Reforming the Scientific Council

[Beathan]

Although I also advocate some reform, I think that Pat's proposal goes a bit too far and does not track with ongoing discussions, both inworld and in the forums. However, I also cannot support Gwyn's proposal to tie the hands of the most democratic arm of government to save the anti-democratic mechanism of selection to the least democratic arm of government.

To that end, I propose the following revisions to Pat's proposals:

Scientific Council Affirmation Procedures Act

Preamble
This Act clarifies the way in which the Representative Assembly will provide a vote of confidence on candidates to the Scientific Council. The intention is that the SC, candidates for the SC and the RA will work together cooperatively to interview candidate SC members at the earliest opportunity and affirm (or deny) the appointment.

1. NL 4-8 Scientific Council Affirmation Procedures Act is repealed.

2. If there is a vacancy on the SC, that vacancy shall be publicized and citizens shall submit notifications of their willingness to serve on the SC within fourteen days of the publication of the notice of vacancy.

3. Within fourteen days of the completion of the notice of candidacy periods, the SC shall evaluate the candidates and shall inform the RA of the results of such evaluations.

4. The LRA will put affirmation of the candidate SC member on the agenda for the next scheduled RA meeting and invite the candidate SC members to attend the meeting. If a candidate SC member is unable to attend the next scheduled RA meeting, the LRA will schedule another meeting at a time which the candidate SC member can attend. Any candidate member who has not attended an RA meeting within thirty days of the date of the SC evaluation shall have their name withdrawn from the list of candidates.

5. If there are more remaining candidates than open seats, then the RA shall vote on the candidates. The SC shall seat the candidates in order of approval by the RA.

Article III – The Philosophic Branch

Section 1 – The Scientific Council

The Scientific Council (SC) is a group of constitutional experts. Its governmental role is to interpret and enforce the constitution. Its service role is to moderate CDS forums and events.

Section 2 – The Scientific Council Body
The New SC is comprised of 5 members including a single Dean. Members take office upon completion of the applicable statutory process for appointment to the SC. If there is no statutory process, then the SC may establish its own procedures for seating new members. Members of the SC can be removed from office by a vote of 2/3 of the other SC members or by impeachment by the RA.

Section 3 – The Scientific Council Leader

The Dean is elected by a simple majority vote of all members.

Section 4 – Proceedings

The SC will convene at least once per month. The SC may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior and with the concurrence of two-thirds expel a member from a session.

Section 5 – Journal

The SC shall keep and publish a journal of its proceedings. All individual votes of the members of the SC on any question shall always be entered in the journal, along with a statement regarding their personal philosophy on a given vote.

Section 6 – Powers of the SC

In regards to the Representative branch:


The Philosophic branch may veto or resubmit a bill or constitutional amendment if it is in violation of any of the founding or constitutional documents or the UDHR.


The SC can seek impeachment of members of the Representative branch for violating the constitution or acting illegally.

The SC may review the outcome of any judicial decision or executive action and may invalidate any such decision or action if it is in violation of any of the founding or constitutional documents or the UDHR.


Section 7 -- Transitional Arrangements

The SC shall continue with its current members until its number falls below 5 by resignation or removal of members.

I'm not completely happy with this reworked proposal, either. However, I am anxious to finish some work on the SC this term.

Beathan

[Gwyneth Llewelyn]

I'm not happy with the wording, either, but I have to say it's a far better move towards a compromise. Thanks for posting it, Beathan.

BTW, why the "anxiety" of "finishing" work on the SC this term — specially during the campaigning days?

[Patroklus Murakami]

Here are a few thoughts in response to some of the comments in this thread.

I have considered all of the feedback both in this thread and in world at the RA meeting and in discussion with individuals (including the Dean of the SC). This has led to at least one change - setting the new SC at five instead of three members - but I accept that is quite a minor alteration. I'm still open to other ideas and a compromise may well be necessary in order to enact SC reform. But I decided to post a relatively 'pure' implementation of what I am proposing because I still think that it's the right way forward. I have read peoples' contributions very carefully (including Gwyn's lengthy posts) but I disagree with them fundamentally and have not been convinced by the arguments put forward.

There is also a slight hint of "the RA should not be doing this, at least not without the SCs consent" which I completely disagree with. I'm with Beathan on this one. The SC is an unelected body. Not only was the RA elected but I ran on a manifesto including proposals for SC reform. I consider that I have a mandate to pursue the reforms I proposed before my election back in November. Gwyn's notion that we should bind the hands of the RA by forcing it to give a veto to other branches of government not provided for in the Constitution is entirely retrograde and regressive in my view. We can't be dependent on the willingness of the SC to accept reform. It is the RAs job to amend the Constitution and this gives it the right to reform the SC *regardless of what they may want us to do*. I do hope there is no veiled threat from the SC that "we might veto your reform if we decide we don't like it".

I think that there is room to find a compromise but time is tight before Saturday's meeting on 12 May (and this RA will probably only meet once more before its term ends). So I'd like to focus on a key issue which seems to separate me and Beathan - nomination of SC members. Enacting this kind of reform is actually very difficult as we need 4 out of 5 votes to enact a Constitutional Amendment. That is a very high bar (as it should be).

If I've understood Beathan's proposal correctly, he would like to retain the current arrangements where the SC selects new members. Several other people have said similar things in this thread or said they oppose the Chancellor making nominations. Here is why I disagree. The Scientific Council is the worst group to select its own members. 'Self-selection' is exceptionally ripe for abuse. So far, the SC has tended to recruit a diverse group of people who (mostly) understand the Constitution. But there is no guarantee that they will continue to do so. If the SC wanted to simply recruit clones of itself or, worse still, people from only one political viewpoint or clique, they would be perfectly capable of doing so. (If they put the names forward around now, when the RA often fails to meet and the new one is not yet in place, they can also circumvent any oversight by the RA). I concede that the current SC members are actually quite good people to judge whether someone is capable of defending and interpreting the Constitution but that does not mean they should choose their members! Perhaps some role in advising the RA would be more appropriate?

I think the Chancellor is best placed to fulfil the role of nominating new SC members. Apart from the transitional period, the Chancellor would usually only nominate one SC member a year. That's not even one per term. A Chancellor would have to be in power for three terms (or longer) to nominate two or more of the SC (apart from filling unexpected vacancies when people leave before their term is up). No Chancellor could determine the make up of the SC so their power would be limited. The Chancellor's power to make 'political' appointments would also be limited by the need to get RA approval for every member. This provides the kind of checks and balances we have striven to include in our governmental system. I see that there is concern that the Chancellor would have 'too much power' with this proposal but I hope I have demonstrated that this power is quite severely constrained. With Chancellor's only usually appointing one SC member per year, some one-term Chancellors will not even get that opportunity. I'm happy to continue debating this one but I really think we need to get away from the SC 'self-selecting' its own members. Imagine if the RA did that!

[Beathan]

Pat,

My proposal doesn't limit SC members to those selected by the SC. Rather, it allows anyone to nominate anyone -- including a person to nominate himself or herself -- during a publicized nominating period (to allow for people who might not realize that there is an opening to put their hat in the ring). The SC's role in nomination is advisory. I thought about giving the SC the right to veto a nomination, but decided against it. I don't want the Chancellor nominating candidates any more than I want the SC nominating them. I want that process to be wide open to all citizens, rather than being a nomination funnel.

Gwyn --

My anxiety arises from the fact that I campaigned on this issue and I don't want to leave campaign promises made last election unresolved this term. It is one thing to try to pass legislation on a promise and failing due to opposition (that happened this term, too). It is quite another thing to campaign on getting something done and then having the entire session pass without even considering, proposing or voting on relevant legislation.

Beathan

[Delia Lake]

Before we embark on any significant reform of the SC, it seems to me that we should discuss some basic questions, starting with

What is the purpose of the Scientific Council?

The functions, roles and structure should in my opinion follow and support the purpose. To start with roles or structure would then force a narrow purpose inside the functionality

Is the purpose of the Scientific Council to provide balance of power as one of three co-equal branches of government? Or is it something else?

In the CDS Constitution Article III - The Philosophic Branch says that the governmental role of the Scientific Council “is to interpret and enforce the constitution. Its service roll (ed. note: sic) is to resolve citizen disputes and moderate user forums and events.” The Constitution is the outcome of lots of discussion about what government should be and do in a virtual community. The purpose, discussed in the archived conversations of 2004 is one of balance of power. http://forums-archive.secondlife.com/10 ... 948/1.html They raised many concerns and wrestled with potential issues they anticipated could arise. They were looking ahead at what they thought they would like as a community structure, what they thought would work for people. I’m not saying we should keep the purpose and structure of the SC the way it is. I am saying that we should make our changes thoughtfully, that we should take the time to go back and read why the folks who set up the original government of Neualtenberg decided to try the set up that we have inherited. As a community we should discuss and decide what we want of our government. In 2012, we look to what might be the future of the CDS community with now over 7 years of experience on which to draw. Given that, I echo a number of Gwyn’s questions in her posts. Is the SC, and the RA and the Chancellorship for that matter, performing the duties that we want to have done for us?

Once we have some consensus on the purpose of the SC, let’s define its roles and structure. If resolving citizen disputes, for example, is to remain a function of the SC, we need a somewhat different structure and perhaps composition than if the function is solely to ensure compliance with the Constitution. If we change the Constitution regarding the SC, have we made sure that we have also changed the areas in the other Articles about the other government branches where they interact with the SC. Sometimes in the past legislatures have changed one part of the Constitution but left in other parts duties that conflict with the new ones. And it’s not only the Constitution we need to look at but the Code of Laws as well. When the Judiciary was developed then disbanded, some of the duties intended for that body were assigned instead to the SC. However the structure of the SC as originally set up is akin to that of a University: Professors, Chairs and a Dean. The role required of someone performing dispute resolution is somewhat different than that of go-to Constitutional expert.

In the current Code of Laws, NL 5-16, often called “the Soothsayer Rules” outlines a complaint and trial procedure. But the SC is not currently really structured to conduct trials. Neither are the laws or LL policies of conduct set up to mete out punishments within a virtual community, and many would say they should not be.

NL 5-19 Judiciary Revision Procedure Act reads:

Our experience with the Judiciary has brought it to our attention that revisions are needed to protect citizen’s rights and to make sure that the power of the judiciary is balanced with that of other branches. This bill changes the code of procedure to accommodate changes in the constitution and plots a way forward towards future judiciary-oriented legislation.

The Code of Procedure is amended to replace all references to the ‘Chair of the Judiciary Commission’ with ‘the Dean of the Scientific Council.’
Starting with the new session the RA will appoint a committee to work with the SC to develop a model for the judiciary functions of the CDS. The committee will solicit public input about proposals as they are developed, then report back to the RA.

The SC will participate only to provide ideas and advice. In order to protect the separation of powers the report and recommendations presented to the RA by will be that of the RA members only and not the SC.
passed 6 January 2007

To my knowledge, no one ever followed up on this sufficiently to provide “a model for the judiciary functions of the CDS.” Yet the law stands.

So my main point is that there is a real need to take a look at the purpose, role and structure of the SC, but to jump hastily to make significant changes without thoughtful consideration and integration is unwise.

~Delia

[Shep]

Forgive me .. but if this was meant to have been sorted in 2007 it hardly feels like rushing into action to deal with it now .....

[Beathan]

Delia,

We have a code of judicial procedure. The SC was directed to follow it. There was to be a re-evaluation to determine whether or not it should be changed. It was not changed. That does not necessarily mean that there was a failure. That could equally well mean that the judicial procedure was deemed adequate and that the SC should have followed it. One of my criticisms of the SC -- perhaps my major criticism -- is that the SC has not followed those procedures but has completely disregarded them.

Also, in revertingthe judicial function to the SC, the RA has already defined the role of the SC and has given it a judicial role. This makes our three branches of government more familiar, not less familiar, from the kind of functions we know in real life. Most governments (with the exception of Marxist-Leninist governments or Islamist governments) don't have a "philosophical" or "ideological" branch. Most governments (perhaps all governments) do have a judicial branch. I don't really see the problem in the SC being primarily judicial -- or the problem with not having a "philosophical" branch of government at all.

Beathan

[Patroklus Murakami]

Beathan

Thank you for clarifying that you were proposing open nominations for the SC rather than retaining the current 'self-selection'. I need to think a bit more about how this would work before I could abandon my proposal that the Chancellor would nominate and the RA provide the vote of confidence.

How do you feel about the SC serving fixed terms though? If I have read your proposal correctly, the current SC would retain their seats until they decide to retire. New members would only be appointed once the number falls below five and they too would be appointed for life. Is that what you intended? I would hope that a fixed term (say 3-5 years) would be a good way to ensure some rotation of officials. If we allowed good SC members to be reappointed then we could also retain experienced SC members when it is sensible to do so.

Delia

I think the basic questions you have outlined have been addressed. Possibly not to your satisfaction but enough for the RA to make some decisions. I've read the material from the Founders' discussions back when the government was being established. Some of it is still relevant, some less so. In my view, the government was intended to have 'separation of branches' and 'checks and balances' between the different branches in line with US constitutional theory. The branches were a bit different from the standard ones but we have moved towards a more 'orthodox' arrangement over time. This is implicit (but not explicit) in the Constitution. Each branch has some power over the other branches.

My drafting, and Beathan's variation, is clear: the SC is there to interpret and uphold the Constitution and moderate user forums and events. All else flows from that. I also took the opportunity to delete a lot of archaic code put in during the debate on the Judiciary Bill and then left there when the Judiciary was abolished.

We need to pass SC reform to tackle the fundamentals - the selection method, ratification of appointments and preferably a period of office so we get some rotation of members. There is a lot more to do to sort out the SC but... the remainder can happen in slower time. A lot of this is for the SC to sort out in my view. SC procedures should be something the SC tackles rather than looking to the RA to solve all of these issues in one fell swoop. I also think it's important to do this now, before the end of term, before any momentum is lost. Otherwise, we will have failed to take a good incremental step in the right direction.

[Beathan]

Pat,

You are right. My proposal has no term limit for the SC and that produces the possibility of indefinite, even lifetime, service after initial appointment. One of the primary concerns raised in this thread is the independence of the SC. That has been the primary objection to our having an RA role in appointment. I think that concern is legitimate, but is not sufficient to rebut the reasonable check and balance on the SC provided by RA appointment or approval of appointment. However, I do want to avoid the problem Gwyn noted of having the SC feel beholden to the RA and therefore act as a rubber stamping body rather than a reviewing body. I think that complete independence after an initial scrutiny in the approval process provides this balance. I note that Calli thinks that I get the balance wrong -- and suggested that we retain unfettered SC control over its own membership appointments checked by term limits. I think that provides no check or balance on the SC. I am aiming for a checked independence.

Beathan

[Gwyneth Llewelyn]

I suggest that one reads the old forum thread that Delia posted earlier, to give a sense of what was intended with the Scientific Council, and why it is important that it remains independent and neutral. Of course a lot has changed since than — eight years is a lot of time — but some major principles remain in place. The idea is that the RA has always the power to remove members of the SC if they clearly are misbehaving, abusing power, and so forth; but while they don't, they remain as a meritocracy.

About the pitfalls of why "mob rule" (otherwise known as "wisdom of the crowds") sometimes fail and why it is important to have the power to prevent "mob rule" from overthrowing democratic institutions:

I'll give a couple of examples of how individual (selfish) choices can collectively be detrimental to a society. The classic example is people at a concert who initially are sitting, can see the stage, and are comfortable. As one person makes an individual (selfish) choice to stand, the people behind, who can no longer see, will make the same choice. Eventually, the entire stadium is standing. They all made natural choices but they are worse of as everyone has to stand throughout the entire concert.

Another example of this behavior is tax cuts or increases passed by majority vote. In Colorado, a law was passed a few years ago giving citizens the ability to approve by vote increases in taxes to support education. Naturally, most people voted down (and continue to vote down) the tax increases year after year slowly starving schools. Schools responded by cutting music, gym, and extracurricular activities. This directly effected test scores, college admission rates, and the socioeconomic status of all children in the district. (You can read about recent controversies here, if you're interested.)

Worse still are situations where politicians also reap short-term benefits from tax cuts. For instance, a politician will promise a tax cut (selfish to get elected) and citizens vote them in (selfish to get a refund) at the detriment of the society by driving it into debt.

These are good examples of where democracy (mob rule) fails. People will often vote to maximize their short-term personal benefit even if in the long run they will eventually suffer. There should exist a branch which stops this kind of behavior by calling it out and vetoing the tax break for the benefit of the society. Needless to say this has to be a group which is not democratically elected! (I've been thinking about this for a while.) (I've heard democracy described as three wolves and a lamb voting on what's for dinner.)
[...]
Never thought you'd see a government with both an antidemocratic and anticapitalist stance backed by logical arguments did you? The goal is to reap all the benefits of a democracy, a meritocracy, and a worker cooperative, while avoiding their downside. So ideally, all of the checks and balances should exist to answer the question, "What do I do to mitigate the bad side of that type of government in that branch, while simultaneously preventing abuse in my own branch?" It's a beastie, isn't it!?

In that thread, Billy Grace ("a lost user") plays devil's advocate. He was in favour of a system where all branches, without exception, were to be elected democratically, and — like Pat and others — questioned very thoroughly the wisdom of having some branches selected by a different method than universal suffrage. Talen Morgan argued that while he was fine with the initial composition of the SC as a self-selected branch, future members should be approved by the "senate" (= Representative Assembly) in order to prevent the SC only to become an "old buddies' club" (my words, not his). This lead to the current system that SC members should be subject by a "vote of confidence" by the RA after being nominated by the SC but before actually taking office.

My point here is not to say that Ulrika Zugzwang was a genius of some sort and always right (Oh, how convoluted our history is...) My point is just that all this was thoroughly discussed, years and years ago. It was not done "on a whim" without logical arguments. Even the idea of having 3 branches selected by different methods was not clear nor obvious from the very start; it was an idea that had to grow through debate and discussion. Other things — like the lack of an Executive — were thought to be unnecessary as the group was still small (half the size of today) and the RA met often and was able to pretty much manage everything. Nevertheless, the SC was found to be a much more reasonable choice since the very beginning — the biggest change it went through was the removal of the option to veto based on "common sense" (because this did, indeed, lead to abuse).

This is mostly the reason why I'm reluctant to make "too many changes with little discussion", specially when they're drastic Constitutional changes. The whole point of having a history is to see that we did, indeed, discuss pretty much everything in the past, and the solution that was picked was the result of logical argumentation, long debate, and thorough discussion. It was not merely a whim, or an "experiment" — "let's try it out and see if it works". It also had the advantage of not mixing personal issues with institutional ones: the current argument that "member X has made a mistake on branch Y, so let's change branch Y completely" didn't happen yet, since nobody was in office yet. This lead the discussion to be focused on institutional relationships as opposed to personal ones. As soon as personal issues pop up, the temptation to change everything so that person X can be "ignored" or even "thrown out" due to personal dislikes is too great. One of the reasons for having an SC is to make sure that legislation is not passed "against" a specific, individual citizen (or a group of citizens) that are disliked, but that legislation focuses instead on the purpose of the CDS as a whole, and its institutions in particular.

There is a mechanism with dealing with "unpopular" members of any branch — or incompetent ones. It's called impeachment. We did impeach people in the past for failing to uphold the Constitution or due to technical irregularities. Aye, it was ugly, and unfair to some, but there always has been that choice. For the past eight years I have always encouraged dealing with irregularities strictly related to one member or a group of members with impeachment, instead of hacking and slashing at the Constitution until it becomes a pale shadow of what it used to be. Over and over again in our history we have taken the opposite approach: weakening the branches more and more in order to keep "unpopular" members at bay. That's why we got rid of factions too, for example. One day, we might get rid of the whole RA as a whole and just use direct democracy for deciding things. For a long period of our time we had groups of citizens pushing for a "tribal government" (adhocracy) where people interested in discussing something would simply assemble, put things to the vote, and whoever popped up at the meeting would command the destiny of the CDS — unimpeded, unstopped, without restrictions.

In fact, similar models have been tried all over SL with different communities.

None of them survived.

We're the only one which is still around after eight years, and is still a representative democracy, and still has checks and balances between its branches. I would really ask you to consider what that means. People come and go in the CDS, all the time. Nevertheless, thanks to the privilege and good fortune of having a rather good Constitution — not a perfect one: there is no such thing as "perfection" in democracy — perfection is a goal which gets redefined as time goes on — we're still around and able to talk about our history with some pride: it lead us to today, where we still have a CDS to talk about.

So... when hacking and slashing at the Constitution, throwing essential things away, ignoring the will of the citizens who claim against the proposals, just because "we have the power to change and will make the change, no matter what anyone says against it" is, IMHO, childish and immature. And we have a rather mature democracy, which should allow us to make pondered decisions.

Again, I ask... what is the problem with the SC as it is? Let's forget personal peeves; personal dislikes about members X or Y; faults and errors (we're human, and to be human is to err); as well as philosophical theories about how certain aspects of the CDS are a "abomination". What is, indeed, the problem with the SC?

Is it because some members subvert it and abuse its powers? Impeach them.
Is it because some members of the SC refuse to restrict themselves to their appointed roles? Impeach them.
It's because some SC members refuse to approve useful laws, because they "dislike" them and shield themselves behind clever argumentation? Impeach them!
It is because the SC is using "loopholes" to "steer" legislation towards a goal which is against the will of the RA and the citizens who elected them? Well, what are those loopholes? Probably badly worded laws, or misinterpreted laws. Correct them, clarify them, rewrite them so that they make sense.

Because the rest is basically throwing the baby out with the bathwater, just "because we can". Of course the RA can do whatever they please. The big question is if they should do it (specially if it's clear that they aren't even doing it for popular reasons). And the other question is, "isn't there a simpler solution to address the problems, whatever they are, instead of getting rid of everything?" This should be a mandatory skill for any RA member to apply for office: the ability to provide solutions within the existing framework instead of being lazy and change the framework itself...

[Gwyneth Llewelyn]

Ah, I missed some of the posts... my fault really. I take too long writing things and sometimes some posts are added that invalidate my own points lol

Anyway, I have now a different question. If the role of the SC is to remain as "interpreters and enforcers" of the Constitution and the Code of Laws, but they effectively become a "puppet branch" of the RA, how are we to guarantee that those "interpretations and enforcements" are unbiased, impartial, and neutral? After all, to deal with severe changes which would never pass with the current SC, all the RA would need to do is to select new members and make sure the new members' views were closely aligned with the RA's.

The easiest way to avoid that was to set up the SC as a self-appointed meritocracy.

There are alternatives. One is to create a two-chamber system, where the High Chamber is elected differently than the Low Chamber. There are many ways to do that without using a meritocracy. For example, it could be elected with a different voting mechanism: say, where the size of land owned in the CDS would weight more (I know this would be highly unpopular; I'm not defending that idea, just pointing out that universal suffrage with the "one citizen, one vote" system is not the only possible choice). Why a different voting method? To make sure that the composition of the High Chamber is different from the RA's composition (i.e. to make sure that different "interest groups" get elected). Or each of the five sims would pick a citizen to represent them on the High Chamber (which would make it closer to the US Senate, for instance) — assuming we can fix the issue of citizens owning land in different sims, of course.

This would just complicate the matter even more but have several advantages:

1) No meritocracy, which should appease some of the people here.
2) A different composition, so that the RA cannot "control" interests in both chambers.
3) Citizens disgruntled with one body — because the "wrong" people got elected... — would have a choice to vote differently for the other chamber. This would specially be the case if the election for each chamber would be staggered in time.
4) The High Chamber would very likely be able to have more power than the SC, namely, by being able to reject laws for political reasons (and not only on Constitutional grounds). But as it would be an elected body, its power would be drawn by the people and thus appease the ideologically-minded ones.

Under a two-chamber system, the role of the SC might just be advisory and irrelevant — deal with the forums and little else. It might not even make any sense to keep it around, as the role of the SC as an arbitration facility might be emptied as well.

As said before, the major reason why we don't have a two-chamber system is due to lack of people willing to serve. The way that RA and SC have worked together in the past 7+ years was to provide some of the benefits of a two-chamber system while actually avoiding to have a real two-chamber system. It also made law approvals speedier: under a two-chamber system, laws would have to be discussed in full twice (and they might still be unconstitutional!). The SC actually discusses (relatively) few laws; only those clearly violating the Constitution — or where there might be some doubts at least — are flagged for review. In practice this means that the RA, when acting reasonably and with good common sense will approve the vast majority of laws without the need of any "SC supervision". It's only when the RA plays insane and starts acting beyond its intended purpose — legislating for the benefit of the people — is the SC called to see if that's actually allowed under the Constitution.

But I don't "oppose" a two-chamber system in theory. It's not an "abomination" for me. Perhaps a bit unnecessary given our size, but it's a tolerable idea. Having, for instance, members elected from each region might even please those who have, for years, demanded more "regional representation" (and no, I won't go into that discussion again...).

This, of course, if the whole point is to make sure that a second branch oversees the work of the RA in a neutral way, having popular support (i.e. being elected), and if it's demonstrated logically and rationally that the SC for some unfathomable reason is suddenly unable to do that (even though they did an excellent job in the past 7+ years).

[Tanoujin Milestone]

Honestly, Gwyn, to read you makes me feel less detached. Sure, the CDS has to outgrow its founders, and it does. But where to? I can't help it, the experimental setups described above frighten me. So much to lose. So many thoroughly implemented mechanisms laying idle. I never thought I could become this conservative in regard to constitutional questions. There are Sims to develop, populate and administer. Candidates, say "Solutions within the existing framework" and get my vote. 
By the way, as far as I know factions are not abolished. They are just no longer mandatory. I guess no one wants to use this powerful instrument any more because individualism prevails against party discipline? Off topic anyway. "Solutions within the existing framework". Yes, yes, and yes.

[Beathan]

Gwyn,

I don't see the current proposals as being anything other than the normal evolution of democratic society, all of which began with some significantly undemocratic bodies (the U.S. Senate was originally appointed, rather than elected, for example) reformed to be either directly democratic (such as the Senate) or at least checked by democratic bodies (such as with approval of American judges before they become judges, which is a lifetime appointment removable only by death, resignation, or impeachment). I am fine having the SC be an insulated and independent body -- but not one that is completely free from all Democratic checks. When the CDS project was mere months old, I could see the utility in having a radically undemocratic body of "self-appointed aristocrats" -- but now, years into our project, we no longer need the crutch of an aristocracy. We are functional enough to have radical election shifts -- and those shifts alone, provided that the RA does not have the ability to unseat the SC on vote or whim, should be enough to unfetter the SC from the RA, even if the RA has and retains an initial approval process.

Beathan

[Patroklus Murakami]

I don't think there's any need to raise all sorts of fears about 'mob rule' and 'hacking and slashing' at the Constitution. As Beathan has pointed out, this is part of the evolution all democratic societies go through. Even the UK is today considering the novel idea that it should elect members of the House of Lords (the second chamber) rather than appointing them. (This follows a previous reform which removed hereditary peers - yes, some of our rulers used to be there by birth!)

SC reform is a step forward, away from aristocracy and towards something more open. This is a process that both of the other branches of government have gone through. The Founders did not get everything right! They may have had very lengthy discussions but their governmental design (while carefully thought through) had to be changed because key parts did not work

Two or our three branches have changed a great deal over the last 7 years:

• We established an Executive Branch - the Chancellor - out of the ashes of the old Guild. The Founders had failed to develop a true Executive branch, worried that power concentrated in one set of hands would be abused. Instead, executive functions were divided between all three branches and... it took ages to get anything done! (Yes, even longer than now!) When it became clear this wasn't working the RA developed proposals for a Chancellor appointed by the RA. Over time this branch has continued to change and is now directly elected.

  The RA used to be body of democratically elected factions (not individuals). You could not even stand for election unless you were a member of a faction and had been chosen to be a candidate. This worked well for the most part and we had issues-based contests with factions putting forward contrasting visions of the future for our community. But the citizens decided they did not want to be ruled solely by factions, they agitated against what they saw as abuse of power by factions and we reformed the RA to allow individuals to stand on their own merits.

The one remaining unreformed branch of government is... the SC.

Now, I'm a great believer in the saying 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it'. But the corollary of that expression is that if something is broken, you had better do something about it. The problems with the SC cannot be fixed simply by impeaching some of its members. In fact, what Beathan and I are broadly proposing is correcting, clarifying and rewriting badly worded laws in order to close loopholes.

Here are what I see as the main problems and why legislation is necessary to fix them:

• The SC filters its own members and is free to recommend people who are clones of the current members or people from one particular clique/faction/school of thought. No one else gets to choose who is put forward as a candidate. Solution: take this power away from them and give it to a) another responsible party e.g. the Chancellor or b) every CDS citizen.

  The SC if free to abuse the spirit of the Constitution (if not the letter of it) by sneaking their candidates in when the RA might struggle to meet within the 30 day deadline set by NL 4-8. Solution: Close the loophole so that candidates for the SC always have to be ratified by the RA as set out in the Constitution.

  The SC is not competent to arbitrate citizen disputes (and shows little interest in doing so). Solution: take this power/responsibility away from them and let them concentrate on what they do better - upholding and defending the Constitution.

These proposals have been on the table for almost two years now. Two of the current RA members were elected on a platform including SC reform. It would be very odd if we did not attempt to complete at least some of these reforms now.

[Aliasi Stonebender]

I find the idea that the SC is inherently anti-democratic amusing; is the United States Supreme Court ALSO anti-democratic?

To be honest, I suspect the SC could easily strike down Pat's proposal anyway, if they wished. (I am not speaking with my 'I am a SC member' hat here, but my 'pundit' hat, by the way. I don't know that we would.) That's what being an independent branch of the government MEANS. The RA does not get to tell the SC what to do outside the bound proscribed in the Constitution. While it's true the SC hasn't been meeting its own guidelines... they are its guidelines and may be changed without asking permission. At best, the RA could go ahead and impeach the current SC for not living up to their own guidelines.