Voting Security Amendment

[Jon Seattle]

* It probably goes without saying, but the SC should not appoint as an electoral deputy any person whose name appears on the ballot

Lets add:

8. No person should be appointed as electoral deputy whose name appears on the ballot

* I do think, especially given our small numbers, that any individual vote data which is released should be randomized, and not just day by day, because it is just too easy to identify individual voters.

In most circumstances fully random order is fine. (In fact I used a fully randomized, anonmous data set for my analysis.) In some cases, however, it may be necessary to confirm a pattern of voting. We could require releasing randomized data, and ask the SC to release a shorter interval (perhaps without identifying the specific interval) if questions arise.

Beathan, what do you think?

[Beathan]

I'll also comment that I see no need to run these changes as constitutional amendments. If the constitution already gives the SC the authority to administer elections, the SC administers according to rules (laws) passed by the RA. Putting procedural stuff like this into the constitution is just not necessary.

Cindy -- you would be right in terms of RL laws concerning administrative states, but this position is not correct given the Constitutional history of the CDS. First, the SC has resisted (on separation of powers grounds, I think) attempts by other branches to dictate its administrative procedures to it. To change the way the SC works, that change must either come from the SC (and is temporary -- lasting only so long as the SC chooses) or that change must come from the Constitution. Frankly, this system works, to a large extent, the way the US Federal State should work and did work before the extra-constitutional but practically necessary creation of the modern administrative state, starting in the late nineteenth century but coming to full fruition under FDR.

I do think, especially given our small numbers, that any individual vote data which is released should be randomized, and not just day by day, because it is just too easy to identify individual voters.

Justice --

This is a fair talking point. I need to know how randomized the result will be. This requires that I know, on average, how many people vote each day. I think it is important to have the data over time so that ebbs and flows can be analyzed and so that we can determine the effect of external, known events had on the voting. However, it is equally true that this information should only be available after the election (so it will not itself be an external event that affected the voting) and only in a manner that protects voter anonymity. If the number of daily voters is too small to protect anonymity, I would be willing to entertain a different grouping -- randomizing votes over a two or three day period; or randomizing votes in clusters of 10 to 20 (with information about the period of time in which those votes were made).

Beathan

[Bromo Ivory]

I would feel most comfortable with data randomized and not time stamped at all. A cornerstone of a democratic process is the secrecy of a secret ballot and the less information one can tell from a ballot about who cast it, the better. I think from the data already given, people can draw conclusions, as well as conduct indy exit polls.

[Justice Soothsayer]

I need to know how randomized the result will be. This requires that I know, on average, how many people vote each day.

Good question. My suspicion is that there will be a large number voting when the polls open, and another large group near the end of the election period, but that is mere uninformed speculation. I also suspect we'll get more voters at the polls on weekend days, but again, that is uninformed speculation. I for one would like to see day-by-day totals of the number of voters (not how they voted, just how many voted). It might also be interesing to see what times people vote.

[Jon Seattle]

Below is a revised version of the bill, reflecting both Beathan's suggestion of splitting it into a separate amendment and statute, and also addressing NuCARE's concern about SC members having access to voting data.

Voting Security Amendment

In order to clarify the operations and rules for operating software used to hold RA elections, the following will be added to article 2 of the constitution:

The Scientific Council shall deputize one or more persons to provide software, hosting services, and operations support for the election of the RA. The Scientific Council will also appoint two or more non-citizens to serve as election monitors.

The RA shall have the power to pass voting rules and procedures by statute as long as these provide for a process that is consistent with the constitution and insures a means for monitoring voting system accuracy and availability at all times during an election.

Voting Security Bill

As provided in the Voting Amendment, the Scientific Council may deputize one or more citizens, and at least two election monitors for the election of the RA.

A. Deputies

Election deputies will:

1. Not release data, either detailed votes or aggregate figures, nor to comment on election results to any person other than election monitors until the polls close. After the polls close and until the results are certified they may report only to election monitors and the SC.

2. Provide unidentified detailed votes as well as aggregate figures on a daily basis to election monitors so they may monitor the availability and accuracy of the voting software.

3. Insure that software used in the election implements the rules for eligibility, voting, and counting votes as described in the constitution.

4. Maintain server and application security, providing privileged access only to the election monitors and other deputies on an as-needed basis.

5. Build into software, where possible, the ability for citizens to check that their votes are correctly registered, and maintain a complete time-stamped record of every transaction that results in a vote being cast.

6. Provide copies of all software source code to the SC and election monitors for review, and on request, provide detailed explanations on the operation of that software.

7. On request by the election monitors, provide unencumbered root user access to servers, including software, database, and log files.

B. Election Monitors

Election monitors will:

1. Check votes against aggregate results providing by the voting system on a daily basis to insure the availability and accuracy of the voting software.

2. May interview any citizen to gather information on potential software problems, voter intimidation, or demands for information about a voter's votes before or after the citizen casts their vote.

3. May examine election servers, software, database, and log files to insure that no changes that resulted in altered voting data or software inconsistent with voting rules occurred during the election.

4. Will immediately report any problem that may have changed votes, infraction, or suspicious activity to the SC. Election monitors may decide to release any election data to the SC in whole or in part that may be relevant to their report.

5. Will not release any data or comment on the election to anyone other than the SC until votes are certified.

C. Release of Votes

After the voting, but before certification, the voting data, including individual votes with the voter identification information redacted, shall be publicly available to all citizens and shall be posted, as a historical document, on the CDS Wiki. This information should be in a form that can be used by citizens and factions to analyze the history of voting over time and in detail such that citizens and factions can discover (1) voting trends during an election (2) the "natural coalitions" of parties that share support among voters, (3) whether factions primarily enjoy support as a primary party or as a support or secondary party, and (4) whether there were voting improprieties or confusion that should be considered by the SC prior to certification of the result.