Doing the unthinkable, reading the Constitution on these vital questions (just kidding) ... first glancing through it I happened to encounter this:
Section 6 – Legislative Process and Veto
A vote in the RA is a simple majority vote of representative seats. Constitutional amendments require a 2/3 vote.
and then:
Section 7 – Powers of the RA
(...)
The RA can amend the constitution with a 2/3 vote.
I think either of the two is probably best dropped, because they say the same thing. If one wanted to change these mechanisms, one would have more of a hairy problem to deal with; by oversight one might even miss one of the two (however unlikely). They do say the same thing right ?
The problems noted where:
1. The Constitution should be changed by the people, not within the orbit of "the ruling groups" exclusively.
2. The RA can not impeach its own judges, which is the SC, because they can be the ones under indictment.
3. The RA can not have powers to appoint judges over itself, or at least not by majority, because they could have any ruling they wanted that way, and where is the recourse ? At the high-court one is at the end of the legal process, even by law, principle and convention (in regular nations at least, fwik).
My goal is to collect the 'offending' Constitutional parts, and propose rectification for them. Moving through the Constitution top-down ... (adding comments outside of these goals too). To make it easier to skip through I tried to make the proposals in bold.
PREAMBLE
All branches of the government are bound to serve the public before themselves and to uphold the Universal Declaration Of Human Rights, Founding Philosophy,
I propose a pointer to what this 'founding philosophy' is ? I note that the pre-ambule is more of a Constitutional law, an article, then a pre-ambule. In a pre-ambule one could for example say something like "On the [date] in full freedom and with the brightest foresight we where awarded by our lives and good fortune, we conveiced our community and lives to be guided by the ideal of having a Government for and by the people, who will serve our common interests. We duly ratified, after careful deliberation, the first draft of the document you are now reading. Correct me if wrong, but that seems to be a pre-ambule, some general statements not necessarily a law that is binding on someone. I'd say the current pre-ambule would make a fine article in the Constitution though, and is of course also good as a pre-ambule (since who cares)."
Any citizen who is eligible to vote, at the time of nomination, may become a candidate by declaring themselves by a message to the Dean of the Scientific Council, within the time set by the Scientific Council for such nominations.
This is where the SC gets a role in the elections, about which they then later have to pass judgement (as at the moment is even occuring !). Judge one cannot be over ones own actions, in a presumed unbiased way. So I propose that this is changed to someone else "by declaring themselves by a message in public spot XYZ, ABC time before the elections" for example ?
(I like the article about the Chancelor (although I'm not a fan of presidential systems, preferring the parliamentary mechanism as it is called, coalition Government/'executive'; CDS might be too small to have a 3 head executive council, though... this is a matter of taste and not a problem in the Constitution.))
Article III – The Philosophic Branch
Section 1 – The Scientific Council
The Scientific Council (SC) is a self-selected meritocracy. Its governmental role is to interpret and enforce the constitution. Its service roll (ed. note: sic) is to resolve citizen disputes and moderate user forums and events.
Section 2 – The Scientific Council Body
The SC is comprised of Professors, Chairs, and a single SC Dean. Professors are chosen at the recommendation of current members based on demonstrated skill and desire to uphold the constitution without bias. Chairs are nominated by the Dean and approved by a simple majority vote. There are a maximum of nine Chairs available, with the Dean receiving one. Members of the SC can be voted out with a 2/3 majority.
The self-perpetuating nature of the SC seems problematic, because it is only another branch of the system and therefore eventually has to be held accountible by the people. Beathan was already working on this ... The power of the SC to impeach other branches of Government seems to be a due power of the SC, imho; since it is a court.
The Philosophic branch may veto or rewrite and resubmit a bill or constitutional amendment if it is in violation of any of the founding documents.
The power test laws against the Constitution seems ok too, the power to approve anything but minor changes to the Constitution seems to be a little bit problematic because it is the basis for their rulings itself ? A way through the People should help with this, it would need to be added somewhere as a article/section. Changing the Constitution is a major thing, so I think maybe it deserves a top spot and its own article ? I don't think the SC should have the power to block changes to the Constitution, as that could block the system at the SC. The SC rules based on the Constitution, but the People form the Constitution. What if the SC is deciding on a Constitutional interpretation the people do not want ? Then they change the Constitution. But what if the SC can block that again ? That is the block.
Another view is that the CDS is a fixated democracy, fixated in the SC interpretation and guidance of Constitutional and other law. I'd say that is an extensive power of the SC, one which might not be envisioned ?
Section 7 – Powers of the RA
The RA can seek impeachment of members of the Philosophic branch by initiating an impeachment hearing.
Is this the place where the RA can "at whim" (as Gwyn said) impeach the SC, without having to go to the SC for such a hearing ? Does "impeachment hearing" refer to a hearing in the RA itself by the RA ? I didn't see "impeachment hearing" further defined in the Constitution as something special in the RA itself, or did I miss something (sorry in that case). I think that this part should be dropped: the RA can not have the power to impeach the whole SC because the SC is its judge. Perhaps it could impeach one member in the SC for example, that may be a more reasonable power, and come to think of it would give the RA over the course of time the power to change the SC - provided someone once impeached can not again be in the SC (for how long ?).
Section 7 – Powers of the RA
In regards to the Philosophic branch:
The RA provides a vote of confidence on candidates to the Philosophic branch.
It might not have to be changed in the RA can no longer impeach the SC, provided such approval of new SC persons does not give it the power to put more people in the SC then there are already in it, altering the outcome of a trial. If the RA can no longer impeach the SC, then the existing members of the SC could vote away the new judges proposed by the RA. The problem is worse when the RA can impeach the SC, because then there not being an SC, anyone whom wants to be SC and secures the confidence vote by the RA becomes the new SC. A safety guard might say the RA can only approve one SC candidate at the time, to prevent them from in a flash approving 30 new SC persons, who then vote away the previously existing SC, denying them the power to vote away those 30 new members because the RA defeated the SC in the speed race towards what effectively would be impeachment. Infinite possible size of the SC:
There are a maximum of nine Chairs available, with the Dean receiving one.
Chairs are delineated from 'professors' in the article, both have a different procedure for being activated. Hence there may be 9 chairs, but an unlimited amount of professors ? That could be a Constitutional gap allowing the RA to gain control over its own judges. The "self appointed meritocracy" element strengthens this, as the new group to be flash-approved can claim to be 'self appointed.' A solution could be that there is a maximum of 9 places in the whole SC, chairs plus professors. ? There are a maximum of nine positions available in the SC, with the Dean receiving one. ?
Article IV – Factions
Section 1 – Requirements
Section 2 – The Faction Body
Section 3 – The Faction Leader
Aren't these requirenments infringing on the free association of individuals as they see fit ? A party how I would like it for example would be unconstitutional from day 1, because it would not have a leader, and may not want to conform to other requirenments, or submit to the idea that the goal is to debate and so on. On the other hand I can understand that only 'more serious' parties would have their own forum place, but that is like an additional privilige for the well behaved. To say "a party has a leader" or 'exists to debate" seem like Constitutional laws to be enforced. Perhaps it can be rewarded "factions that conform to .... leader .... debate .... list of demands .... notify the dean ... are granted their own forum," thus leaving other parties although without the privilige of a forum, at least free to exist without becoming illegal.
Unfortunately I am not intelligent enough to read that, perhaps it can be reworded to accomodate dummies like undersigned : ); maybe I should just invest more time ... seems pretty complicated though doesn't it ?
Back to the original goal:
1. The Constitution should be changed by the people, not within the orbit of "the ruling bodies" exclusively.
> Article to be added somewhere ? Beathan is working on it already.
2. The RA can not impeach its own judges, which is the SC, because they can be the ones under indictment.
> Article to be changed to only 1 SC judge, for example, or dropped altogether ? Or the change to take effect only for the next RA ? ........ ?
3. The RA can not have powers to appoint judges over itself.
> Article to be changed to only appoint one or a few judges, not a majority ? New changes only take effect for the next RA ? ....... ? This problem is reduced/solved when the RA can not impeach the SC anymore.
I find the Constitution pretty well written (style), it is clear and concise ! It also seems to have a fair bit of checks and balances in it already. Maybe with a few changes around the edges, plugging a few gaps, it could be pretty good compared to other real-world nations; and at the same time its own unique system, which is rather awesome.
best regards,
josjoha
I hope that made sense, I'm sure I made some mistakes, but try to be constructive.
P.S.
Delia, indeed, that is the point. A citizen claims that her case was not heard by the SC, and if I recall correctly the Chancelor was given the de-facto responsibility of judging of whether the case would reach the court, which I protested. What has to happen now ? I am not the court, I do not want to judge the case, only prefer there to be a proper trial and saying that the Chancelor (the executive) can not be allowed to block access to the judicairy (the SC). Perhaps this issue is old news now, because I have heard the case was settled out of court (yay!).