Nothing in the CDS is written in stone; anything can be questioned and/or changed. That's the whole point of democracy.
Nevertheless, there is a good reason why the SC works like it does, and why I personally am completely against changing its composition and/or eligibility of new members.
Even though the CDS was nothing more than a democracy from its very start, and it was expected that, come what may, the CDS would remain a democracy forever — even if one quite different from the original assumptions — there were two major guidelines that were at its core.
The first was the importance of balance and checks, so that no single person or group of persons could "take over" the CDS. The only people able to "take over" the CDS are... the citizens, by electing their representatives. There is no "power beyond the people" in the CDS, and it was attempted to make sure it always remained that way. That required a lot of tweaking over the years...
The second thing was the notion that institutions were more important than individuals. This is a two-edged sword. It was mostly meant to take into account that the CDS would not "fail" even if a specially charismatic leader left. This, as you well know, has always been the case — "charismatic leaders" come and go, but the CDS remains. The other side of the coin, however, was to make sure that we wouldn't fall into the simplistic assumption that if an institution has bad members, the institution should be abolished. That doesn't make any sense, but the temptation is great...
The principle of balance and checks defined that there would be three branches — the Executive is a recent addition in our history — but that each would have different rules for admission. This was very deliberate and not a lapse or a whim. In RL, different countries have dealt with this problem in different ways. For example, if all public offices are elected, how can the population prevent that all power is not in the hand of a few factions or parties? How can non-political individuals with excellent skills ever hope to come into power, if they don't get faction/party support?
The reverse question is, of course, if some public offices are appointed or nominated, how can we prevent them to create an oligarchy and remain in power forever? How can we give people the right to remove non-elected public officers from office if they want to do so?
This lead us to create a model where each of the three branches had their members appointed differently. In this model, the RA, since they were the more powerful branch — the one able to emit legislation changing pretty much everything, including the Constitution — would obviously have to be elected by universal suffrage, and any citizen would have the right to be elected.
But to make sure that there wasn't a permanent group that were constantly elected into office — by exhaustion of the minorities failing to get even a seat elected — and that they would slowly change the Constitution and Code of Laws to make sure they remained in power forever (see the current attempts of changing the rules for the elections during an election week...), we needed a group of people that were not elected but could check the powers of the RA when they misbehaved. This was what lead us to create the Scientific Council. An alternative at that time was to have a two-chamber RA, where each chamber would be elected differently. At that time, there were so few citizens in the CDS that this was unpractical — even today, as you know, it's always hard to find enough candidates for the RA.
So, instead, we opted to have the Scientific Council. The idea was that deliberately nobody could "tamper" with the admission of new members, in the sense that politics would not be a requirement for becoming a member. Of course that was naive, thus the current requirement that the RA has to pass a vote of confidence on new members. However, the RA is also not allowed to stall the process: if they fail to call for a vote of confidence in 30 days, the SC member gets automatically approved. In any case, this was mostly to avoid a sudden influx of "unwanted" SC members.
To remove them from office, they can be impeached by the RA. That's very simple 
but something that was never used, even though I don't know why hehe...
The more administrative/executive roles were originally invested in the Old Guild and are now in the Executive. There was something lost in the process. First the Chancellor was nominated by the RA and was little more than a civil servant. Then, at some point in time, while we still had factions, they tended to select an Executive as well and present a list of candidates for the RA. The Executive election was thus very dependent on the RA election and very political. Nowadays, well, without factions, we can say that the Chancellor is a bit less "political", even though, of course, the Chancellor will often try to align himself or herself with a group of RA members who support his or her role.
The SC, by contrast, can be way more detached, and even antagonistic to the RA. This, again, was deliberate. That's why there has been a substantial reduction in powers of the SC. On the other hand, in moments of crisis, the RA and the SC can quickly and swiftly act in tandem to get laws approved. I remember super-short RA sessions where only a single bill was approved, and as soon as the RA members stepped down from their chairs, we would all rush to the SC meeting and ratify those laws immediately. So both alternatives, stalling or quick approval — both important in the CDS, depending on necessity — were possible. The model was flexible enough to allow both to coexist. And the beauty of it was that each branch was independently created and sustained, so that there was little influence across both — if there was a need greater than individual egos, both could work closely together for the benefit of the citizens.
The old wording about Professors, Chairs, and a Dean reflects the original principles: the Scientific Council was thought to work like a University College of Laws, with members well-versed in the law, and offering advice, or even plainly rejecting badly-written laws. This made perhaps more sense when the CDS was new. It might feel a bit outdated at this point in time.
Of course, the SC is never completely unbiased — that's pretty much impossible to achieve, since everybody has their own bias So a way to deal with that — pretty much inspired by Moon Adamant, when she was running the New Guild — was to invite ex-members from all factions, and keep a balance that way. With the end of factions, current SC Deans have to be more creative in achieving that balance when inviting new members, but that's ok, we encourage creativity Since RA members can only get elected two terms in a row (and Chancellors just once every year), this makes it pretty obvious that a simple method to achieve rotativity is to invite non-elegible former RA members as SC members, since they have lots of experience with the law.
So these are pretty much the principles behind the system, and it works well. Remember, any SC member can always be impeached, or even all together, if the RA so wills. Failing to uphold the Constitution is more than reason enough for that, but there is a deliberate twist: the RA can impeach any member of the SC without giving a reason. This was mostly to avoid that in a court of impeachment, fellow SC members might question the validity of the reasons behind an impeachment. So, the RA doesn't need a valid justification. They can just "do it" All it needs is a motion and a simple majority vote.
Now what has been argued in this thread is something that we deliberately tried to avoid for seven years: changing an institution because someone dislikes a member of that institution (even with a valid reason for that dislike). This is not really acceptable under the principles we work under; granted, those are unwritten principles, but they're just common sense. I personally have nothing against Soro or any other member of the SC, and, in general, I think they did a fair job overall, kept a cool head most of the time, and pronounced things according to their views and interpretations of the legislation, and those interpretations were usually correct. Of course, that's just my opinion as a detached watcher. I don't what happened outside the public scope, and thus have no grounds to have any different opinion. Obviously anyone is prone to make mistakes; not even the SC is exempt from infallibility, and the Dean of the Scientific Council is not under the dogmatic mandate to speak the truth ex cathedra like some sort of Pope of Law
So I urge you to leave the SC as it is; it works well that way. If, however, there is a strong view against one or more members of the SC, citizens are encouraged to present a motion of impeachment at the RA and persuade the RA to vote upon it. A different strategy is to get accepted as SC member and try to influence its decisions; all it takes for a nomination from five citizens. There is precedent for that in the past. The SC can still reject the application, of course, but since SC members are voted in with a majority vote, and shortly there will be four members in the SC, I can imagine that it won't be hard to get a few more nominees in.
In any case, I do side with Pat on this. I cannot criticize any errors that were made in the past, specially if they were made in ignorance and with a good intention. I might resent that a lot of petitions to the SC have been ignored so far, but there might be good reasons for that. Of course, if someone has proof that the intentions of some SC members are not what they seem, then that's a different story. But one thing is gossip, rumour, and drama; the other thing is factual evidence.
"Loss of confidence" in the current SC is not a valid reason to abolish the SC or to turn it into a different thing. It is, however, a good pretext for, at most, nominating a few new members and/or impeach some of the current ones...
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