Reforming the Scientific Council

[Gwyneth Llewelyn]

As said, I proposed a model for universal suffrage of SC members while still maintaining the notion of "tenure" that Calli so well explained. And it also allows the RA to put forward nominations. But it completely removes the RA from the "approval" process.

To recap (my long-winded posts sometimes get confusing):

1. SC announces vacancy (for whatever reason)

2. Nominations for candidates are accepted:

   • From the SC;

   • From the RA;

   • From any group of 5 citizens.

3. Candidates are validated by the SC (through a majority vote of SC Chairs) as to their qualifications (i.e. known merit in discussing complex legal/constitutional issues, knowledge about the workings of the CDS and its history, and so forth — just as we have today).

4. Eligible candidates are put to a yes/no vote via universal suffrage (could be also done during General Elections, or, in case of need, using the mechanism for by-elections).

5. Candidates with a "yes" vote become new Professors at the SC as soon as the results are in.

This method:

• Preserves the SC's prerogative of selecting which candidates are appropriate or not;

• Allows the RA (or any group of 5 citizens) to nominate whomever they wish as candidates to the SC;

• Allows the RA — or anyone else, really — to publicly campaign for or against any SC candidates, organise public debates, etc. just like we have for the RA itself and/or the Chancellor;

• Allows the whole population to select which of the eligible candidates are allowed to serve to the SC, one by one.

Note that I'm not entirely happy about having a "popularity contest" for selecting people for their abilities to interpret the law and solve complex constitutional questions, because, as usual, the ones with more charisma will win, no matter if there are more qualified candidates to join the SC. Still, under that suggestion, at least the SC has a chance to weed out the rotten apples, but might afterwards be unable to get the "best" members for the job — just the "most popular" ones, which will weaken the SC in the long run. But, as said, it's a compromise. Far, far better than having the RA selecting whatever members they wish to, in order to make sure they can "control" the SC and curb their power to remain independent (as much as possible).

I'm happy to discuss why that suggestion is not good

Pat, I know that you suggested that the RA would only select the SC members once, and so, on subsequent terms, it would matter less if a "political Professor" is aligned with the RA or not. IMHO, though, this will hardly be the case: a RA-friendly Professor in one term — who will pretty much approve everything the RA says — will become a RA-hating Professor on the next term — who might just disapprove everything on a whim because "their friends" are not currently "in power" and stall legislation until "their friends" can get elected again. We have seen this happening even under the current system! And this is just the pragmatic view... I'm not even talking about the "abomination" of having a branch selecting the members of another branch which is supposed to keep the first branch in check. That's really asking for trouble! Or, well, just asking for having an "unbounded" RA that can pretty much do whatever they please at will, even revoke the Constitution or at least change it so that nobody gets elected for the next decade or two...

And we know that RA members do try to subvert the Constitution, all the time. It's not just a hypothetical issue. We also know that an "absent SC" will allow the Constitution to be changed beyond recognition and it will take years until some semblance of democracy, checks and balances are restored, just because the SC sometimes fails to meet in a reasonable timeframe. So we know this to be the case. Getting the SC full with "RA buddies" will just make it much worse and destroy pretty much any chance of getting back to "normalcy" again.

So if your personal peeve is that "nobody elects" the SC members and thus we're not "democratic" — take a look at universities; they have a long track record of being fairly democratic, even when they operated under external political systems allergic to democracy — then the only solution is to have all the citizens approve them...

I'm very reluctant to say so, but I might find it tolerable to allow the SC nominate members and have the RA vote on their approval, so long as there is no "cross-examining" and public humiliation, but just a yes/no vote... but I'm going to regret having written this paragraph Because, of course, it would mean that the RA would always reject a highly-qualified candidate just because they disagree with their views. Having them elected by universal suffrage will avoid that issue to a degree — the same justification applies to when we discussed electing the Chancellor by universal suffrage, as the RA tended to over-politicise the Chancellor election and hardly anyone would agree to become a candidate if they knew that the RA's majority was against them.

Oh well...

[Sudane Erato]

Decisions may involve monetary penalties, which can be collected over time through an increase the judgment debtors tier payments. If the monetary penalty is considered an award to an individual, it shall be credited to the tier payments due from that individual when paid by the judgment debtor. (I don’t know if this process is even possible. Sudane can ring in here.)

Not very possible. Tier payments now under the new Hippo system are "parcel-based", rather than as before "citizen-based". Judgments could cause the alteration in the given tier settings for an individual's box, but the individual has only to "terminate with refund" and take up residence on another box in order to avoid that penalty. A person in receipt of such a judgement might of course benefit from having lowered tier on their box, but unless it was a judgement *against* the state, I have no idea how the state would recoup the money.

Furthermore, I will *extremely* resistant to frequent changes in tier box settings. Each one comes fraught with the possibility of dispute over due procedure and proper communication, and with almost a hundred citizens paying into twice that many tier boxes, the possibility for error (since this would be a manual process) increases exponentially.

Sudane............................

[Gwyneth Llewelyn]

Heh. There goes nother good idea down the drain

But thanks a lot for the input, Sudane. It's rather a pity this isn't possible. On the other hand, there are other ways to deal with it, but it requires some programming:

Suppose that someone engages in arbitration, and both parties at least agree that the one being "right" is to be paid L$1000. Before arbitration commences, each of the two parties "deposits" L$500 on a specially-scripted object. After arbitration, the arbitrator makes the object release the L$1000 to the "winning" party. This has been employed elsewhere and sort of works, although it can also quickly become a "game" (i.e. invent plausible issues for arbitration and start winning money from other citizens... assuming they're willing, of course).

I know it's a silly idea, but I have seen it used elsewhere. It also gives the possibility of having multiple parties and adding a "handling fee" for the moderation/arbitration which would revert to the Treasury.

[Bagheera]

First thoughts (sorry, these are the negatives) : I am totally opposed to "fines", even if they became technically feasible. The reason why is because too many real world entities begin to budget FOR fines and a whole shadow agenda comes into play to gather fines instead of render merciful judgment.

As for arbitration - I can only see very limited applications for this that I would consider valid. For something like slander, there are real world solutions and if I'm worried about slander, I wouldn't take it to an in-world experimental court, but would take it to a real world court. Where I could see an in-world ruling body being useful would be for something like a mega prim that is trespassing on a neighbor's property or someone with hover text that crosses into their neighbor's living room - where the recourse would be for a demand to fix the problem or someone with estate manager rights will return it.

Other than that, I really like Gwyn's proposal very much. I'm not in favor of having the Chancellor make the selection, we are too small a community for that to be a good idea.

[Callipygian]

There are a number of posts in this thread I want to reply to parts of. The whole arbitration aspect of reform stems from Beathan's observation that CDS lacks a mechanism to appeal a decision handed down by the SC as the first and only body with the task of dealing with disputes. That seems a perfectly reasonable concern.

Beathan's proposal , imo, goes way past what is needed and when words like 'hearing', 'hearing examiner' 'monetary penalties' , ' creation of a body of Common Law' etc show up it just starts sounding like another stab at instituting a judiciary level. In addition, Beathan's proposal seems to limit the SC in it's appeal role - examiner's will 'rule' based on Common Law precedent but the SC is limited to allowing appeals only under Constitutional grounds? Beathan - I am sure your proposition is a perfectly clear legal proposition, but I am guessing a lot of people in CDS, and I include myself in that, don't understand exactly what it implies or places in effect. If you do intend to put it forward as legislation, I think wording it in non-legal, clear language would be beneficial.

That said, I am with Pat - I don't see a need for a Judiciary. Most disputes in CDS stem from areas of law, rule or tradition that come under the umbrella of the Executive's duties. This was why my original discussions about arbitration with Pat and Beathan had it moved over to the Executive's area. Request action or a decision from the Executive, if the action is not justified within the laws and Constitution, have the right to appeal the decision to the SC. Gwyn gives a list of possible situations; i see all of those given as issues that could be dealt with by (throwing in a new option for a title here) dispute resolution.

A small roster of individuals with some experience of the laws and practises in CDS - past RA or SC members, long time residents - available and willing to resolve disputes where a citizen feels the Executive or the RA has failed to respond or has made an unfair or illegal decision. This group could be approved jointly by the RA and the Executive. Their role would be to communicate with all parties involved, look at the rationale for the original decision, or the information provided to show lack of response, and give an opinion and recommendation based on the law. In the case of a Chancellor's decision it might be that it should be reversed, or that the Chancellor be required to respond to an ignored complaint. In the case of the RA it might be to insist the ignored item be added to the next Agenda. It might even be reasonable to give them an expanded scope that allows them to direct a party in a dispute to make a public apology in the Forums and group notices in situations where the issue is over something said or done that causes distress to the person requesting dispute resolution - if we are creating a way to deal with disputes we can have it look whatever way we choose.

In all cases, the complaint, the resolution and the rationale for it would be posted on the Forums, so that there is a record of it and to form the basis of research for the SC if an appeal is filed. The actual process of fact finding and discussion of resolution could be done privately - removing the use of a complaint as a public spectacle for grinding axes and giving citizens a less formal and more convenient method of dealing with disputes.

There are very few incidences I can see where there could be any need for monetary penalties and even where there are it just isn't something I am comfortable with and I will have to give more thought to why that is. I suppose if someone decides to stand outside of my gallery in NFS at every event I hold there and yell to those attending that I am a crazy woman, that my art sucks and that it is scripted to steal all of their lindens the moment they rez it, I might have some cause for complaint. The critique of my art and sanity are probably covered by freedom of speech,but the claim that my artworks steals from people might give me grounds to claim a monetary loss - 'my sales at this event were half of the usual amount because the comments made people afraid to buy'. It's complex ground though - who gets to decide what my monetary loss actually is, or if it's ongoing since my reputation and honesty have been called in to question? In such cases I think the most that CDS can demand is public apology, a promise not to repeat the activity, and consequences like banishment if the behaviour reoccurs - all things which can be built into a dispute resolution framework.

Calli

[Gwyneth Llewelyn]

I just hope that the question of arbitration and its different possible interpretations of what it means and how it should be presented doesn't distract us too much from the core issue, which is how the SC gets new members and what its role is

Saying that, I'm neither "for" nor "against" a clear "arbitration role" for the SC: the current implied role has suited us quite well so far, and, to the best of my knowledge, hasn't really hurted anyone, even though a lot of requests to the SC got completely ignored in the past.

I'm also not "against" a separate Judiciary Branch. I wasn't against it in 2007; the only problem I had back then is that the proposed model had way too much power invested into a person that could not be removed from office — not even through impeachment. I believe, however, that we don't actually need such a complicated system. Back then we had the ambition to create moderation and arbitration facilities that went beyond the CDS and would be offered to the SL residents at large (not much unlike our "experiments" with CDS-Government-backed bonds as a way to raise capital for new sims; it was a relatively safe investment in an epoch where Ponzi schemes and other frauds were being offered in SL as "financial services"; since LL forbade all financial services in SL, that plan was also dropped). So it wasn't just something created to serve our community, but the whole of SL. In fact, LL, in 2010 or so, announced arbitration facilities by "alternative dispute resolution services" (external to them). We could have been on that list if we had established ourselves as an ADR back then, and it was really our intention to do so, even before LL announced their programme.

However, I also agree that this would not really be required for managing such a small community as ours. And, as said, in general, the current, informal system we have has handled things rather well so far. I'll stick to one of my favourite sayings, "If it isn't broken, don't attempt to fix it"

[FernLeissa]

I have read the posts in this thread but cannot establish clearly for myself why there is a call to abolish or reform the SC.

It appears that the two issues driving this call are 1) The SC’s decision “not to allow us to cast votes for the Representative Assembly “[STV] and 2) Soro’s appointment as Dean of the SC.

If not having enough candidates to have a “real” election is at issue, than we need to discuss the merits of our current laws regarding standing for and voting in a general election. (Might I note that this issue has not been raised with respect to the Chancellor’s position). The SC’s only job was to rule on Constitutionality, which it did.

If Soro’s appointment is a problem because people feel that he should not have been appointed during a period the RA was not meeting, then perhaps we should consider what Gwyn has suggested, that we need an amendment stipulating that SC appointments be made on a pre-determined schedule. My choice would be to have the RA remove themselves from the approval process of new SC members. I do not see any illegal behavior on the part of the SC given our existing laws.

In neither case do I see evidence that suggests that the SC is the central problem and that the RA should therefore seek impeachment of the existing members of the SC nor the restructuring of the SC itself.
I suggest that these types of disagreements with SC decisions are precisely why we need a branch of government, independent from the multiple and constantly changing personal opinions of individual citizens, RA members and members of the executive branch.

I don’t think the Chancellor should be allowed to appoint SC members, nor do I agree with the idea of RA members voting to approve new SC members. This seems contradictory to the idea behind a separation of powers.

I find the present structure of the SC – a self-appointed meritocracy of legislatively knowledgeable CDS citizens – to be a reasonably practical solution to maintaining the coherence and integrity of our democracy. I would like to see more evidence of the kind of egregious and consistent wrongdoing that might indicate a structural/organization problem before commencing with the dismantling and restructuring of the SC.

[Delia Lake]

I want to clarify the record regarding the nomination and confirmation of Soro Dagostino to the SC. Misinformation about that is running through this discussion thread, starting with Pat's statement of April 19:

Currently the SC appoints new members and can get round the need for RA approval by doing this in between elections when the RA might not be ready to meet. (This is how Soro was appointed some years ago).

There was no attempt whatsoever to get around RA confirmation. Soro was nominated to the SC at the meeting of 10 May 2010. The SC had recently had one of its members, Dnate Mars, who resigned due to RL commitments that precluded his continued participation as a member of the SC. The SC meeting transcript can be found at http://forums.slcds.info/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=2866. Patroklus Murakami was in attendance at that meeting. Gwyn Llewelyn was also at the meeting. Arria Perreault came in before the end of the meeting. All three were at that time members of the RA. Pat did object to Soro’s nomination during that meeting. However that SC meeting was the place for the SC to question a potential nominee as to his understanding of the SC and his commitment to uphold the CDS Constitution, Code of Laws and founding documents, which we did. Following questions and discussion, Soro was voted on to the SC by the then current SC and his nomination was forwarded to the LRA for confirmation by the RA. According to the CDS Constitution, in regard to the Philosophic Branch the RA provides a “vote of confidence on candidates to the Philosophic branch. This vote is in regards to their perceived likelihood to uphold the constitution” In the Code of Laws, NL 4-8 Scientific Council Affirmation Procedures Act states “if the RA fails to act on an SC nomination within 30 days of the Scientific Council Dean’s communicating notice of the nomination to the Leader of the RA, the nominee is confirmed automatically.”

From that SC Meeting transcript:

Delia Lake: Pat and Gwyn, if we nominate Soro and pass his nomination on to the RA you may question him there
Gwyneth Llewelyn *nods*
Patroklus Murakami: we will
Delia Lake: so then i call for a vote on the nomination of Soro Dagostino to join the ranks of the SC. all SC in favor?
Delia Lake: oops
Delia Lake: second
Claude Desmoulins: do we need a second?
Aliasi Stonebender: it's on the agenda, after all. but if we do, I'll second the call. And vote in favor.
Claude Desmoulins: in favor
Delia Lake: in favor
Danton Sideways: I'm in favor, and might mention that Soro is wearing an AA tag, and could bring diversity to the SC
Delia Lake: ty Soro. we will now forward your nomination to the RA

The LRA did schedule a RA meeting for 23 May 2010. The Agenda for that meeting is posted here http://forums.slcds.info/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=2876 and it includes as New Items c. “Confirmation of the election of Soro Dagostino as SC member. Although Pat said that the RA would question Soro at a meeting of the RA that did not happen. There is no transcript of that meeting posted. My recollection is that the meeting did not have a quorum. It may be regrettable but should not to be laid at the feet of the SC if the RA did not follow through.

The process of nomination and acceptance of Soro Dagostino to the SC was done in accord with the Constitution and Code of Laws in a scheduled SC public meeting. The LRA was notified and scheduled a meeting of the RA with Soro’s confirmation on the Agenda. It is all in the published record. The inference that the SC “sneaked in” Soro is simply not true. To imply that the SC does not follow the letter and spirit of the law when nominating new members and requesting RA confirmation then citing Soro’s nomination to the SC as an example is counterfactual. Anyone who checks the published accounts can verify Soro's nomination process for themselves. There are many good reasons to reevaluate and update the procedures of the SC. Not the least of which are cleaning up the current inclusions of remnants of the failed Judiciary that are still interspersed. Let’s not muddy the waters by throwing around erroneous examples.

~Delia

[Delia Lake]

Here's the "ancient history" url where the founders (including Gwyn) discuss the thinking behind the differences for the three branches of our government that Gwyn was looking for and unable to find in her post on p.1 of this thread. http://forums-archive.secondlife.com/10 ... 948/1.html

[Patroklus Murakami]

Delia

Our perspectives are always going to differ on what the SC was up to when it appointed Soro to the SC *at the end of the term*, when RA meetings are *often inquorate* and when looming elections mean that there is *often a gap* before the new RA takes office. Maybe it was just, ahem, 'coincidental' that the SC appointed Soro but he was hardly a non-controversial appointment. Had he appeared at a quorate RA meeting he would have been questioned closely. I doubt I would have supported his nomination.

So maybe it wasn't deliberate but it was a poor decision by the SC to push through Soro's nomination at the end of a term when, historically, RAs enter a 'lame duck' period where they often fail to meet.

What your account omits though is that, at the subsequent SC meeting on 9 June 2010, the timing of Soro's appointment was acknowledged to be less than ideal by one of the SC members present:

Arria Perreault: yes, the meeting where the LRA was elected
Danton Sideways: so wellcome, Soro
StuiChicanne Darkstone: well it's not strange that
StuiChicanne Darkstone:
Soro Dagostino: Thank you.
StuiChicanne Darkstone: let's not cry over spilt milk
Claude Desmoulins: If so, then with due respect to all the MRA sitting here, the responsibility for the lack of discussion rests with the RA.
Danton Sideways: Well the timing was very poor
Danton Sideways: elections and all
Claude Desmoulins: Granted, it did create additional challenge.
Danton Sideways: SC nominations should be made during the term
Delia Lake: and in fact, the RA has had 2 meetings. Soro's certification was on the agenda for the last meeting of the 12th RA
StuiChicanne Darkstone: ha that went inquorate too Dee
Arria Perreault: Stui has chaired this meeting and there was no quorum
StuiChicanne Darkstone: I remember because I was LRA thingee sit in spare wheelus
Callipygian Christensen: You areon my lap Jamie
Delia Lake: that the RA neither had a quorum nor raised the issue at that meeting does not invalidate NL 4-8

But the main point is to move on and make sure this can never happen again. I'll post a bill later which will repeal NL 4-8 and make it impossible for new SC members to be appointed without RA confirmation.

[Patroklus Murakami]

These next two posts are a bill and a Constitutional Amendment to enact the kind of SC reform I have been describing. I ask that these be put on the agenda for the next RA meeting on 12 May and that we vote on these reform proposals.

====================================================================================
Scientific Council Affirmation Procedures Act

Preamble
This Act clarifies the way in which the Representative Assembly will provide a vote of confidence on candidates to the Scientific Council. The intention is that the SC, candidates for the SC and the RA will work together cooperatively to interview candidate SC members at the earliest opportunity and affirm (or deny) the appointment.

• 1. NL 4-8 Scientific Council Affirmation Procedures Act is repealed.

  2. When new members are appointed to the SC, the Dean of the SC will notify the LRA by sending them a notecard.

  3. The LRA will put affirmation of the candidate SC member on the agenda for the next scheduled RA meeting and invite the candidate SC member to attend the meeting. If the candidate SC member is unable to attend the next scheduled RA meeting, the LRA will schedule another meeting at a time which the candidate SC member can attend.

  4. Candidate SC members need to be ratified by a majority of RA seats before they join the SC.

  5. If the RA fails to ratify the nomination of a candidate SC member within 30 days of the Dean of the SC communicating notice of the nomination to the LRA, the candidacy automatically fails.

[Patroklus Murakami]

This is the Constitutional Amendment to enact SC reform. It does the following:
1. It changes the nomination procedure so that, instead of a 'self-selecting meritocracy', the Chancellor nominates new SC members who are then ratified (or not) by the RA. The Chancellor only gets to do this once a year (or when seats become vacant).
2. It makes it clear that the SCs role is to interpret and enforce the constitution and not to act as arbitrators in private disputes.
3. It limits the SC to five members who serve a five-year term.
4. It sets out transitional arrangements for the move from the current SC to the New SC.

================================================================================================
Amend Article II, Section 2 and Article III to read:

Article II – The Executive
Section 2 – Powers of the Chancellor
The Chancellor of CDS shall, subject to the laws of CDS, have the power:
…

(f) to make regulations pursuant to the above;

(g) to enforce such regulations in accordance with law; and
(h) nominate candidates for vacant seats on the New Scientific Council.

Article III – The Philosophic Branch
Section 1 – The New Scientific Council
The New Scientific Council (SC) is a group of constitutional experts. It replaces the old Scientific Council. Its governmental role is to interpret and enforce the constitution. Its service role is to moderate CDS forums and events.
Section 2 – The New Scientific Council Body
The New SC is comprised of 5 members including a single Dean. Members are nominated by the Chancellor and take office when ratified by the Representative Assembly. Members serve a five year term of office which ends on 31 May. Members of the New SC can be removed from office by a vote of 2/3 of the other SC members.
Section 3 – The New Scientific Council Leader
The Dean is elected by a simple majority vote of all members.
Section 4 – Proceedings
The SC will convene at least once per month. The SC may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior and with the concurrence of two-thirds expel a member from a session.
Section 5 – Journal
The SC shall keep and publish a journal of its proceedings. All individual votes of the members of the SC on any question shall always be entered in the journal, along with a statement regarding their personal philosophy on a given vote.
Section 6 – Ratification of bills passed by the Representative Assembly
Chairs of the SC will ratify bills passed by the Representative Assembly by simple majority vote and may resubmit the bill with modifications for vote.
Section 7 – Powers of the New SC
In regards to the Representative branch:

The Philosophic branch may veto or rewrite and resubmit a bill or constitutional amendment if it is in violation of any of the founding documents.

The SC can seek impeachment of members of the Representative branch for violating the constitution or acting illegally.
Section 8 – Transitional Arrangements
The transition from the old Scientific Council to the New Scientific Council requires a set of transitional arrangements. The Chancellor will nominate 5 members to comprise the New Scientific Council by 31 May 2012. This first set of members will serve one year, two year, three year, four year and five year terms respectively. The New Scientific Council will take office when the RA has ratified at least three of the five nominations. The old Scientific Council remains in office until the New Scientific Council takes office.

[Delia Lake]

I agree that the timing at the end of the RA term posed some challenges for the RA but that often happens in life. The SC was responding to Dnate's resignation that April. It is unlikely that Dnate was thinking "If I resign from the SC now it will really cause difficulties for the RA." Dnate's resignation did mean that the SC had to take a look at its situation as a responsible branch of government and make some choices, one of which was replacing him. Was that necessary at all, and if so when. Context matters in making choices. At that time in May of 2010 the CDS was going through significant changes. It looked like the merger with AA was a done deal and that would be a permanent doubling of what had been the population and number of sims in the CDS previously. The campaigning rules were changing. The voting system was changing. All of these had the potential for increasing the workload of the SC. Could the SC have waited to nominate a replacement until the 13th RA was up and running? Perhaps. Realistically that incoming RA would not have been prepared to confirm a nominee at their first organizing meeting in June, so in all likelihood the SC nomination and confirmation would have been pushed out until July. It then would have been three months from the time Dnate resigned until his replacement joined the SC. Would that have been in the best interest of the community to intentionally have a reduced strength SC during a time of change? We decided that the community would be best served at that time by replacing Dnate with a qualified candidate as quickly as possible and talked with three people about joining the SC: Soro, Jamie Palisades and Micael Khandr. Each of these people had served the CDS in government positions previously. Soro was the one of them who was interested in joining the SC. We held a public SC meeting as reported above, voted that Soro become a member of the SC and requested that the LRA schedule a meeting of the RA with Soro's confirmation on the Agenda. The LRA did that. In a perfect world Dnate might have resigned from the SC in February, and been replaced in March.

In a perfect world we would only have to deal with unexpected change when it was "convenient." Even a virtual world is not a perfect world. The SC has to be prepared to handle issues when they arise. So does the Chancellor. So does the RA. When RA members take office it is for a 6-month term, not a 5 or 5.5 month term with the first and last weeks designated as non-functional times. The end of any previous RA term ends on the day that the next RA takes office, not before that. I do have sympathy for the difficulties of scheduling inworld meetings across so many RL timezones, and among volunteers who have to fulfill their commitments in their RL as well. It's not easy. And that is exactly why we have the 30 day period (that's 1/5 of a term of an RA) for the RA to act on confirmation of SC nominees. Granted that the 12th RA only had 20 days left in its term. But it shouldn't take long to confirm or not whether it is likely that a new member of the SC will be able and willing to uphold the CDS Constitution and Code of Laws. Maybe 15 minutes at the very most from start to finish if that were all that was on the RA meeting agenda? I find it hard to believe that there was no 15 minute period within the 20 days remaining to its term that a quorum of RA could have convened inworld to vote on that single, specific issue.

[Bagheera]

*gack* So much for the forums being an opportunity for RA members to listen to their constituents. Pat, within this discussion, people have been willing to consider some of what you suggested and outright opposed other elements. However, the amendment you have written appears to reflect none of that discussion but is wholly shaped on your original idea. I am really disappointed.

[Gwyneth Llewelyn]

Delia,

Double-thanks to you for the clarifications and the precious link you've found. I have to apologise if my memory didn't serve me right regarding Soro's appointment; on the other hand, I maintain that the letter of the law of the appointment was dutifully followed. There is no question about that. I understood that Pat's comments were regarding the spirit of the law, which might perhaps not have been followed with the same duty. However, I also think that since it was not really publicly questioned at that time, we should not dwell on the issue so much...

On the other hand, having just read the SC's deliberation on declaring the RA's last meeting as invalid for not following proper procedure is a good start in trying to have a bit more rigour when publishing meetings I know I've been often accused in the past (mostly in private, though...) for failing to uphold the strictest procedure. In fact, I've just noticed that the SC has not been following its own strict meeting procedure, either, even though I understand that those rules might be outdated and should be revised and simplified (see http://forums.slcds.info/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=3675 which alludes to some procedural changes)...

Anyway. I would also like to second Bagheera's comments. I was perhaps a bit shocked that after so many comments here from the citizens, Pat completely ignored them. The only point that seems to be "new" is that there is a "transitional arrangement" — which was unclear in the first posts and is now made crystal clear. The rest basically remains.

Now, from my representatives, I would expect at least some valid reasoning for proposing a law that does not meet with the citizen's approval. I'm not claiming that "the citizens are always right"; I don't even believe in the "wisdom of the crowds", either. I just find it a bit strange, as we approach election time, that the RA is deciding to abolish the SC as we know it, and replace it by a "puppet branch" full in control by the RA. I can only assume that such a move has enough popular backing or solid reasons why it is a good idea or a good move. The ones presented here were clearly insufficient to gather any popular support, and I expect that my representatives will take it in consideration when voting on the bill (or maybe I should get the guys from Avaaz send all representatives tens of thousands of emails Hmm. That gave me an idea. ).

In exercising my right as a citizen to submit proposals for legislation to be discussed and eventually approved at the RA, I'm submitting a notecard to the LRA for a bill to be included on the next agenda:

CDSL #### - "Reinforcing the Balance of Power Act"

Preamble

Since very early in the history of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, the three branches have tried by every legal means to change the balance of power between themselves by either reinterpreting the extent of the powers granted by them constitutionally, or, in the case of the Representative Assembly, by either passing laws or constitutional amendments changing these same powers. Specially in the case of constitutional changes, and since the Scientific Council has no power to veto constitutional amendments (all constitutional amendments have to be approved, because, by definition, they change the applicability of the Constitution; and the Scientific Council's power to interpret the laws based on the founding documents, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Linden Lab's Code of Conduct and Terms of Service was abolished long ago), this means that effectively is able to curb the power — and the checks of balances — of the other two branches regarding itself.

While this is often desirable in a community subject to many changes over the years, and the freedom to be able to adapt the Constitution as the Confederation of Democratic Simulators changes is highly necessary, this can also effectively conduct to abuses of power, specially in the cases where discussion has not been exhaustive and/or clearly misrepresents the will of the citizens as expressed publicly. Even though legislation is often reverted and abolished on subsequent terms, using the principle of democratic rotativity to elect new representatives on a term to revert specific laws, Constitutional changes tend to be harder to revert and have potentially more damaging effects. Also due to the small size of the Representative Assembly, a 2/3 majority vote of all members is usually not hard to get, specially on items that reinforce the Representative Assembly's power regarding other branches.

To avoid abuses, thus, this bill introduces the notion that any changes proposed by the Representative Assembly to change the constitutionally granted powers, checks, and balances of the other branches has first to meet approval by a Joint Committee between members of the Representative Assembly and members of the branch which is being changed, after sufficient public discussion has been completed.

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Constitutional Amendment

Add a new paragraph to Article I, Section 8 at the end:

Article I — The Representative Branch
Section 8 – Limits on the RA

[...]
Any proposal by the Representative Assembly to change, delete, limit, or add further powers to the other branches, as well as change, delete, limit, or add checks and balances between the other branches and itself, require a previous approval by a Joint Committee between members of the Representative Assembly and members of the branch which is being changed, after sufficient public discussion has been completed.

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New bill

Joint Committee Act

In order to comply with the limitations of the Representative Assembly regarding proposed changes, deletions, limitations, or additions to powers, checks, and balances between the Representative Assembly and the Executive Branch and/or the Philosophy Branch (Scientific Council), this bill mandates the following:

1. A motion to begin discussion of a proposed change, deletion, limitation, or addition to powers, checks, and balances to the specified branch is to be approved by the RA by a simple majority vote. If the motion carries, a Joint Committee is appointed using the RA procedures and the applicable laws for empowering a committee.
2. The total number of members of the RA participating on the Joint Committee cannot exceed half the number of the current members of the branch whose powers are being changed.
3. Immediately after the meeting where the motion was carried, the Leader of the RA notifies the leader of the branch whose powers are being changed under the motion to designate a number of its own members for the Joint Committee, and proposes a date for its first meeting, within a limit of 15 days.
4. Failure of either branch to provide members to the Joint Committee and/or boycotting/stalling the meetings are considered serious offenses and may be basis for impeachment.
5. If the total number of members in the Joint Committee is even, a citizen (not holding office on any branch of Government) is asked to join.
6. At the same time that the date for the first meeting is set, the meeting and its agenda (which will include the original motion for discussion) is to be published on the official forums of the Confederation of Democratic Simulators, and citizen participation is encouraged.
7. Procedure and deliberation of the Joint Committee shall be followed as per the meeting procedures of the Representative Assembly regarding committees, to the exclusion of any others.
8. Citizens are welcome to attend and participate in the open and public meetings of the Joint Committee.
9. The Joint Committee will attempt to reach a consensus on the final wording of the proposed change within the time frame of the current term of the RA, or until the end of the subsequent term if the motion is proposed within three months of the end of the current RA term.
10. If no consensus is reached, the motion is declared null and void.
11. At the moment consensus is reached, and if sufficient input has also been gathered from the public — either via the official CDS forums or by direct participation in the Joint Committee meetings — the final wording of the proposed changes are resubmitted to the Leader of the RA as a new motion to be approved.
12. Approval of the final wording at the subsequent RA meeting will follow any established procedures or laws for passing a Constitutional amendment.
13. Changes affecting simultaneously more than one branch (besides the RA) require separate motions, which are to be discussed by different Joint Committees, to be held simultaneously or subsequently at the RA's discretion.