beathan":e83sau21]However, the Chancellor has the practical duty of the day-to-day implementation of the laws. Therefore, I think that it is appropriate for the Chancellor to veto a law just because it would be unduly difficult to implement or because its implementation would cause problems (possibly unforeseen problems) which the RA has not addressed. [/quote:e83sau21]
I agree with this and would be willing to add it to my list of situations where it is legitimate to use a veto. I read Claude and DNate as arguing for a far greater power over the RA:

[quote="Claude Desmoulins":e83sau21]I would disagree with Jon when he says the veto is just about when the RA overreaches The veto was written very broadly, and the Chancellor is allowed to veto a bill for any reason at all.[/quote:e83sau21][quote="Dnate Mars":e83sau21]In this section, there is nothing that is said that the veto is only to be used in case of the RA overstepping its powers. In fact, it says nothing but the fact that the Chancellor has this power.[/quote:e83sau21]
Beathan, I think you and I agree that using the veto to impose minority rule would not be legitimate. However, I would like to hear the same from DNate. I would certainly take his word if he offered his assurance.

[Beathan]

Brian --

I think that, technically, Dnate and Claude are right. The Chancellor veto, unlike the SC veto, is not restricted in any way. Therefore, it is true that, in terms of Constitutional power, the Chancellor can exercise his veto for any reason.

However, as a practical matter, the veto is restricted -- and is restricted to whatever a supermajority of the RA restricts it. The Chancellor vetos legislation at his peril. Not only can the RA override a veto -- and should override a veto that is imposed for no reason, or for an improper reason -- the RA can, and should, remove a Chancellor who is imposing improper vetos.

So, what is an improper veto? Again, as a practical matter, an improper veto is whatever a supermajority of the RA says it is. I have already stated what I would consider a proper veto. If the CSDF finds a single additional RA member -- from either CARE or the SP -- willing to impose somesuch limitation, we would have a clear policy, supported by a supermajority, to guide the Chancellor during the current session. I think that a wise Chancellor would pay attention to such clearly stated policies from the RA.

Beathan