Expediting the development of our legal system

[Ashcroft Burnham]

[quote="Gwyneth Llewelyn":2rczo5d1]Just a brief comment on "wiretapping" communications in Second Life, or any other medium.[/quote:2rczo5d1]

It may be noted that the ToS change was aimed at people who were participants or observers of converations, and enabling them to use thier own records of those conversations. I am not aware that it is possibly truly to "intercept" any communications in SecondLife without hacking the software.

[quote:2rczo5d1]The rationality of if wiretapping is, or not, the rational way of creating a better world is irrelevant based on the premises that the Neufreistadt Constitution is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which clearly states on its Article 12, "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his [b:2rczo5d1]privacy[/b:2rczo5d1], family, home or [b:2rczo5d1]correspondence[/b:2rczo5d1]" (emphasis mine).[/quote:2rczo5d1]

I have explained above why the wide concept of privacy that is necessary to support any assertion that courts using as evidence logs of a person's conversation is an unwarrented infringement thereon is not a valid such concept.

[quote:2rczo5d1]Worse than that, in some countries, doing continuous wiretapping of electronic communications (as opposed to selective wiretapping, or wiretapping as ordered by a court), can be considered in a criminal offense. In Portugal, for instance, if I did that, I could get 5-10 years of jail. Definitely not a prospect that I look forward to [/quote:2rczo5d1]

Again, I am not aware that it is technically feasible in SecondLife to [i:2rczo5d1]intercept[/i:2rczo5d1] communications, as opposed to merely being a participant or observer thereof.

[quote:2rczo5d1]The issue here is [i:2rczo5d1]arbitrary interference[/i:2rczo5d1]. It's obvious that if someone is a suspect in any sort of crime (harassment, defamation, cheating...), and a NFS Court would demand more proof, wiretapping communications could be authorised — after due following of the procedures. Without those procedures in place, all capture of communication by others, without their explicit consent, is a violation of their privacy.

Even if one could argue that "rationally" and "logically" a better world is one where we have the ability to spy upon others at will, making thus everybody more aware that anything they say in private can be used against them (and naturally, such a 1984-ish logic is well beyond my abilities to understand), there is still the jurisdiction of Second Life to consider, which, like any sensible jurisdiction, defaults to Californian law, which also protects the privacy of electronic communications. Thus we have no foundation to establish an exception on the right to privacy that is valid only in Neufreistadt. Doing so would be at the very least a LL ToS violation, and considered a crime in many countries.[/quote:2rczo5d1]

What I was suggesting cannot possibly be either a crime or a violation of the Linden Labs Terms of Service, since all that I was suggesting is making participation in Neufreistadt conditional on consent to records of conversations being used in evidence in court. Making such consent so conditional is not itself a form of interception of communications. Furthermore, I have already explained above why such a term cannot possibly be a violation of the Linden Labs Terms of Service.

[quote:2rczo5d1]Ashcroft, you can argue rationally and logically until your fingers drop from typing, but I'm sorry — the current SC will never accept a bill or a constitutional amendment that limits a citizen's right to privacy [i:2rczo5d1]in any way[/i:2rczo5d1].[/quote:2rczo5d1]

As I stated above, the question is not whether to limit citizens' right to privacy, but exactly what the right to privacy is a right to at all.

[quote:2rczo5d1]Still, let's not get too distracted about a single issue. Like a good lawyer, dismissing a clause in a contract does not mean automatically that the whole contract is now void; there are still very good points worth discussing and implementing from your proposal.[/quote:2rczo5d1]

Yes, indeed. Of course, it is possible to have a thorough discussion of something without at the same time being [i:2rczo5d1]distracted[/i:2rczo5d1] by it

[Aliasi Stonebender]

[quote="Ashcroft Burnham":odlhi7bn][quote="Gwyneth Llewelyn":odlhi7bn]Just a brief comment on "wiretapping" communications in Second Life, or any other medium.[/quote:odlhi7bn]

It may be noted that the ToS change was aimed at people who were participants or observers of converations, and enabling them to use thier own records of those conversations. I am not aware that it is possibly truly to "intercept" any communications in SecondLife without hacking the software.
[/quote:odlhi7bn]

I *could* have a script follow you, listening quietly on channel zero (the main chat channel). IMs cannot be intercepted by non-Lindens, but chat is easily captured. However, use of such a device without permission is considered a violation of SL ToS.

[Ashcroft Burnham]

[quote="Aliasi Stonebender":30yblu4n]I *could* have a script follow you, listening quietly on channel zero (the main chat channel). IMs cannot be intercepted by non-Lindens, but chat is easily captured. However, use of such a device without permission is considered a violation of SL ToS.[/quote:30yblu4n]

Well, I don't know the technicalities of it, but the whole point of the amendment was to require permission

[Ashcroft Burnham]

[quote="Gwyneth Llewelyn":3uui4ghj]On another point, and just to let matters settle while we delve further on this very strong and complex proposal, I have a few questions for clarification:[/quote:3uui4ghj]

Thank you very much for your suggestions - I had missed them yesterday, as you were posting these at the same time as I was replying to your previous post.

[quote:3uui4ghj][b:3uui4ghj]Proposed Article VIII, section 9:[/b:3uui4ghj]
[quote:3uui4ghj]All trials and other hearings in any Court of Common Jurisdiction shall be held in public, and, subject to section 8(e) above, any person (whether or not a citizen of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators) shall be entitled to observe the entirety of such proceedings, a full transcript of which shall be made available to the public at large in perpetuity and without charge.[/quote:3uui4ghj]

One issue we have found during the longest (and most painful) hearing ever in our history was dealing with the way on how witnesses should present their views, without knowing what other witnesses might have said.

In some cases it is customary that the witnesses are not in plain view of each other when bearing witness. This means that, for a certain period of time, people might have both "private" and fully public parts, as the judges in session listen to a witness' testimonial.

Do you think that the right to selectively call in witnesses but disallow temporary others to listen to what they're saying is in conflict with your proposed section 9?

If yes, there should be a provision for selective hearing of witnesses in some cases.

If no, there probably should be a one-liner explaining why not.[/quote:3uui4ghj]

This is a familliar issue from real world legal proceedings: the answer is not to have any part of any trial that is not, generally, [i:3uui4ghj]public[/i:3uui4ghj], but temporarily to require that witnesses who have not yet given evidence do not observe any part of the proceedings in which they are due to give evidence until they have finished doing so. After they have finished giving evidence, of course, they should be allowed to see the transcript of the whole trial.

You make a good point, however, that, for the sake of clarity, there should be an express derogation from the provision requiring trials to be held in public to allow for this, and I will add that to my next draft.

[quote:3uui4ghj][b:3uui4ghj]2. (b) Article III, Section 7 (Scientific Council - Alternative Dispute Resolution), the whole section;[/b:3uui4ghj]

Justice Soothsayer has made a point elsewhere about the importance of Alternative Dispute Resolution as a quick and efficient means to have two conflicting parts to agree to compromise on something without the need of going through a full judicial process.

Why do you think it's important to remove this right from the citizens? I might have missed your argumentation against it. Almost all legal systems I know usually have this option somewhere. In many petty cases, all that is needed is a moderator to calm down both conflicting parties and find some common ground, without requiring due process...[/quote:3uui4ghj]

I explain my arguments in favour of removing this section in response to Justice Soothsayer's original query on this point [url=http://forums.neufreistadt.info/viewtop ... 7:3uui4ghj]here[/url:3uui4ghj].

In (very brief) summary, the point is that it is best to see what demand that there is for ADR, and let it grow organically, rather than have an inflexible requirement for it in the constitution. But if you are going to respond to this point, you should read the full argument linked above first.

[quote:3uui4ghj][b:3uui4ghj]Impeachment proceedings[/b:3uui4ghj]

Apparently you've placed all duties of impeachment proceedings into the Scientific Council. In the past, a question was raised, which has only (partially) answered so far: what happens when the Scientifc Council, abusing its powers, prevent the other branches from working, by establishing itself as a "police state" through an abuse of their vetoing powers, employed collectively (ie. with all Chairs of the SC in full agreement and working together)? The SC would thus be impossible to remove; even selective impeachment of them would never come to bear fruit, since all the remaining judges would naturally vote down any attempts of impeachment.

The provision left open on the current Constitution, despite all flaws it might have, is the ability of the RA to impeach the whole SC in a single act. The complex "dance of chairs" established on the Constitution would thus allow the whole block of SC members to sit in trial, presided by the Guildmeister (or someone appointed by the Guildmeister). That way, the SC could not ever "seize power".

A similar provision seems not to exist on your proposed text: members of the SC will be tried and judged by their own peers, and one has to assume that they are [i:3uui4ghj]not[/i:3uui4ghj] working together as a block to "seize power".

Removing the power of impeachment by the other two branches is effectively depositing even more power on the Scientific Council — one thing that most citizens were very much against on the previous term, and I tend to agree.[/quote:3uui4ghj]

A Scientific Council lead coup was not a possibility that I had considered when drafting the [b:3uui4ghj]Judiciary Bill[/b:3uui4ghj]. However, the current arrangements are flawed in that they effecively require somebody with no judicial experience or traning (the Guildmeister, for example) to sit as a judge. One of the essential purposes of my bill was to provide for a professional judiciary.

That leaves two possible options: (1) to add a constitutional provision giving anybody seeking impeachment of a member of the Scientific Council the power to require that the hearing is presided over by one or more Judges of Common Jurisdiction (although, following the procedures of the Court of Scientific Council, and exercising only the powers exercisable by the Court of Scientific Council), or (2), which is similar to the way that it (in theory: the power has only ever been used once, hundreds of years ago) works in England, which is to permit a vote of the Representative Assembly (perhaps requiring an enhanced majority and then ratification by referrendum) remove members of the Scientific Council.

Of course, in either the original system, or either of my proposed variants, the problem becomes: if [i:3uui4ghj]all[/i:3uui4ghj] of the Scientific Council are removed from office, who appoints the new members of the Scientific Council?

[quote:3uui4ghj]On Article VI - Citizenship, I have a question on the wording (and it's just the wording) on section 2: [i:3uui4ghj]no citizen shall be deprived of citizenship in the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, nor shall any person, whether a citizen or not, be banished from any public land in the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, without trial in accordance with law, or consent not to be so tried.[/i:3uui4ghj]

What happens when someone does not consent to be tried according to the law? Would that mean that someone could not be legally banned? Remember that this will be the most common case wth griefers...

Alternative: trials [i:3uui4ghj]in absentia[/i:3uui4ghj].[/quote:3uui4ghj]

Ahh, I think that you misread what the section says It requires a trial unless the person formally consents [i:3uui4ghj]not[/i:3uui4ghj] to be tried (i.e., by admitting formally everything that he or she is accused of, or just not replying within the time limit for submitting a reply, whereby he or she would be deemed so to have admitted). No consent is required for a trial, and, although the person has a [i:3uui4ghj]right[/i:3uui4ghj] to be present at the trial, there is nothing anywhere saying that a trial cannot proceed if that person does not exercise that right. Of course, trial in a person's absence would only, in practice, happen when a person submitted a notice of response, but then failed to turn up for the trial. That would be unusual, because I imagine that most people who could be bothered to submit a notice in response would also want to turn up to their trial.

[quote:3uui4ghj][b:3uui4ghj]13. All citizens of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators shall consent to the variation in the Terms of Service provided for in Section 12 above on or before the 1st of September 2006.[/b:3uui4ghj]

How will they show their consent? And what exactly do you propose to do about people not giving their explicit consent to the new ToS? [/quote:3uui4ghj]

The point is that the [i:3uui4ghj]existing[/i:3uui4ghj] terms of service require that everybody obey all of our laws. It therefore effectively gives the lawmaking institutions a power to vary those terms by passing a law that people shall accept the new terms.

[quote:3uui4ghj]In any case, I feel that this bill is much more "edible" than a 20-page long document with full details on each step of the procedures, and worth some tiny revisions to have it approved...[/quote:3uui4ghj]

And for those for whom even this bill is inedible, I am about to write an executive summary of the whole proposal.

[Ashcroft Burnham]

[b:2mogrq11][u:2mogrq11]New Judiciary Bill[/b:2mogrq11][/u:2mogrq11]

Since the [b:2mogrq11]Judiciary Bill[/b:2mogrq11] that I proposed above was not debated, through lack of time, at the last meeting of the Representative Assembly, I will be proposing the Bill again at the next meeting, which will be next week.

Since then, however, I have revised the Bill in a number of ways, the summary of which is as follows:

[b:2mogrq11]Chatlogs[/b:2mogrq11]

As it seemed inevitable, despite the lack of good reasoning in support of the opposition, that the chatlogs provision would not be passed, I have removed that from the ToS amendment, but have retained the part requiring consent to be given for records of judicial proceedings themselves to be made public, since it cannot sanely be said that the publication of records of public proceedings could infringe anybody's privacy, and because it is necessary, in the interests of judicial fairness and openness (some trendily would call it "transparency"), for all records of judicial proceedings to be made public.

[b:2mogrq11]Further ToS clarifications[/b:2mogrq11]

It occurred to me that it needed to be clear in the Terms of Service that what people are agreeing to be bound to when they agree to be bound by our laws, is our laws as they change and develop from time to time, not our laws fixed for ever as they were on the date that the agreement was entered into, so I have made a new ToS modification to reflect this.

[b:2mogrq11]The Chancellory[/b:2mogrq11]

Following the recent constitutional reform, establishing the post of a Chancellor, I have updated the Bill to take account of that.

[b:2mogrq11]Witness exclusion[/b:2mogrq11]

Following Gwynneth's suggestion above, I have added an express provision to the constitution permitting witnesses who are to be called to give evidence in judicial proceedings to be excluded from those proceedings until they have finished giving their evidence, as in real world courts, to preserve the independence and integrity of their testimony.

[b:2mogrq11]Impeachment of the Scientific Council[/b:2mogrq11]

Following Gwynneth's suggestion, I have added a section permitting one or more Judges of Common Jurisdiction to sit as Judges of the Court of Scientific Council when members of the Scientific Council are being impeached, to prevent abuse of power by the Scientific Council.

There are also, as always, one or two minor wording enhancements. I present the new version of the Bill below.

******

[b:2mogrq11]The Judiciary Bill
[i:2mogrq11]New version[/i:2mogrq11][/b:2mogrq11]

[i:2mogrq11]A Bill to make provision for a professional judiciary, judicial procedure, to reform citizenship rights and duties with respect thereto, to make provisions for marshals of the peace, and to make repeals and consequential amendments to the Constitution and certain Acts of the Representative Assembly, as well as to make provisions for bringing official documents in line with the recent change of name to "The Confederation of Democratic Simulators"[/i:2mogrq11].

[b:2mogrq11]Chapter I - the Judiciary Commission and the Common Jurisdiction[/b:2mogrq11]

1. The following section shall be inserted at the end of the Constitution, but before the table of amendments: –

***

[b:2mogrq11]Article VII - The Judiciary[/b:2mogrq11]

1. There shall be a Judiciary Commission, the chair of which shall be appointed by simple majority vote in the Scientific Council as soon as is practicable after a vacancy arises, and who shall hold office until resignation or successful impeachment, whichever is sooner.

2. The chair of the Judiciary Commission shall have the power: –

(a) to appoint a Chief Judge of Common Jurisdiction, who shall hold office until resignation or successful impeachment, whichever is sooner;

(b) to determine the total number of Judges of Common Jurisdiction who shall hold office at any given time, who shall each hold office until resignation or successful impeachment, whichever is sooner;

(c) subject to any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly, and the exercise of any authority delegated thereby, and subject to any contrary proclamation of the Chancellor, to commission and, once commissioned, maintain and administer as many court-houses as the chair shall deem appropriate, for the purposes of holding trials and other judicial hearings, and any other purposes as the chair shall deem appropriate, provided always that neither the Representative Assembly or the Chancellor individually or between shall prohibit the commissioning, construction, maintenance and continued existence and use of at least one court-house;

(d) to expend any monies held by the Judiciary Commission for any purposes connected with the discharge of any of the functions of the Judiciary Commission;

(e) subject to Section 5 below, to employ, for valuable remuneration or otherwise, such deputies and officers, and to delegate to them such functions, as the chair shall deem appropriate;

(f) to provide, or arrange to have provided, advice to citizens who may submit bills to the Representative Assembly, or any official, or delegate of that official, charged with drafting or approving regulations under powers delegated to her or him by the Constitution or any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly, concerning the drafting of such legislation or regulations, provided always that the Judiciary Commission shall not provide advice as to the desirability of any policy objective of such legislation or regulations;

(g) to publicise, both within the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, and elsewhere, the judicial system of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, or publicise the Confederation of Democratic Simulators (or any geographic subset thereof) by publicising its judicial system;

(h) to provide, and oversee the provision by others of, education concerning the law and legal system of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, and to issue, or regulate the issue of, qualifications in respect thereof;

(i) to provide advice to other governments and similar institutions in SecondLife and other such virtual worlds concerning the establishment and development of judicial systems therein;

(j) to maintain and publicise a record of all judicial proceedings, precedents and other public official judicial documents, not being documents relating to judicial proceedings in the Scientific Council; and

(k) to bring impeachment proceedings against any Judge of Common Jurisdiction, on the grounds only of either or both of (i) gross dereliction of duty, whether culpable or not, but, if not culpable, sustained for at least 28 days; or (ii) bias, corruption or insanity.

3. Even when not sitting as a Judge of Common Jurisdiction in an individual case or cases, the Chief Judge of Common Jurisdiction shall have the power: –

(a) to determine who other than her or himself shall be appointed to be a Judge of Common Jurisdiction;

(b) to determine which Judges of Common Jurisdiction shall hear which cases, or parts thereof;

(c) to issue general directions concerning procedure in Courts of Common Jurisdiction;

(d) to determine which Courts of Common Jurisdiction shall be superior, and which inferior; and

(e) to bring impeachment proceedings against the Chair of the Judiciary Commission or any other Judge of Common Jurisdiction, on the grounds only of either or both of (i) gross dereliction of duty, whether culpable or not, but, if not culpable, sustained for at least 28 days; or (ii) bias, corruption or insanity, or additionally, in the case of the Chair of the Judiciary Commission, either or both of (i) gross incompetence; or (ii) gross fiscal imprudence.

4. Nothing in this Constitution shall prevent a single person holding office both as the Chair of the Judiciary Commission and the Chief Judge of Common Jurisdiction simultaneously or in succession, but, if a single person simultaneously holds office as any Judge of Common Jurisdiction and the Chair of the Judiciary Commission, any impeachment of that person that succeeds only on grounds applicable only to the Chair of the Judiciary Commission shall not have effect in removing that person from the office of Judge of Common Jurisdiction, whether Chief Judge or otherwise, or disqualifying that person from holding office as any Judge of Common Jurisdiction.

5. Only Judges of Common Jurisdiction shall preside over proceedings in any trial or other hearing, or deliver any judgment as to the law in any Court of Common Jurisdiction, or otherwise exercise any of the powers of any Court of Common Jurisdiction, save for those powers exercisable by juries, and any power, not exercised during the course of a trial or other hearing, deemed by any Judge of Common Jurisdiction to be administrative in nature, providing always that any party to such proceedings may appeal to a Judge of Common Jurisdiction from any such administrative decision.

6. Only Judges of Common Jurisdiction or juries empanelled in accordance with law shall deliver any judgment or verdict as to any question of fact in any trial or hearing in any Court of Common Jurisdiction.

7. A person who is a party to any case shall not preside over that case as judge or juror, or over any part thereof.

8. Subject to any powers of the Scientific Council when sitting as a court expressly stated in the text of this Constitution, Courts of Common Jurisdiction, and only Courts of Common Jurisdiction, shall have the power when giving judgment on a disputed matter between two or more parties (who must be residents of SecondLife or bodies corporate, including states, recognised as such by the law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, but who need not be citizens of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators): –

(a) to make binding determinations of the rights, duties, powers, privileges, immunities, liabilities and disabilities of any or all such parties according to the law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators;

(b) to make binding determinations of any facts in dispute between any or all such parties, provided that making such determinations are necessary in order to make such a determination as mentioned in paragraph (a) above, or (c) below;

(c) subject to either (i) a party formally accepting, or (ii) a court finding as a fact at a trial held in accordance with law that a party's conduct is culpable, to impose upon that party in respect of that conduct any penalty, including, but not limited to, banishment from any or all territory of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, either permanently or for such shorter period as shall be specified by the court, and forfeiture of any SecondLife asset (including debts and other such duties owed thereto), either immediately or suspended on such conditions as the court may prescribe;

(d) to make any non-penal orders such as to give effect to the rights, duties, powers, privileges, immunities, liabilities and disabilities of any party according to the law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, including any law relating to judicial procedure, or any other person or body on behalf of whom any party makes any claim, or to give effect to any penalty imposed by any Court of Common Jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph (c) above; and

(e) to order that any person be removed from the court-house at which any trial or any other hearing is being held, or, if he or she refuses so to be removed, banished from the Confederation of Democratic Simulators for the duration of that trial or other hearing (and for up to one hour thereafter) on the ground that that person is disrupting court proceedings, improperly interfering with the administration of justice, or attempting to do so.

9. All trials and other hearings in any Court of Common Jurisdiction shall be held in public, and, subject to section 8(e) above and 10 below, any person (whether or not a citizen of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators) shall be entitled to observe the entirety of such proceedings, a full transcript of which shall be made available to the public at large in perpetuity and without charge.

10. Section 9 above is subject to any rule of law whereby a person who is to be a witness in any judicial proceedings may be excluded from those proceedings, and prohibited from receiving information about the course of those proceedings, until he or she has completed giving her or his evidence, provided always that, at the conclusion of the proceedings, any such person shall have the opportunity to access a full transcript of the whole of the proceedings.

11. When making any binding determination of the rights, duties, powers, privileges, immunities, liabilities and disabilities according to the law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators of any parties in any proceedings in any Court of Common Jurisdiction, Judges of Common Jurisdiction shall be bound by the following sources of law, each item in the following list
taking precedence over each subsequent item: –

(a) the Constitution (as interpreted by any judgment of the Scientific Council sitting as a court, or of the Scientific Council in any capacity before the passing of the [b:2mogrq11]Judiciary Act[/b:2mogrq11] that sets a precedent);

(b) any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly;

(c) any regulations made under any powers delegated, whether directly or indirectly, by any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly;

(d) any judgment of the Scientific Council sitting as a court (or of the Scientific Council in any capacity before the passing of the [b:2mogrq11]Judiciary Act[/b:2mogrq11]) that establishes a precedent;

(e) any judgment of any superior Court of Common Jurisdiction that establishes a precedent;

(f) any judgment of any Court of Common Jurisdiction of equal superiority that establishes a precedent; and

(g) any directions or rules issued under Section 3 (c) above,

and where a judgment of the Scientific Council sitting as a court, or any Court of Common Jurisdiction, establishes a precedent as to whether any regulations of the sort mentioned in paragraph (c) above are made in accordance with, or conflict with, any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly, that shall take precedence over any contrary regulations.

12. A judgment establishes a precedent where, in order to determine the outcome of the proceedings in respect of which the judgment, or any part thereof, was given the judge or judges who determined such an outcome (and, if, where more than one judge so determines, they disagree, a simple majority of them) reach any conclusion or conclusions regarding the law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, that conclusion, and the reasoning used in reaching that conclusion, being the precedent set thereby.

13. A Judge of Common Jurisdiction, when delivering any judgment in any proceedings, or part thereof, in any Court of Common Jurisdiction, shall be bound to conclude that any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly is constitutional and has binding effect.

14. Nothing in this Constitution shall preclude any procedure whereby a party to proceedings in any inferior Court of Common Jurisdiction may appeal the outcome of such proceedings to any superior Court of Common Jurisdiction, which may allow or dismiss such an appeal in whole or in part.

15. Any Resident of SecondLife, or any body corporate (including any state) recognised by the law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, whether or not a citizen of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, shall be entitled to commence proceedings to resolve any dispute capable of being resolved in accordance with the law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, in a Court of Common Jurisdiction.

16. Subject to any provision in this Constitution, and any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly, Courts of Common Jurisdiction shall have inherent jurisdiction to govern their own proceedings.

17. The Court of Common Jurisdiction shall not have the power to hold any impeachment hearing, or to order that any public official who holds office in the Confederation of Democratic Simulators (whether a Judge of Common Jurisdiction, the Chancellor, a member of the Representative Assembly, a member of the Scientific Council, a member of the Artisanal Collective, or other such body, or otherwise) cease to hold or be disqualified from holding such public office, or be suspended therefrom, whether with or without pay.

***

2. The following sections of the Constitution shall be repealed: –

(a) Article III, Section 6, apart from the first sentence thereof ([i:2mogrq11]Scientific Council - Hearings, Trials and Ratifications[/i:2mogrq11]);

(b) Article III, Section 7 ([i:2mogrq11]Scientific Council - Alternative Dispute Resolution[/i:2mogrq11]), the whole section;

(c) Article III, Section 8 before the beginning of the sentence that starts, "In regard to ([i:2mogrq11]sic[/i:2mogrq11]) the Representative Branch" ([i:2mogrq11]Powers of the Scientific Council[/i:2mogrq11]),

and the title of Article III, Section 6 shall be changed to "Ratification of bills passed by the Representative Assembly".

3. The following part of the NL4-14 Registration and Incorporation Act shall be repealed: Article 2, Section 3 ([i:2mogrq11]commercial court: constitution[/i:2mogrq11]): the whole section, and any references in any part of that Act to the "Commercial Court" shall be taken as references to the Court of Common Jurisdiction, and any reference therein to any procedure before the Commercial Court shall be subject to any general directions issued by the Chief Judge of Common Jurisdiction under Article VII, Section 3 (c) of the Constitution.

4. The following shall be added to the Constitution immediately at the end of Article II, Section 4 ([i:2mogrq11]Powers of the Artisanal Collective[/i:2mogrq11]): –

***

With respect to the judiciary:

1. The Artisanal Collective may bring impeachment proceedings against the Chair of the Judiciary Commission on the ground of gross fiscal imprudence.

***

5. The Judiciary Commission shall have the power to serve upon any citizen of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators notice that that person is required to serve on a jury in a Court of Common Jurisdiction; any such person upon whom such notice has been served shall attend at the date and time set out in the notice, unless excused from so doing by a Judge of Common Jurisdiction after notice was served but before the date and time specified therein, and shall, unless excused from so doing by a Judge of Common Jurisdiction, duly serve as a juror, and act in accordance with all lawful directions of the Court.

[b:2mogrq11]Chapter II - the Scientific Council[/b:2mogrq11]

6. The following shall be inserted in the Constitution between Article III, Section 6 and Article III, Section 8:

***

[b:2mogrq11]Section 7 - The Court of Scientific Council[/b:2mogrq11]

1. The Scientific Council shall sit as a court when it exercises, or is considering whether to exercise, its power: –

(a) to impeach any person; or

(b) to allow any appeal from any Court of Common Jurisdiction.

2. When the Scientific Council sits as a court, it shall be known as "The Court of Scientific Council".

3. Subject to Section 6 below, when sitting as a court, the Scientific Council shall be presided over by an odd number of judges greater in number than one, each of whom shall be members of the Scientific Council, not also being Judges of Common Jurisdiction or the Chair of the Judiciary Commission.

4. The Dean of the Scientific Council shall determine which members of the Scientific Council sit as judges in any trial or other hearing before the Court of Scientific Council.

5. Where not all Judges of the Court of Scientific Council agree on a judgment in any proceedings before it, the judgment of the Court shall be that agreed upon by a simple majority of those judges presiding over those proceedings.

6. When any person bringing impeachment proceedings against any member of the Scientific Council so requires, the impeachment proceedings shall be presided over by one or more (and if more, and odd number of) Judges of Common Jurisdiction, not being members of the Scientific Council, who shall, for the purposes only of those proceedings, exercise all and only the powers exercisable by judges of the Court of Scientific Council.

7. The Scientific Council, when sitting as a court, shall be bound to conclude that any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly is constitutional and has binding effect.

8. All trials and other hearings before the Scientific Council when sitting as a court shall be held in public, and, subject to sections 9 and 10 below, any person (whether or not a citizen of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators) shall be entitled to observe the entirety of such proceedings.

9. The Court of Scientific Council shall have the same powers as Courts of Common Jurisdiction as is conferred by Article VII, section 8(e) of this Constitution ([i:2mogrq11]persons misbehaving in court[/i:2mogrq11]).

10. Section 8 above is subject to any rule of law whereby a person who is to be a witness in any judicial proceedings may be excluded from those proceedings, and prohibited from receiving information about the course of those proceedings, until he or she has completed giving her or his evidence, provided always that, at the conclusion of the proceedings, any such person shall have the opportunity to access a full transcript of the whole of the proceedings.

11. The Court of Scientific Council shall sit without a jury.

12. The Court of Scientific Council shall have the power to make such orders as is necessary for the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by this Constitution or any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly.

13. Subject to any provision in this Constitution, and any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly, the Court of Scientific Council shall have inherent jurisdiction to govern its own proceedings.

14. The Dean of the Scientific Council shall have the power to issue general directions concerning procedure in Scientific Council, when sitting as a court and otherwise, which shall, subject to any contrary provision in the Constitution or any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly, have the force of law.

***

7. The following shall be added to the Constitution immediately at the end of Article III, Section 8 ([i:2mogrq11]Powers of the Scientific Council[/i:2mogrq11]): –

***

[i:2mogrq11]With respect to the judiciary[/i:2mogrq11]:

1. The Scientific Council, when sitting as a court, may hear and determine an appeal from any superior Court of Common Jurisdiction (or any inferior Court of Common Jurisdiction if no superior Court of Common Jurisdiction will entertain an appeal on the matter), and either uphold or overturn the decision (or any part thereof) from which the appeal is made, but only on the grounds both that the Court of Common Jurisdiction from which the appeal is sought: –

(a) acted in the proceedings out of which the appeal arises outside its jurisdiction as conferred by the text of this Constitution; and

(b) that, by so doing, whether wholly or in part, incorrectly determined any issue in dispute between any parties to those proceedings (including any question of law necessary to resolve such a dispute).

2. Without prejudice to the specificity of the foregoing, the Scientific Council when sitting as a court shall not in any circumstances have the power to determine any appeal from any Court of Common Jurisdiction only on any or all of the following grounds: –

(a) that the Court of Common Jurisdiction reached the wrong conclusion on any question of fact;

(b) that the Court of Common Jurisdiction wrongly interpreted or applied the common law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators (except the common law with respect to the jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Jurisdiction);

(c) that the Court of Common Jurisdiction wrongly interpreted or applied any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly (except where the Court of Common Jurisdiction expressly purports to disapply any Act of the Representative Assembly); or

(d) that the Court of Common Jurisdiction wrongly interpreted, applied, or disapplied any regulation (or similar) made by any person or body deriving its power to do so from the Representative Assembly, or any person or body who, in turn, derives her, his or its power to do so from the Representative Assembly,

nor shall any of those grounds have any bearing on the outcome of any appeal from any Court of Common Jurisdiction to the Court of Scientific Council.

[i:2mogrq11]Impeachment proceedings[/i:2mogrq11]

1. Impeachment is an order that a holder of public office cease to hold such public office, or is suspended from such office for any time with or without pay, and/or is disqualified either permanently or for a term certain from holding any or all public office or offices.

2. A person may only be impeached by the Scientific Council, sitting as a court, following a trial in accordance with law.

3. Only persons (or persons acting on behalf of bodies) specified in the text of the Constitution shall have the power to commence impeachment proceedings.

4. Subject to Article IV, Sections 2 and 7 of this Constitution, nothing in this Constitution shall prevent a Court of Common Jurisdiction from banishing any person, even where that person is a holder of public office in the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, and banishment would preclude that person from continuing to hold such public office.

5. When a member of the Scientific Council brings impeachment proceedings, that person shall not sit as a judge of the Court of Scientific Council hearing those proceedings at any stage thereof.

***

8. The following sections of the constitution shall be repealed: –

(a) Article I, Section 7 ([i:2mogrq11]Powers of the Representative Assembly[/i:2mogrq11]), the following text: (i) "The leader of the RA sits as the leader of the Artisanal branch if the Artisanal branch seeks to impeach a member of the Philosophic branch," and (ii) "The leader of the RA sits as the leader of the Philosophic branch if the Philosophic branch seeks to impeach a member of the
Artisanal branch"; and

(b) Article II, Section 4 ([i:2mogrq11]Powers of the Artisanal Collective[/i:2mogrq11]), the following text: (i) "The leader of the AC sits as the leader of the Representative branch if the Representative branch seeks to impeach a member of the Philosophic branch," and (ii) "The leader of the AC sits as the leader of the Philosophic branch if the Philosophic branch seeks to impeach a member of the Representative branch".

[b:2mogrq11]Chapter III - Name and citizenship[/b:2mogrq11]

9. The title of the Neufreistadt Constitution shall hereafter be, "The Constitution of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators".

10. Any reference in any Act of the Representative Assembly passed before the date on which this Act comes into force to "Neufreistadt" or to “Neualtenburgâ€

[Ashcroft Burnham]

[b:8wald7lt][u:8wald7lt]New revised Judiciary Bill[/u:8wald7lt][/b:8wald7lt]

On further reflection, there was one additional provision of the [b:8wald7lt]Judiciary Bill[/b:8wald7lt] that needed to be added to address a concern that Jon raised in the CSDF meeting before last (what would happen if there came a time when no Judges of Common Jurisdiction were available).

To prevent the system collapsing if that eventuality were to occur, I have added a section in the revised Bill that would allow the Dean of the Scientific Council to appoint a member of the Scientific Council to sit as a Judge of Common Jurisdiction in relation to particular proceedings where no Judge of Common Jurisdiciton holds office. The Dean also has that power where there is a Judge or are Judges of Common Jurisdiction, but they are all disqualified from presiding over the proceedings because they are parties to those proceedings (an earlier revision added the requirement that a person shall never be a judge in her or his own cause).

These amendments hopefully resolve two potential impasses that might have been created with the original version.

There are also minor wording enhancements.

I am about to submit this in standard notecard form to Claude for the forthcoming RA meeting. I should nonetheless still be interested in any comments on this latest version, especially since such submitted bills can always be amended at the meeting.

As before, I urge all those who have a say in the matter to adopt this, single, coherent Bill, rather than Justice's piecemeal proposals, not only for all the reasons that I have given before on the thread dedicated to that topic, but also because his Bills do not incorporate the latest changes to this Bill that I have made, and that are important for the reasons already given.

For all the reasons already given, I commend this Bill to the people of Neufreistadt and to the members of the Representative Assembly in the hope that it will be passed, and that our community will be much the better for it.

******

[b:8wald7lt]The Judiciary Bill
[i:8wald7lt]New revised version[/i:8wald7lt][/b:8wald7lt]

[i:8wald7lt]A Bill to make provision for a professional judiciary, judicial procedure, to reform citizenship rights and duties with respect thereto, to make provisions for marshals of the peace, and to make repeals and consequential amendments to the Constitution and certain Acts of the Representative Assembly, as well as to make provisions for bringing official documents in line with the recent change of name to "The Confederation of Democratic Simulators"[/i:8wald7lt].

[b:8wald7lt]Chapter I - the Judiciary Commission and the Common Jurisdiction[/b:8wald7lt]

1. The following section shall be inserted at the end of the Constitution, but before the table of amendments: –

***

[b:8wald7lt]Article VII - The Judiciary[/b:8wald7lt]

1. There shall be a Judiciary Commission, the chair of which shall be appointed by simple majority vote in the Scientific Council as soon as is practicable after a vacancy arises, and who shall hold office until resignation or successful impeachment, whichever is sooner.

2. The chair of the Judiciary Commission shall have the power: –

(a) to appoint a Chief Judge of Common Jurisdiction, who shall hold office until resignation or successful impeachment, whichever is sooner;

(b) to determine the total number of Judges of Common Jurisdiction who shall hold office at any given time, who shall each hold office until resignation or successful impeachment, whichever is sooner;

(c) subject to any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly, and the exercise of any authority delegated thereby, and subject to any contrary proclamation of the Chancellor, to commission and, once commissioned, maintain and administer as many court-houses as the chair shall deem appropriate, for the purposes of holding trials and other judicial hearings, and any other purposes as the chair shall deem appropriate, provided always that neither the Representative Assembly or the Chancellor individually or between shall prohibit the commissioning, construction, maintenance and continued existence and use of at least one court-house;

(d) to expend any monies held by the Judiciary Commission for any purposes connected with the discharge of any of the functions of the Judiciary Commission;

(e) subject to Section 5 below, to employ, for valuable remuneration or otherwise, such deputies and officers, and to delegate to them such functions, as the chair shall deem appropriate;

(f) to provide, or arrange to have provided, advice to citizens who may submit bills to the Representative Assembly, or any official, or delegate of that official, charged with drafting or approving regulations under powers delegated to her or him by the Constitution or any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly, concerning the drafting of such legislation or regulations, provided always that the Judiciary Commission shall not provide advice as to the desirability of any policy objective of such legislation or regulations;

(g) to publicise, both within the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, and elsewhere, the judicial system of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, or publicise the Confederation of Democratic Simulators (or any geographic subset thereof) by publicising its judicial system;

(h) to provide, and oversee the provision by others of, education concerning the law and legal system of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, and to issue, or regulate the issue of, qualifications in respect thereof;

(i) to provide advice to other governments and similar institutions in SecondLife and other such virtual worlds concerning the establishment and development of judicial systems therein;

(j) to maintain and publicise a record of all judicial proceedings, precedents and other public official judicial documents, not being documents relating to judicial proceedings in the Scientific Council; and

(k) to bring impeachment proceedings against any Judge of Common Jurisdiction, on the grounds only of either or both of (i) gross dereliction of duty, whether culpable or not, but, if not culpable, sustained for at least 28 days; or (ii) bias, corruption or insanity.

3. Even when not sitting as a Judge of Common Jurisdiction in an individual case or cases, the Chief Judge of Common Jurisdiction shall have the power: –

(a) to determine who other than her or himself shall be appointed to be a Judge of Common Jurisdiction;

(b) to determine which Judges of Common Jurisdiction shall hear which cases, or parts thereof;

(c) to issue general directions concerning procedure in Courts of Common Jurisdiction;

(d) to determine which Courts of Common Jurisdiction shall be superior, and which inferior; and

(e) to bring impeachment proceedings against the Chair of the Judiciary Commission or any other Judge of Common Jurisdiction, on the grounds only of either or both of (i) gross dereliction of duty, whether culpable or not, but, if not culpable, sustained for at least 28 days; or (ii) bias, corruption or insanity, or additionally, in the case of the Chair of the Judiciary Commission, either or both of (i) gross incompetence; or (ii) gross fiscal imprudence.

4. Nothing in this Constitution shall prevent a single person holding office both as the Chair of the Judiciary Commission and the Chief Judge of Common Jurisdiction simultaneously or in succession, but, if a single person simultaneously holds office as any Judge of Common Jurisdiction and the Chair of the Judiciary Commission, any impeachment of that person that succeeds only on grounds applicable only to the Chair of the Judiciary Commission shall not have effect in removing, suspending or disqualifying that person from the office of Judge of Common Jurisdiction, whether Chief Judge or otherwise.

5. Subject to Section 8 below, only Judges of Common Jurisdiction shall preside over proceedings in any trial or other hearing, or deliver any judgment as to the law in any Court of Common Jurisdiction, or otherwise exercise any of the powers of any Court of Common Jurisdiction, save for those powers exercisable by juries, and any power, not exercised during the course of a trial or other hearing, deemed by any Judge of Common Jurisdiction to be administrative in nature, providing always that any party to such proceedings may appeal to a Judge of Common Jurisdiction from any such administrative decision.

6. Subject to Section 8 below, only Judges of Common Jurisdiction or juries empanelled in accordance with law shall deliver any judgment or verdict as to any question of fact in any trial or hearing in any Court of Common Jurisdiction.

7. A person who is a party to any proceedings before any Court of Common Jurisdiction shall not preside over those proceedings as judge or juror, or over any part thereof, or deliver any judgment or verdict in respect of those proceedings.

8. If no Judge of Common Jurisdiction is available to preside over any proceedings in any Court of Common Jurisdiction, either by virtue of Section 7 above, or because there is no Judge of Common Jurisdiction at all who holds office at a time at which a Judge of Common Jurisdiction is required to preside over such proceedings, the Dean of the Scientific Council shall appoint a member of the Scientific Council to act as judge in those proceedings, and that person shall, for the purposes only of the particular proceedings for which he or she is appointed, have all and only the powers in respect of those proceedings as a Judge of Common Jurisdiction.

9. Subject to any powers of the Scientific Council when sitting as a court expressly stated in the text of this Constitution, Courts of Common Jurisdiction, and only Courts of Common Jurisdiction, shall have the power when giving judgment on a disputed matter between two or more parties (who must be residents of SecondLife or bodies corporate, including states, recognised as such by the law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, but who need not be citizens of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators): –

(a) to make binding determinations of the rights, duties, powers, privileges, immunities, liabilities and disabilities of any or all such parties according to the law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators;

(b) to make binding determinations of any facts in dispute between any or all such parties, provided that making such determinations are necessary in order to make such a determination as mentioned in paragraph (a) above, or (c) below;

(c) subject to either (i) a party formally accepting, or (ii) a court finding as a fact at a trial held in accordance with law that a party's conduct is culpable, to impose upon that party in respect of that conduct any penalty, including, but not limited to, banishment from any or all territory of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, either permanently or for such shorter period as shall be specified by the court, and forfeiture of any SecondLife asset (including debts and other such duties owed thereto), either immediately or suspended on such conditions as the court may prescribe;

(d) to make any non-penal orders such as to give effect to the rights, duties, powers, privileges, immunities, liabilities and disabilities of any party according to the law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, including any law relating to judicial procedure, or any other person or body on behalf of whom any party makes any claim, or to give effect to any penalty imposed by any Court of Common Jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph (c) above; and

(e) to order that any person be removed from the court-house at which any trial or any other hearing is being held, or, if he or she refuses so to be removed, banished from the Confederation of Democratic Simulators for the duration of that trial or other hearing (and for up to one hour thereafter) on the ground that that person is disrupting court proceedings, improperly interfering with the administration of justice, or attempting to do so.

10. All trials and other hearings in any Court of Common Jurisdiction shall be held in public, and, subject to section 9(e) above and 11 below, any person (whether or not a citizen of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators) shall be entitled to observe the entirety of such proceedings, a full transcript of which shall be made available to the public at large in perpetuity and without charge.

11. Section 10 above is subject to any rule of law whereby a person who is to be a witness in any judicial proceedings may be excluded from those proceedings, and prohibited from receiving information about the course of those proceedings, until he or she has completed giving her or his evidence, provided always that, at the conclusion of the proceedings, any such person shall have the opportunity to access a full transcript of the whole of the proceedings.

12. When making any binding determination of the rights, duties, powers, privileges, immunities, liabilities and disabilities according to the law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators of any parties in any proceedings in any Court of Common Jurisdiction, Judges of Common Jurisdiction shall be bound by the following sources of law, each item in the following list
taking precedence over each subsequent item: –

(a) the Constitution (as interpreted by any judgment of the Scientific Council sitting as a court, or of the Scientific Council in any capacity before the passing of the [b:8wald7lt]Judiciary Act[/b:8wald7lt] that sets a precedent);

(b) any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly;

(c) any regulations made under any powers delegated, whether directly or indirectly, by any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly;

(d) any judgment of the Scientific Council sitting as a court (or of the Scientific Council in any capacity before the passing of the [b:8wald7lt]Judiciary Act[/b:8wald7lt]) that establishes a precedent;

(e) any judgment of any superior Court of Common Jurisdiction that establishes a precedent;

(f) any judgment of any Court of Common Jurisdiction of equal superiority that establishes a precedent; and

(g) any directions or rules issued under Section 3 (c) above,

and where a judgment of the Scientific Council sitting as a court, or any Court of Common Jurisdiction, establishes a precedent as to whether any regulations of the sort mentioned in paragraph (c) above are made in accordance with, or conflict with, any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly, that shall take precedence over any contrary regulations.

13. A judgment establishes a precedent where, in order to determine the outcome of the proceedings in respect of which the judgment, or any part thereof, was given the judge or judges who determined such an outcome (and, if, where more than one judge so determines, they disagree, a simple majority of them) reach any conclusion or conclusions regarding the law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, that conclusion, and the reasoning used in reaching that conclusion, being the precedent set thereby.

14. A Judge of Common Jurisdiction, when delivering any judgment in any proceedings, or part thereof, in any Court of Common Jurisdiction, shall be bound to conclude that any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly is constitutional and has binding effect.

15. Nothing in this Constitution shall preclude any procedure whereby a party to proceedings in any inferior Court of Common Jurisdiction may appeal the outcome of such proceedings to any superior Court of Common Jurisdiction, which may allow or dismiss such an appeal in whole or in part.

16. Any Resident of SecondLife, or any body corporate (including any state) recognised by the law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, whether or not a citizen of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, shall be entitled to commence proceedings to resolve any dispute capable of being resolved in accordance with the law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, in a Court of Common Jurisdiction.

17. Subject to any provision in this Constitution, and any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly, Courts of Common Jurisdiction shall have inherent jurisdiction to govern their own proceedings.

18. The Court of Common Jurisdiction shall not have the power to hold any impeachment hearing, or to order that any public official who holds office in the Confederation of Democratic Simulators (whether a Judge of Common Jurisdiction, the Chancellor, a member of the Representative Assembly, a member of the Scientific Council, a member of the Artisanal Collective, or other such body, or otherwise) cease to hold or be disqualified from holding such public office, or be suspended therefrom, whether with or without pay.

***

2. The following sections of the Constitution shall be repealed: –

(a) Article III, Section 6, apart from the first sentence thereof ([i:8wald7lt]Scientific Council - Hearings, Trials and Ratifications[/i:8wald7lt]);

(b) Article III, Section 7 ([i:8wald7lt]Scientific Council - Alternative Dispute Resolution[/i:8wald7lt]), the whole section;

(c) Article III, Section 8 before the beginning of the sentence that starts, "In regard to ([i:8wald7lt]sic[/i:8wald7lt]) the Representative Branch" ([i:8wald7lt]Powers of the Scientific Council[/i:8wald7lt]),

and the title of Article III, Section 6 shall be changed to "Ratification of bills passed by the Representative Assembly".

3. The following part of the NL4-14 Registration and Incorporation Act shall be repealed: Article 2, Section 3 ([i:8wald7lt]commercial court: constitution[/i:8wald7lt]): the whole section, and any references in any part of that Act to the "Commercial Court" shall be taken as references to the Court of Common Jurisdiction, and any reference therein to any procedure before the Commercial Court shall be subject to any general directions issued by the Chief Judge of Common Jurisdiction under Article VII, Section 3 (c) of the Constitution.

4. The following shall be added to the Constitution immediately at the end of Article II, Section 4 ([i:8wald7lt]Powers of the Artisanal Collective[/i:8wald7lt]): –

***

With respect to the judiciary:

1. The Artisanal Collective may bring impeachment proceedings against the Chair of the Judiciary Commission on the ground of gross fiscal imprudence.

***

5. The Judiciary Commission shall have the power to serve upon any citizen of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators notice that that person is required to serve on a jury in a Court of Common Jurisdiction; any such person upon whom such notice has been served shall attend at the date and time set out in the notice, unless excused from so doing by a Judge of Common Jurisdiction after notice was served but before the date and time specified therein, and shall, unless excused from so doing by a Judge of Common Jurisdiction, duly serve as a juror, and act in accordance with all lawful directions of the Court.

[b:8wald7lt]Chapter II - the Scientific Council[/b:8wald7lt]

6. The following shall be inserted in the Constitution between Article III, Section 6 and Article III, Section 8:

***

[b:8wald7lt]Section 7 - The Court of Scientific Council[/b:8wald7lt]

1. The Scientific Council shall sit as a court when it exercises, or is considering whether to exercise, its power: –

(a) to impeach any person; or

(b) to allow any appeal from any Court of Common Jurisdiction.

2. When the Scientific Council sits as a court, it shall be known as "The Court of Scientific Council".

3. Subject to Section 6 below, when sitting as a court, the Scientific Council shall be presided over by an odd number of judges greater in number than one, each of whom shall be members of the Scientific Council, not also being Judges of Common Jurisdiction or the Chair of the Judiciary Commission.

4. The Dean of the Scientific Council shall determine which members of the Scientific Council sit as judges in any trial or other hearing before the Court of Scientific Council.

5. Where not all Judges of the Court of Scientific Council agree on a judgment in any proceedings before it, the judgment of the Court shall be that agreed upon by a simple majority of those judges presiding over those proceedings.

6. When any person bringing impeachment proceedings against any member of the Scientific Council so requires, the impeachment proceedings shall be presided over by one or more (and if more, and odd number of) Judges of Common Jurisdiction, not being members of the Scientific Council, who shall, for the purposes only of those proceedings, exercise all and only the powers exercisable by judges of the Court of Scientific Council.

7. The Scientific Council, when sitting as a court, shall be bound to conclude that any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly is constitutional and has binding effect.

8. All trials and other hearings before the Scientific Council when sitting as a court shall be held in public, and, subject to sections 9 and 10 below, any person (whether or not a citizen of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators) shall be entitled to observe the entirety of such proceedings.

9. The Court of Scientific Council shall have the same powers as Courts of Common Jurisdiction as is conferred by Article VII, section 8(e) of this Constitution ([i:8wald7lt]persons misbehaving in court[/i:8wald7lt]).

10. Section 8 above is subject to any rule of law whereby a person who is to be a witness in any judicial proceedings may be excluded from those proceedings, and prohibited from receiving information about the course of those proceedings, until he or she has completed giving her or his evidence, provided always that, at the conclusion of the proceedings, any such person shall have the opportunity to access a full transcript of the whole of the proceedings.

11. The Court of Scientific Council shall sit without a jury.

12. The Court of Scientific Council shall have the power to make such orders as is necessary for the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by this Constitution or any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly.

13. Subject to any provision in this Constitution, and any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly, the Court of Scientific Council shall have inherent jurisdiction to govern its own proceedings.

14. The Dean of the Scientific Council shall have the power to issue general directions concerning procedure in Scientific Council, when sitting as a court and otherwise, which shall, subject to any contrary provision in the Constitution or any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly, have the force of law.

***

7. The following shall be added to the Constitution immediately at the end of Article III, Section 8 ([i:8wald7lt]Powers of the Scientific Council[/i:8wald7lt]): –

***

[i:8wald7lt]With respect to the judiciary[/i:8wald7lt]:

1. The Scientific Council, when sitting as a court, may hear and determine an appeal from any superior Court of Common Jurisdiction (or any inferior Court of Common Jurisdiction if no superior Court of Common Jurisdiction will entertain an appeal on the matter), and either uphold or overturn the decision (or any part thereof) from which the appeal is made, but only on the grounds both that the Court of Common Jurisdiction from which the appeal is sought: –

(a) acted in the proceedings out of which the appeal arises outside its jurisdiction as conferred by the text of this Constitution; and

(b) that, by so doing, whether wholly or in part, incorrectly determined any issue in dispute between any parties to those proceedings (including any question of law necessary to resolve such a dispute).

2. Without prejudice to the specificity of the foregoing, the Scientific Council when sitting as a court shall not in any circumstances have the power to determine any appeal from any Court of Common Jurisdiction only on any or all of the following grounds: –

(a) that the Court of Common Jurisdiction reached the wrong conclusion on any question of fact;

(b) that the Court of Common Jurisdiction wrongly interpreted or applied the common law of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators (except the common law with respect to the jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Jurisdiction);

(c) that the Court of Common Jurisdiction wrongly interpreted or applied any duly ratified Act of the Representative Assembly (except where the Court of Common Jurisdiction expressly purports to disapply any Act of the Representative Assembly); or

(d) that the Court of Common Jurisdiction wrongly interpreted, applied, or disapplied any regulation (or similar) made by any person or body deriving its power to do so from the Representative Assembly, or any person or body who, in turn, derives her, his or its power to do so from the Representative Assembly,

nor shall any of those grounds have any bearing on the outcome of any appeal from any Court of Common Jurisdiction to the Court of Scientific Council.

[i:8wald7lt]Impeachment proceedings[/i:8wald7lt]

1. Impeachment is an order that a holder of public office cease to hold such public office, or is suspended from such office for any time with or without pay, and/or is disqualified either permanently or for a term certain from holding any or all public office or offices.

2. A person may only be impeached by the Scientific Council, sitting as a court, following a trial in accordance with law.

3. Only persons (or persons acting on behalf of bodies) specified in the text of the Constitution shall have the power to commence impeachment proceedings.

4. Subject to Article IV, Sections 2 and 7 of this Constitution, nothing in this Constitution shall prevent a Court of Common Jurisdiction from banishing any person, even where that person is a holder of public office in the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, and banishment would preclude that person from continuing to hold such public office.

5. When a member of the Scientific Council brings impeachment proceedings, that person shall not sit as a judge of the Court of Scientific Council hearing those proceedings at any stage thereof.

***

8. The following sections of the constitution shall be repealed: –

(a) Article I, Section 7 ([i:8wald7lt]Powers of the Representative Assembly[/i:8wald7lt]), the following text: (i) "The leader of the RA sits as the leader of the Artisanal branch if the Artisanal branch seeks to impeach a member of the Philosophic branch," and (ii) "The leader of the RA sits as the leader of the Philosophic branch if the Philosophic branch seeks to impeach a member of the
Artisanal branch"; and

(b) Article II, Section 4 ([i:8wald7lt]Powers of the Artisanal Collective[/i:8wald7lt]), the following text: (i) "The leader of the AC sits as the leader of the Representative branch if the Representative branch seeks to impeach a member of the Philosophic branch," and (ii) "The leader of the AC sits as the leader of the Philosophic branch if the Philosophic branch seeks to impeach a member of the Representative branch".

[b:8wald7lt]Chapter III - Name and citizenship[/b:8wald7lt]

9. The title of the Neufreistadt Constitution shall hereafter be, "The Constitution of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators".

10. Any reference in any Act of the Representative Assembly passed before the date on which this Act comes into force to "Neufreistadt" or to “Neualtenburgâ€

[Justice Soothsayer]

I have been traveling and spending a lot of time on other activities, and so haven’t had a chance to defend my proposal for five separate bills in place of Ashcroft’s proposal. I very much like most of what Ashcroft has proposed, with a few significant exceptions that mean I can’t vote in favor of Ashcroft’s bill as it stands. The RA could either consider Ashcroft’s proposal and amend it per the following discussion, or consider my five bills as substitute amendments. I think it would be simpler to consider the “five easy piecesâ€

[Ashcroft Burnham]

Justice,

I am extremely concerned that you are repeating over and over again the same points as you have already made, and I have already made arguments that are, if no flaw can be found in them, conclusive against them, which you have not even attempted to address. I find it utterly bizarre that, despite the huge amount of time that has elapsed since my proposals were first put forward, and the great amount of time that has elapsed since I responded carefully and at some length to your original contrary suggestions, you have not brought forward any reasoned arugment (and, in many cases, even any real detail) to support your concerns.

Indeed, your original "more digestable legal system" proposal with the split bills was premised on breaking the idea down into chunks to make it easier to digest, and, although contained substantive changes in the text of the bills, contained no explanation of why such changes had been inserted.

It cannot be said that you have not had time to think of the reasons or details because you have been busy, since it cannot be the case that you honestly hold the beliefs in question (i.e., that there are problems what what I propose) at all unless you [i:a1tn2sfv]already[/i:a1tn2sfv] have reasons. It is utterly inexplicable that you have not stated what they are.

Furthermore, as I will address in detail below, your concerns are in many places extremely vague: do you even have at this stage a clear idea of what your concerns are in those respects? I find it highly doubtful that it can be proper to raise an objection to a carefully considered proposal on the ground of unconsidered, vague and unreasoned concerns, that, despite ample opportunity, have not even been discussed, and are, in the case of most of them, aired for the first time the day before the matter is due to be debated formally and decided upon.

[quote="Justice Soothsayer":a1tn2sfv]My concerns with Ashcroft’s revised proposal, stated very briefly, are:

1) Too much power to the Chief Judge / Chair of Judiciary Commission.[/quote:a1tn2sfv]

What do you mean too much power? What exact powers do you think excessive, and why do you think them excessive? What powers would you give to the Chair of the Judiciary Commission and Chief Judge of Common Jurisdiction?

Do you already know the answers to these questions? If so, why not already supply them? If not, why should an ill-considered objection stand against a well-considered proposal?

[quote:a1tn2sfv]2) A one-person Judiciary Commission does not make sense. [/quote:a1tn2sfv]

Why not? The powers exercisable by the Judiciary Commission make perfect sense. As a matter of practicality, it will start with one Chair/Chief Judge, and, hopefully, a Chief Clerk. Other people will be added as needed. What exactly is the problem with it existing in the early stages with those two people alone?

Again, is the answer to that question something that you already know, or something that you have yet to work out? If the former, why have you not stated it already, if the latter, why should an ill-considered objection stand against a well-considered proposal?

[quote:a1tn2sfv]3) Judges should be selected by someone other than the Chief Judge; I think the SC would do nicely, but the RA would work as well.[/quote:a1tn2sfv]

I have already given [i:a1tn2sfv]very[/i:a1tn2sfv] lengthy and detailed reasons on why election by a political body would be wholly wrong, that was a very long time ago indeed, and you have not even attempted to muster arguments against that.

Why do you think that the members of the Scientific Council would be better qualified to appoint Judges of Common Jurisdiction than the Cheif Judge of Common Jurisdiction? What precise problem do you foresee with the Chief Judge having power to appoint other judges? Who other than the Cheif Judge will know the workings of the Courts of Common Jurisdiction as well, and know as well what would make a candidate suitably qualified?

[quote:a1tn2sfv]4) Chat logs. This horse has been debated to death in the forums. I’ve deleted the clause requiring consent to use of chat logs from my bills, for all of the reasons that have been discussed.[/quote:a1tn2sfv]

All of the reasons that have been discussed relate only to that part of the chatlogs requirement that I have removed from my new draft. Do you have any new reasons against the more limited verion that I put forward? If so, what are they? Why do you not post them here?

[quote]5) Impeachment standards are too tight. Ash would have us impeach judges on very narrow grounds of “only [emphasis added] of either or both of (i) gross dereliction of duty, whether culpable or not, but, if not culpable, sustained for at least 28 days; or (ii) bias, corruption or insanity.â€

[Tad Peckham]

ashcroft, first let me commend you on putting together a document that is not only comprehensive and clear in its objectives, but it also looks beyond the present, and attempts to set a stable foundation from which the CDS can grow and mature.

i am not a lawyer, and legal language can often confuse those of us who pursued liberal arts degrees in college... with that said, i have a couple questions and comments for you based upon my more 'pedestrian' reading of your bill.

[quote:2rgoosbh]Point for further discussion: Should the Chief Clerk to the Judiciary be appointed by the Chair, or directly by the SC?[/quote:2rgoosbh]

i am not sure the cheif clerk or the judiciary chair should be appointed by the SC. if i am reading your bill correctly, you would be expanding the powers of the SC by having the SC determine who would oversee the entire judiciary system in the CDS. moreover, this person would, in effect, be given a life-long term. i do not like the idea of a small group of people having so much power in their hands. furthermore, i do not like the concept of life-long terms.

for example, in my country, the president has the power to sway the political makeup of the supreme court in any way he or she sees fit. this power has proven to be extremely dangerous at times, advantagous at others. however, we as citizens can do little to stop judicial appointments that affect how our laws and constitution are interpreted in good times, and in bad.

assuming i am reading your bill correctly, i do not think the judiciary chair sould be chosen by the SC; rather, the citizens of the CDS should decide by voting who will be appointed into that chair.

[quote:2rgoosbh]Point for further discussion: Should the Chair of the Judiciary Commission also be a member of the Scientific Council?[/quote:2rgoosbh]

again, i think this could blur the lines of power the SC has. it is my understanding that the SC's job is to ratify laws passed by the RA, or suggest changes to those laws before they are ratified. i think the job the SC has, and the job the judiciary chair will have, are different enough to keep them seperate.

aside from those comments/questions that i know you will clarify for me, i think this is a solid model that will help do good things for the citizens of neufreistadt.

regards,

Tad

[Chicago Kipling]

While I'm equally unschooled in things I think it's wise to remember that appointed positions have a value in that they can tame the chaotic swing of public opinion. There is a reason that there are few pure democracies in RL and why the US was never meant to be one.

[Tad Peckham]

[quote="Chicago Kipling":2zgsszuh]While I'm equally unschooled in things I think it's wise to remember that appointed positions have a value in that they can tame the chaotic swing of public opinion.[/quote:2zgsszuh]

true, but people in appointed positions (or even people simply nominated to those positions) can add to the chaotic swing of public opinion just as much as they can quell it. i am not against appointed positions, but based upon my reading of the proposal, the appointment of the judiciary chair puts a lot of power in the hands of the SC, a branch of government i might add that is not elected, but is a "self-selected meritocracy" according to the constitution.

[Ashcroft Burnham]

[quote="Tad Peckham":3qctdkdk]i am not sure the cheif clerk or the judiciary chair should be appointed by the SC. if i am reading your bill correctly, you would be expanding the powers of the SC by having the SC determine who would oversee the entire judiciary system in the CDS. moreover, this person would, in effect, be given a life-long term. i do not like the idea of a small group of people having so much power in their hands. furthermore, i do not like the concept of life-long terms.

for example, in my country, the president has the power to sway the political makeup of the supreme court in any way he or she sees fit. this power has proven to be extremely dangerous at times, advantagous at others. however, we as citizens can do little to stop judicial appointments that affect how our laws and constitution are interpreted in good times, and in bad.

assuming i am reading your bill correctly, i do not think the judiciary chair sould be chosen by the SC; rather, the citizens of the CDS should decide by voting who will be appointed into that chair.[/quote:3qctdkdk]

I have dealt elsewhere at length with this issue, explaining in some considerable detail why it is extremely dangerous to undermine the separation of the powers by conflating politics and the judiciary. See earlier in this thread for the details of my argument.

[Ashcroft Burnham]

[quote="Tad Peckham":3mvww1jr]true, but people in appointed positions (or even people simply nominated to those positions) can add to the chaotic swing of public opinion just as much as they can quell it. i am not against appointed positions, but based upon my reading of the proposal, the appointment of the judiciary chair puts a lot of power in the hands of the SC, a branch of government i might add that is not elected, but is a "self-selected meritocracy" according to the constitution.[/quote:3mvww1jr]

It may be worth noting that my proposal does not [i:3mvww1jr]increase[/i:3mvww1jr] the powers of the Scientific Council, but reduce them, since the SC's current powers are effectively split between the SC and the Judiciary Commission. That is one reason why it is important that the latter remains autonomous.

[Ashcroft Burnham]

[quote="Tad Peckham":35qvkidy]ashcroft, first let me commend you on putting together a document that is not only comprehensive and clear in its objectives, but it also looks beyond the present, and attempts to set a stable foundation from which the CDS can grow and mature....

aside from those comments/questions that i know you will clarify for me, i think this is a solid model that will help do good things for the citizens of neufreistadt.[/quote:35qvkidy]

Incidentally, I forgot to thank you earlier for the above comments Those are kind things to say.

[Tad Peckham]

i guess this is where i have a problem. you believe that judges should be appointed, because [quote:cctb56by] those who appoint judges (existing senior judges themselves) are precisely those who simultaneously know who is best qualified for the job, and have the least personal interest in the outcomes of cases [/quote:cctb56by] while at the same you said that [quote:cctb56by] it is vital that judges are completely impartial and independent, and make their judgments based on, and only on, [i:cctb56by]their genuine view of what the law and correct outcome of a case is, and do not take into account in any way what other people might think of that decision.[/i:cctb56by] [/quote:cctb56by] i think it is important to note that someone's genuine view of what the law is, might not reflect what the law actually is.

the danger that i see here is that by limiting judiciary appointments to members of the SC, the law becomes limited in scope and applicability by the viewpoint of the SC and the SC alone. while i understand their are safeguards in check (such as removal from office) having to go through that process seems highly bureaucratic, and a process that could detract from more important political matters.

[quote:cctb56by]Similarly, even though a judge might not be consciously influenced thereby, the desire to be reappointed might unconsciously pressure the judge to make the popular, rather than the right, decision in a case. That would be disastrous for the interests of justice.[/quote:cctb56by]

i think that is a risk i am willing to take. to put it another way, we elect members of our legislative and executive branch of government and expect them to be the voice of the people. however, those people have clear political biases and often act out based on those biases, and not the will of the people. however, we accept the system and live with that system because it is the closest thing to a representative government we have. along those lines, when it comes to these branches of government people readily accept that the people we vote into these offices have a bias and will act based on that bias. yet, when it comes to the judicial branch, we try and remove the word bias from our vocabulary. we expect judges to be impartial. however, they can only be as impartial as their own interpretation of the law.

i want to make it clear that i am not against judiciary appointments. however, when it comes to the judiciary chair, i believe the people should have a voice, especially if the judiciary chair serves a life term. it concerns me that the SC would have the power to appoint the person who will interpret and define the laws of the CDS for the rest of our second lives.