A defense of complexity

[Beathan]

Wow --

I apologize for starting my contribution in this subject. It looks like I tore off a scab and exposed the Thomas Jefferson/John Adams campaign debates.

Beathan

[Diderot Mirabeau]

Since apparently my contribution to this forum has been the cause of resentment leading to disparaging comments about my character I'd like to take a moment to reflect upon what I have said, how it may have come out in relation to what I meant and finally whether it should have any consequences for my future contributions to these forums. I'd like to invite anyone interested to contribute with their own observations in regard to this not unlike how Chicago Kipling has so tactfully done it.

Since my name is attached to the Forum Moderation Guidelines it seems reasonable that I use these as a point of departure for pinpointing what might be deplorable in my statement. I presume that the following paragraph might be relevant for this purpose:

[quote:2gouj5cm]3.5: When disagreeing with another poster make sure that your response takes issue with the arguments rather than with the person behind them. Abuse and personal attacks will not be tolerated.[/quote:2gouj5cm]

Judging on the basis of Ashcroft's quotation it seems fair to estimate that it is the phrase "This pompous rhetoric" that has lead to feelings of resentment possibly arising from the assumption that it was intended to take issue with the person behind the argument rather than the argument itself.

My usage of the word "pompous rhetoric" is supposed to designate a sequence of statements that are (a) lofty and (b) wrapped in (self-)celebratory oratory but which ultimately simply express the conviction of the speaker as they are based on (c) unvalidated assumptions about the circumstances, which they address.

From the Princeton WordNet dictionary the synonyms that best describe my intended meaning would be "overblown oratory" I think.

By making this statement I was simply intending to refer to the qualities of the paragraph in question and not making any inferences about the general personal traits of the poster writing them. I am not even holding myself free of making pompous statements every so often. Quite the contrary in fact.

Looking back at the paragraph that triggered this characterisation I believe it to hold the qualities that merit making such an assessment:

(a) Speaking of the CDS as something new and unique and an attempt to create a true state in a virtual world is celebratory by definition. If or when I am making such statements myself I recognise them to be celebratory. Linking such results directly with one's own efforts can be justifiably said to be a self-celebratory statement.

(b) Saying that we will fail in attaining these high goals if we do not immediately implement a system of justice that embodies certain governing norms is lofty (i.e. arguing in terms of high flown ideals).

(c) Saying that we will have failed in bringing democracy and justice to SL by giving up before we started and purporting that to be the ambition of my argument seems at least to me to be based on an unvalidated assessment of my opinion and to further be made using quite broad and intangible concepts such as "bringing justice to a virtual world for the first time in the world ever" that are highly difficult to use as measures for success, and are therefore well suited to be molded according to the writer's own convictions of what constitutes a success.

I will however not rely simply on my own limited interpretation of the validity of my statement or of its conformance with forum moderation guidelines. I shall therefore be submitting my post to the college of Forum Moderators to have them assess whether it was in breach of Forum Moderation guidelines and deservant of a sanction. I hope by this procedure to learn more of how my conduct in this discussion is perceived by others and I hope that I will have the mental capacity to absorb such discovery and adapt my behaviour so as to be able to contribute better to the forum discussion in the future.

[Publius Crabgrass]

"Pompous rhetoric" in no way offends the guidelines for these fora and is certainly well within the bounds of fair comment.

Moreover, I fully agree!

[Rudy Ruml]

I have just become aware of the recent posts on this forum, and want to respond to the characterization of government proposed by Claude Desmoulins and seconded, among others, by Beathan. That is that government is about or has the purpose to solve problems facing a community. This is a typical European and socialist view of government. It is a TOOL to be used by REASON to improve he quality of life. I strongly disagree with this ideology, and it has led to many of the problems governments have caused in the world. Rather than solving problems, this makes government the problem.

Rather, government is the means by which people are enabled to solve their own problems in the light of their own values and interests, such as by providing security (police/courts/trials). The guarantee of human rights and rule of law does these means. These are not solving problems, but freeing people to do so themselves. For example, the rule of law, consistently applied, enables the free market to operate, people to form contracts, and to buy and sell products as they wise, and to privately institutionalize problem solving (e.g., chambers of commerce, dispute resolution, co-ops, or consumer organizations).

And what this means, as I have proposed, is a much less complex and weighty government than we now have, one for which the only purpose would be to establish GENERAL laws/rules facilitating citizens their OWN problems.

[Beathan]

Rudy wrote, in disgreement with the general concept that the purpose of government is to solve problems, that the purpose of government is rather to allow people to solve their own problems. He asserts that the contrary, government-as-problemsolver, view is a socialist view of government as an instrumentality guided by a (presumably) impersonal or idealized Reason (as a general faculty, possibly an emergent property, of the State). Thus, he asserts, that this view is inherently Stateist (although he does not use that term), and as such is dangerous and problematic to individual human freedom, civil liberties, and free problem-solving by individuals. He then impliedly argues that this Stateist view of government is illegitimate, due to the problems it creates, and presents an alternative theory of governement.

[quote:2n5gv8a9]Rather, government is the means by which people are enabled to solve their own problems in the light of their own values and interests, such as by providing security (police/courts/trials). The guarantee of human rights and rule of law does these means. These are not solving problems, but freeing people to do so themselves. For example, the rule of law, consistently applied, enables the free market to operate, people to form contracts, and to buy and sell products as they wise, and to privately institutionalize problem solving (e.g., chambers of commerce, dispute resolution, co-ops, or consumer organizations).
[/quote:2n5gv8a9]

I think this argument is a case of special pleading. My position is that government exists to solve problems. I believe that this is a sound assertion, and is entirely silent as to the mechanics of government or the characteristics of legitimate government. That is, government should solve problems, and it should use whatever policies or means result in solutions to problems. If private or market forces, rather than State fiat, are better able to solve problems -- then government should support and foster, rather than retard or suppress, such forces. Thus, I believe that my position that the goal of governemnt is problem-solving is entirely compatible with Rudy's limited and free-market, libertarian view of government. (Indeed, I personally share that view for the most part, tempered with the need to consider economic externalities and the possibility that there are some spheres of human action, such as national defense or instances of social break-down in which people are unable to act and thus unable to approach and solve their own problems, where different logic may apply.)

Where I find Rudy's argument to involve special pleading is in his conflation of the purposive definition of government (a problem solving entity) with an argument for governmental legitimacy. An institution is legitimate to the extent it serves its purpose, and does so in a limited way that does not imperil other interests, needs or goals. Lawyers will recognize my position as strict scrutiny, which I think should be brought to bear on any and all governmental action. I think that what form of government is most legitimate -- is most narrowly tailored to accomplish its purpose (problem solving) with the minimum harm (problem creation) -- is a different question, and one that is best answered by studying which governments actually work best. However, I think that the definition of government (as a problem-solving entity) is logically prior to this exploration (we need to define the goal of government to even begin to look for examples of legitimate and illegitimate government). Further, I think that my definition does not beg the question of which government actually works.

For instance, in cost-benefit policy analysis, there should always be an alternative of "do nothing" considered along with the active proposals. Thus, cost-benefit analysis, even when applied to a proposed regulation, undertaking, or other active proposal, does not force us to actually do anything, create anything, regulate anything. Rather, we might discover that all possible cures are worse than the disease, in which case the correct solution to the problem is to leave the problem alone.

I do think that Rudy is onto something, however. Specifically, when an institution, especially a governmental institution, is created, it has a need to do something to justify its existence. Thus, the do nothing (or wu wei) possibility is often excluded from the analysis at the outset. However, in my opinion, this is an example of bad government (through bad thinking -- bad use of Reason), rather than a counter-example to the basic purposive definition of government that should cause us to rethink and redefine what government is and what government is supposed to do.

Beathan

[Dianne]

[quote:24qcdmw6]For instance, in cost-benefit policy analysis, there should always be an alternative of "do nothing" considered along with the active proposals. Thus, cost-benefit analysis, even when applied to a proposed regulation, undertaking, or other active proposal, does not force us to actually do anything, create anything, regulate anything. Rather, we might discover that all possible cures are worse than the disease, in which case the correct solution to the problem is to leave the problem alone. [/quote:24qcdmw6]
Not being a fan of business-related metaphors I would never use the words "cost-benefit analysis" but I completely agree with the concept expressed here in that it is simple common sense. Creating elaborate structures - "government" - that have no active purpose or reason for being is foolish. Government should be a minimal system of rules that allow a community to simply get along with itself, not some massive organisation concieved so as to solve every possible problem in existence.

I have long felt that the government project in Neufreistadt may have started to "get away from us" in the sense of being a purely academic persuit with decreasing relevance to the community that currently exists.

While I agree with the idea that we should plan for greater goals and that the placing of ourselves as a legal/governmental solution for a wider audience of Second Life as a whole is an admirable cause, there is little evidence that there is a need - even a future need - for such a thing so far. This doesn't mean that we should stop planning for those goals, but it does distress me that less has been done and les structure created, that is of relevance to our existence as a simple community of 50 avatars that live in a sim called Neufreistadt.

Are we even a community? Or are we simply a planning system for a wider Governmental system in Second Life as a whole? Do the laws we create really have any relevance to the day to day concerns of the avatars and their interaction in the sim? Or are they more about abstract possibilities of future systems?

I think we can do both of these things, but perhaps not together. It seems clear to me that any overarching governmental or legal system we create, if it is to be taken up by other sims, would by necessity have to deal with a variety of different small communities with a variety of local rules. Perhaps we should seperate the "government project" from the [i:24qcdmw6]community[/i:24qcdmw6] (soon to be plural) and regress back to a minimalist, (and ironically probably [i:24qcdmw6]feudalist[/i:24qcdmw6]) structure, for our day to day governance and political life. After all, the government should grow organically out of the needs of the community shouldn't it? Then we could work on the legal system and greater government structure as the abstract, long term, overarching projects that they seem to be.

[Rudy Ruml]

In response to Beathan, there is a difference between legitimacy and purpose. Government is legitimate if it is recognized by other governments. It does not matter whether it comes into being by a coup, revolution, or a constitutional change of power. The deciding factor is recognition in international law.

The purpose of government is what its constitution, leaders, rulers, monarch, or whoever exercises power, say it is. Now, the purpose can be given by tradition and even absolute monarch may depart from that with care. Or, a dictator can give it, such as in achieving development, glory, a unified homogenous people, or it can be given by an ideology. In Western history, the prevailing ideology that gives purpose to government was born in the French Revolution, and by the French philosophers that idolized reason. The purpose of government in this view was to be a tool, a tool to achieve the General Will. What this meant in practice was that an elite decided what the General Will was, and used the power of government to satisfy it. In this view, then, government was to solve problems as defined by and understood by an elite, elected, representative, or otherwise.

A contrary view was born in the American Revolution, which saw government not as a tool, but as a moderator between interests. The purpose of government was to balance and check various interests, and get or stay out of the way of the people's business, interests, or their solving their own problems. It was not to solve problems, which was seen as a dangerous intervention in private affairs. Note that the French model allows for no checks and balances. One does not check and balance a tool. One applies it to better society.

The understanding is new to many people who have been educated to see government as a means for dealing with poverty, violence, unemployment, sexual harassment, racism, and so on. To read the best treatment of this distinction, see F.A. Hayek's <I>Law, Legislation, and Liberty</I> (3 vol.) I have written on this as well. See http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/COMM.5.1.05.HTM.

[Beathan]

Rudy wrote [quote:wkpchhdz]In response to Beathan, there is a difference between legitimacy and purpose. Government is legitimate if it is recognized by other governments. It does not matter whether it comes into being by a coup, revolution, or a constitutional change of power. The deciding factor is recognition in international law. [/quote:wkpchhdz]

While that is one definition of legitimacy -- specifically the one used in the international law concept of "rogue states" -- it is not the only one, and it is not the one I was employing. I was employing an older, but still current, definition from political philosophy. On this definition, institutions and actions of institutions serve purposes, and they are legitimate based on how well they serve those purposes.

We use this poli-phil concept all the time in political discourse. For instance, if someone says, "the invasion of Iraq is illegitimate because the Iraqi regime, although it was a rogue state, was not supporting the Islamicist terrorist movement associated with Al Qaeda, so the invasion serves no purpose in furthering international opposition to Islamacist terrorism," she is employing my definition of legitimacy. This definition side-steps international law arguments about the legality of the invasion under the UN resolutions or other provisions of international law.

For our purposes in creating a virtual state, which will be the first state -- or at least one of the first states -- in a virtual world that does not have an international system of nations, and thus which has no international law, I think my definition is the more useful and appropriate definition.

That said, I still see the arguments between the French Egalitarians and the American Libertarians to be an argument about governmental legitimacy not governmental definition. I think that everyone would agree that institutions on the French model and institutions on the American model are both governments. The real question is which model produces better governments.

To treat this as a definitional question, rather than an ethical or normative one (a question of legitimacy) is to engage in a rhetorical trick. Specifically, it is to use an abusive definition that begs the question of governmental legitimacy by defining one competing model of government in a way that excludes it from the debate.

More importantly, I don't think that libertarians need to use such suspect rhetoric to hold our own, or even to prevail, in the debate with leveller egalitarians or personality-cult totalitarians. We can, and should, accept their claim that government is properly defined as a problem-solving instrumentality. However, having done so, we should require that the advocates of great centralized power-states (whether totalitarian or egalitarian) prove the value of the institutions they are advocating under the standards they assert.

To use an example from management theory -- a managers job is to make sure that the institution he is managing does what it should. However, that obligation does not imply that the manager should actually do the work -- or that the manager should even personally supervise every aspect of the work. Rather, the manager should do what best promotes the work -- which more often involves giving the actual workers general instructions and periodically checking the outcome to see that things are operating properly. The mediation-model of government Rudy advocates is not unlike this kind of management. I agree with Rudy that, at least for large states, the mediation model is optimal.

Beathan

[Ashcroft Burnham]

To my mind, there is a relatively straightforward answer, in the abstract, about how big that governments should be. (I write straightforward "in the abstract" because applying the principle is often much harder than working out what the principle is, but, nonetheless, far better than applying the wrong principle, or using no principle at all). The principle is this: governments should solve all those problems, and only those problems, that governments, by their nature, are in the best position to solve. Thus, governments should most certainly not try to solve every possible problem, or else they will likely end up creating more problems than they set out to rectify, but nor should they be as minimal as absolutely possible whilst still retaining some degree of law and order and prosperity.

Thus, the when a problem presents itself, the question is not, "what should the government do?" (as a great many people who believe in big government often ask), but, "out of all the realistically possible solutions to this problem, is the best one one that involves government or not?".

A debate, therefore, about whether one wants the government to be "big" or "small", in general, or whether a government should solve problems directly or help other people solve their own problems (which do not, in any event, seem to me to be entirely distinct), quite misses the point.

The [i:1zi4znqz]raison d'etre[/i:1zi4znqz] of governments is that governments, [i:1zi4znqz]qua[/i:1zi4znqz] governments can solve some problems better than any other means of doing things. Law and order is the most notable example, but there are others. In asking "what should this institution do?", the only answers that make sense are ones that are consistent with the answer to the question, "what is this institution for?". Attempting to answer the former question by thinking about a "size" in general, or asking whether problems are being solved directly or indirectly, therefore, does not address the real issue of whether government should act on any particular issue or not. Also, one should not expect there necessarily to be any easy or obvious hallmarks of when any given solution is one that is best discharged by a government or not: the world is vastly complex and subtle, and the answer to that question can also in many cases be complex and subtle. Stark and unsubtle indicators that are claimed to be a reliable guide, therefore, almost never are.

[Beathan]

Ashcroft wrote [quote:14erzic1]The principle is this: governments should solve all those problems, and only those problems, that governments, by their nature, are in the best position to solve.[/quote:14erzic1] I quite agree with this.

Ashcroft further wrote [quote:14erzic1]Thus, the when a problem presents itself, the question is not, "what should the government do?" (as a great many people who believe in big government often ask), but, "out of all the realistically possible solutions to this problem, is the best one one that involves government or not?". [/quote:14erzic1] I also agree with this.

On this basis, Ashcroft concluded [quote:14erzic1]A debate, therefore, about whether one wants the government to be "big" or "small", in general, or whether a government should solve problems directly or help other people solve their own problems (which do not, in any event, seem to me to be entirely distinct), quite misses the point. [/quote:14erzic1]

Here I part company, because the issue is actually not simply a matter of identifying problems and then creating governmental institutions to solve the ones that appear most amenable to governmental solutions. As I have stated elsewhere, formal institutions, through their formality, have more definite existence, even selfconsciousness, as institutions. They become things, artifacts -- with integrity in the sense of being a unified, undivided thing that can define itself as distict from other others. Such institutions tend to outlast the problems they are designed to solve -- looking for and trying to solve new and different problems so that they can continue to be. The problems they find to solve might well be problems that governmental institutions are not well-suited to solve. For this reason, governmental institutions are dangerous -- and we need to be mindful not merely of the present utility of a proposed government institution, but also on the likely future behavior of the institution.

That is, to do government-building well, we need to predict the future. This is hard, even impossible. In the face of challenges that are extremely difficult, humans often (and correctly) apply more general rules-of-thumb rather than complicated and difficult analyses (even if the full analysis would be result in better solutions, if the solutions are reachable). The results reached by these rules of thumb might not the the abosolute best -- but they tend to be the relative best because they can be easily justified, easily understood, and reached with minimal effort.

The preference for simplicity over complexity is one such rule of thumb. Rather than ask, "what problems are best solved by government" and then constituting a government that solves those problems (which will create institutions that outlast their usefulness); or the more complicated problem of creating such a government while providing checks on the institutions (perhaps sunset clauses, etc.) designed to avoid the problem -- the preference for simplicity asks, "what problems require governmental resolution and what is the simplest, most narrowly focused institutions that can address those problems". This framing of the question provides a natural check on government -- preventing it from proliferating into unwieldy or over-reaching institutions.

The simple government formed on this principle may not be as effective as a larger, more perfect government, but, ironically, it is more easily justified, more controlled, more stable, and more able to maintain its legitimacy despite changes in circumstances. Further, the limited government -- as being created with a eye constantly on the problems that need governmental action -- is good enough for government work, and that's all we need in a government.

This argument also sidesteps the borderwars that will otherwise arise between people who trust and privilege governmental institutions and those who mistrust those institutions and privilege private action. (This is the border war that Rudy's theory of government is engaged in.) The argument grants that there are problems that government might be more able to solve, but still refuses to expand government to those areas because private action is also able to solve the problems, although not as well or as efficiently, without the risk that inherently arises from the creation of a governmental institution.

Beathan

[Ashcroft Burnham]

[quote="Beathan":2zbx81cl]Here I part company, because the issue is actually not simply a matter of identifying problems and then creating governmental institutions to solve the ones that appear most amenable to governmental solutions. As I have stated elsewhere, formal institutions, through their formality, have more definite existence, even selfconsciousness, as institutions. They become things, artifacts -- with integrity in the sense of being a unified, undivided thing that can define itself as distict from other others. Such institutions tend to outlast the problems they are designed to solve -- looking for and trying to solve new and different problems so that they can continue to be. The problems they find to solve might well be problems that governmental institutions are not well-suited to solve. For this reason, governmental institutions are dangerous -- and we need to be mindful not merely of the present utility of a proposed government institution, but also on the likely future behavior of the institution.

That is, to do government-building well, we need to predict the future. This is hard, even impossible. In the face of challenges that are extremely difficult, humans often (and correctly) apply more general rules-of-thumb rather than complicated and difficult analyses (even if the full analysis would be result in better solutions, if the solutions are reachable). The results reached by these rules of thumb might not the the abosolute best -- but they tend to be the relative best because they can be easily justified, easily understood, and reached with minimal effort.

The preference for simplicity over complexity is one such rule of thumb. Rather than ask, "what problems are best solved by government" and then constituting a government that solves those problems (which will create institutions that outlast their usefulness); or the more complicated problem of creating such a government while providing checks on the institutions (perhaps sunset clauses, etc.) designed to avoid the problem -- the preference for simplicity asks, "what problems require governmental resolution and what is the simplest, most narrowly focused institutions that can address those problems". This framing of the question provides a natural check on government -- preventing it from proliferating into unwieldy or over-reaching institutions. [/quote:2zbx81cl]

I do not think that the last step in the reasoning works. You start out by claiming that good government-building requires prediction of the future, which is "hard, even impossible" (which entails that good government-building is hard, even impossible). You then say that, when people have to do something that is difficult, they tend to do so using approximate "rules of thumb", conclude that that is the best way of doing difficult things, then finally go onto the ultimate claim, that simplicity, in the abstract, is one such rule of thumb that is best to follow.

The problem is, many of those steps lack justification. For example, while it is undoubtedly true that humans often [i:2zbx81cl]do[/i:2zbx81cl] create approximate rules to deal with difficult problems, that does not mean that that is always the right way of dealing with difficult problems. Sometimes, difficult problems are either best avoided all together, or dealt with by a very great degree of thorough work to solve them accurately, or as accurately as possible. There may be yet other best ways of dealing with such things. Which way is best will depend on the nature of the difficult thing itself.

Secondly, there is no justification of why "the simpler the better" is the right approximate rule-of-thumb here, even supposing that using an approximate rule-of-thumb is the right way of going about things. The problem that is "hard, even impossible" to solve, in your contention, is predicting how governmental institutions that might outlast their functions might misbehave, and designing ways of preventing them from doing so. There is no particular reason to believe that simple institutions are any less likely to misbehave, or are likely to misbehave in a less damaging way, if they outlast their function, nor that a simplicity requirement makes it any easier to design ways of preventing institutions misbehaving if they outlast their function; indeed, such a requirement could make it [i:2zbx81cl]harder[/i:2zbx81cl] to do so, because many potential solutions will be complex, and therefore excluded from consideration.

Finally, not all government institutions [i:2zbx81cl]do[/i:2zbx81cl] have the kind of function that there is any real liklihood of being outlasted. The legislature, for instance, will never cease to be useful, nor will the executive or the judiciary. Indeed, it is only the more esoteric, specific organs of government, particular committees or commissions for narrow, present-day-only purposes, that are in danger of outlasting their functions. Indeed, the solution to [i:2zbx81cl]that[/i:2zbx81cl] problem (time-limited institutions misbhaving after their useful life has expired) is not necessarily difficult: one can either set up a commission to monitor life-expired institutions, and propose legislation to abolish them (which we can be fairly sure will not itself, in turn, become life-expired), or set up institutions that are always going to have limited useful lives with a time limit on their existence.

The problem with a generalised "simple institutions only" rule is that it arbitrarily prevents many sorts of governmental institutional design that might achieve what they seek to achieve in a more satisfactory way merely because they are complex. Since there is no reason to believe that simplicity, in and of itself, will make government institutions work better, a "simple institutions only" rule will result in worse government overall, because it will exclude from consideration all those possible instiutional designs that are better but more complex than simple designs.

[quote:2zbx81cl]The simple government formed on this principle may not be as effective as a larger, more perfect government, but, ironically, it is more easily justified, more controlled, more stable, and more able to maintain its legitimacy despite changes in circumstances.[/quote:2zbx81cl]

What do you mean by "easily justified" here? Do you mean "more likely to be justified in fact?" or "is easier to convince people is justified, irrespective of whether it is justified or not"?

Furthrmore, you have not actually explained why it is that you think that simplicity, in and of itself, has the effect of making government more controlled (it is not clear precisely how you mean that here, either), stable and able to maintain its legitimacy despite changes in circumstances. Why should simple institutions, by virtue of being simple, tend to have those qualities more than complex institutions?

[quote:2zbx81cl]Further, the limited government -- as being created with a eye constantly on the problems that need governmental action -- is good enough for government work, and that's all we need in a government.[/quote:2zbx81cl]

Why should the question be "what is good enough?" rather than "what is best"?

[quote:2zbx81cl]This argument also sidesteps the borderwars that will otherwise arise between people who trust and privilege governmental institutions and those who mistrust those institutions and privilege private action. (This is the border war that Rudy's theory of government is engaged in.) The argument grants that there are problems that government might be more able to solve, but still refuses to expand government to those areas because private action is also able to solve the problems, although not as well or as efficiently, without the risk that inherently arises from the creation of a governmental institution.[/quote:2zbx81cl]

I do not think that this argument holds either: in answering the question, "what problems are best solved by governments", one must of course take into account not only all the benefits of governmental action, but also all the potential drawbacks, including the possibility that time-limited institutions will overstay their welcome and start misbehaving. That possibility, along with all the other potential problems that governments have or can create, is required to be contempleated in the answer, and do not, therefore, mandate a different question. The rule that you suggest above also will tend to result in worse outcomes, since it will exclude from consideration the possibility that, in a given set of circumstances, the drawbacks of private action will outweigh the drawbacks of government action.

[Beathan]

::sigh:: I just wrote an extensive response, but it did not post because I was logged off the forums somehow while writing it. I will try to reconstruct it.

Beathan[/quote]

[Ashcroft Burnham]

[quote="Beathan":1x4a44qt]::sigh:: I just wrote an extensive response, but it did not post because I was logged off the forums somehow while writing it. I will try to reconstruct it.[/quote:1x4a44qt]

Ouch!

Remember the mantra: CTRL+A; CTRL+C before posting anything long

[Beathan]

Well, here goes. I think that I have improved some points from the post I lost. However, I also think that I have forgotten entire arguments. Well, no matter, I will probably remember them later.

Ashcroft summarizes my argument as follows: [quote:32r4p09q]”I do not think that the last step in the reasoning works. You start out by claiming that good government-building requires prediction of the future, which is "hard, even impossible" (which entails that good government-building is hard, even impossible). You then say that, when people have to do something that is difficult, they tend to do so using approximate "rules of thumb", conclude that that is the best way of doing difficult things, then finally go onto the ultimate claim, that simplicity, in the abstract, is one such rule of thumb that is best to follow.”[/quote:32r4p09q]

For the most part, this is a fair summary. However, I am not asserting that “good government-building is hard, even impossible.” Under the simplicity rule, good government building is relatively simple and readily achievable. What I am asserting is that best government building, which appears to be Ashcroft’s goal, is impossible. Therefore, under the general rule that “ought implies can” – that it is incoherent to say we ought to do something that we cannot, in fact, do – we ought not engage in best government building. We should accept our limitations as humans and build a good government, secure in the knowledge that, even if it is not the best, it is good enough – and then we should always strive to make it better.

Ashrcoft continues: [quote:32r4p09q]
”The problem is, many of those steps lack justification. For example, while it is undoubtedly true that humans often do create approximate rules to deal with difficult problems, that does not mean that that is always the right way of dealing with difficult problems. Sometimes, difficult problems are either best avoided all together, or dealt with by a very great degree of thorough work to solve them accurately, or as accurately as possible. There may be yet other best ways of dealing with such things. Which way is best will depend on the nature of the difficult thing itself. “

”Secondly, there is no justification of why "the simpler the better" is the right approximate rule-of-thumb here, even supposing that using an approximate rule-of-thumb is the right way of going about things. The problem that is "hard, even impossible" to solve, in your contention, is predicting how governmental institutions that might outlast their functions might misbehave, and designing ways of preventing them from doing so. There is no particular reason to believe that simple institutions are any less likely to misbehave, or are likely to misbehave in a less damaging way, if they outlast their function, nor that a simplicity requirement makes it any easier to design ways of preventing institutions misbehaving if they outlast their function; indeed, such a requirement could make it harder to do so, because many potential solutions will be complex, and therefore excluded from consideration.”[/quote:32r4p09q]

I also agree with this argument, but it misses the force of my argument from simplicity. I have argued elsewhere for the importance of leaving open a “do nothing” or “wu wei” option. If problem is not solveable, or if the solution is worse than the problem then we should leave the problem alone. Also, sometimes complicated problems need complicated solutions – and I am not arguing that we should not solve these problems. Rather, I am arguing that when choosing among solutions, especially governmental solutions that involve creation of institutions or the constitution of a government, we should choose the simplest available solution. That is, I am not asserting that we should never have complicated institutions. Rather, I am arguing that our institutions should not be unnecessarily complicated. There is a huge difference between these positions. This is a critical distinction.

Further, as I will argue below, simple institutions and structures are more transparent and controllable. Thus, even though it is true that simple institutions, as institutions, can outlive their usefulness or overstep their jurisdictions, they are more subject to scrutiny, which means these problems can be more easily and more quickly identified and fixed. These benefits arise from simplicity. Complex institutions have two defects: they lead to professionalization which, in turn, insulates them from legitimate attack and they are more likely to have problems because their complexity provides more opportunity for error, both error in creation and error in behavior. (I will expand these arguments below.) Further constitutional complexity creates the additional problem of creating a crowd of institutions, which allows harmful or obsolete institutions to get lost in the crowd and escape proper scrutiny.

Ashcroft continues: [quote:32r4p09q]”Finally, not all government institutions do have the kind of function that there is any real liklihood of being outlasted. The legislature, for instance, will never cease to be useful, nor will the executive or the judiciary. Indeed, it is only the more esoteric, specific organs of government, particular committees or commissions for narrow, present-day-only purposes, that are in danger of outlasting their functions. Indeed, the solution to that problem (time-limited institutions misbhaving after their useful life has expired) is not necessarily difficult: one can either set up a commission to monitor life-expired institutions, and propose legislation to abolish them (which we can be fairly sure will not itself, in turn, become life-expired), or set up institutions that are always going to have limited useful lives with a time limit on their existence.”[/quote:32r4p09q]

This is an argument for the necessity of government, which I grant, not for the necessity for or propriety of complexity in government. Certain governmental institutions seem primal. Certainly, the classic three (executive, judicial and legislative) seem to serve proper governmental functions such that they should exist. However, saying that they should exist does not answer the question of how they should exist – or whether or not they should be as simple as possible.

However, I don’t think that it is proper to say that only esoteric institutions pose the danger of outliving their usefulness. Even one of the primary institutions can outlive its usefulness as constituted in any particular government. For instance, the executive institution of absolute monarchy seems to have outlived its usefulness and has been replaced in all modern governments. Further, I would submit that the relative ease with which England and other Northern European countries made the transition from absolute to constitutional monarch (when compared with the difficulty of the transition in France and Russia) is a direct result of the relative simplicity of the monarchies in England and Northern Europe, which had neither the institutional nor social complexities of the Courts of the Sun King or the Tsars.

However, I do agree that esoteric institutions pose a greater problem because they are less useful and therefore more likely to outlive their usefulness. However, I don’t believe that the solution to this problem of reified bureaucracy is to create a new layer of bureaucracy to police it. In other words, it is not wise or proper to create a new esoteric institution to ensure that we do not have unnecessary esoteric institutions. Rather, if the government is simple enough (as simple as it could be), that very function can be performed directly by the people, with systemic benefits to both legitimacy and stability as a result. (I explore this in more detail below.)

Sunset clauses are not adequate solutions, either. Sunset clauses merely force debate, they do not make the debate easier to understand or more effective when it happens. Further, any institution, even an obsolete or harmful institution, will have partisans (at a minimum, including the employees of the institution). If the government is or institution is complex, then these partisans will have a disproportionate impact. Disinterested parties will be too busy looking elsewhere and will become uninterested parties. In other words, if the constitutional structure of government is complicated, the institution will be lost in the crowd and will survive. Similarly, if the institution is complex, then the partisans will be able to claim special or privileged knowledge or understanding, and will use the following argument to quell the institution’s critics: “You, critic, don’t understand the complexity of the situation, while I, as someone who has spent more time learning these complexities, do. If you understood the complexities, you would agree with me and would want the institution to continue. Just trust me and let the institution continue.” The problem with this argument is that it ends debate, rather than resolving the issue being debated. It is a claim of privilege and prerogative – and, as such, should be mistrusted by friends of democracy. Under some circumstances (when the institution is necessarily complicated), this argument is appropriate. However, the argument is always suspect – and it is always fair to ask, “why should the institution be so complicated that ordinary interested observers cannot understand it?”

Ashcroft concludes his general discussion: [quote:32r4p09q] ”The problem with a generalised "simple institutions only" rule is that it arbitrarily prevents many sorts of governmental institutional design that might achieve what they seek to achieve in a more satisfactory way merely because they are complex. Since there is no reason to believe that simplicity, in and of itself, will make government institutions work better, a "simple institutions only" rule will result in worse government overall, because it will exclude from consideration all those possible instiutional designs that are better but more complex than simple designs.”[/quote:32r4p09q]

First, I am not arguing for “simple institutions only.” I am arguing for the simplest effective institutions. There is a world of difference between these positions. Second, as argued at length below, there is very good reason to believe “that simplicity, in and of itself, will make government institutions work better.”

Ashcroft then asks “What do you mean by ‘easily justified’ here? Do you mean ‘more likely to be justified in fact?’ or ‘is easier to convince people is justified, irrespective of whether it is justified or not’? "

In a democracy, this is a distinction without a difference. An institution is justified if and only if people are convinced that it is justified. Thus, if it is easier to convince people that an institution is justified, the institution is more easily justified. As a corollary of this, democratic institutions are justified only so long as, and only so far as, the people are convinced that they are justified. That means that all democratic institutions are necessarily tentative and temporary. However, this tentative temporariness serves to legitimate institutions by assuring that they comport with the will of the governed. Simplicity serves this purpose by making it possible that the governed can actually understand and attend to the institutions so that we can comfortably say, “the people have reviewed the institution and have found it justified.”

Ashcroft then asserts [quote:32r4p09q] ”Furthrmore, you have not actually explained why it is that you think that simplicity, in and of itself, has the effect of making government more controlled (it is not clear precisely how you mean that here, either), stable and able to maintain its legitimacy despite changes in circumstances. Why should simple institutions, by virtue of being simple, tend to have those qualities more than complex institutions?”[/quote:32r4p09q]

This is the meat of the matter. In fact, I have explained this at length in my original post in this topic. Simple governments are more easily understood and assessed by the people. This makes them more controlled, more stable, and more legitimate. In my first post, I explored the danger of professionalization at length.

My argument above shows how government is more controlled if it is simple. The people can control government more easily if they can understand it. Simplicity serves this function. In fact, without simplicity, popular control of the government is threatened. This loss of popular oversight is not merely a loss of the people (which might result ultimately in a loss of liberty), it is a loss of the government. The government loses the meaningful participation of the people in and through the process. Further, the government will probably have to make up this loss by multiplying governmental institutions (by, for example, creating an esoteric institution to oversee the other esoteric institutions), which serves to exacerbate the problem and further alienate the people.

This alienation of the people from the government undermines both stability and legitimacy. The less people understand the government, the more people will mistrust the government (and rightly so). There is only so much a government can ask the people to take on faith, especially if the people simultaneously feel the ever-increasing weight of an ever-expanding, ever more complicated, and ever less understandable government. This will lead to discontent, which is harmful to stability, and will ultimately cause the people to believe that the government is not justified (legitimate).

In other words, complexity sacrifices transparency, and transparency is necessary for outsider scrutiny of an institution. Every effort must be made to ensure that government remains scrutable by the people such that the people can continue to pass judgment on the government – blessing it or modifying it depending on the popular judgment.

Ashcroft then asks “Why should the question be ‘what is good enough?’ rather than ‘what is best’? "

Because, in this case, the simplest solution that is good enough is best. There is a principle of diminishing returns involved in the activity of creating and evaluating a government, as there is such a principle involved in all human activities. There is always a point at which it is better to implement our current best guess rather than expend the additional time and resources to obtain a real, but minimal and marginal benefit.

Further, for the reasons asserted in my first post and above, the best government is not always the most effective government. There are real benefits to simplicity, especially in a democracy. Simple things are easier for simple people to understand – and democracy is committed to the inclusion of everyone, including simple people. Further, the more complicated something is, the more opportunities there are for something to go wrong. (The more parts something has, the more likely is it to break because there are more parts that can break). Therefore, there is a real loss when this simplicity is sacrificed to other goals – and that sacrifice can (and I think usually does) outweigh the minimal and marginal benefits of complexity.

To argue this by poetic quotation:

'Tis the gift to be simple,
'tis the gift to be free,
'tis the gift to come down
where we ought to be,
and when we find ourselves in the place just right,
'twill be in the valley of love and delight.
When true simplicity is gained
to bow and to bend we shan't be ashamed,
to turn, turn, will be our delight
till by turning, turning we come round right.

Ashcroft concludes [quote:32r4p09q] “I do not think that this argument holds either: in answering the question, "what problems are best solved by governments", one must of course take into account not only all the benefits of governmental action, but also all the potential drawbacks, including the possibility that time-limited institutions will overstay their welcome and start misbehaving. That possibility, along with all the other potential problems that governments have or can create, is required to be contempleated in the answer, and do not, therefore, mandate a different question. The rule that you suggest above also will tend to result in worse outcomes, since it will exclude from consideration the possibility that, in a given set of circumstances, the drawbacks of private action will outweigh the drawbacks of government action.”[/quote:32r4p09q]

First, I am not committed to the idea that we should privilege private action over governmental action in all cases. I firmly believe that there are problems that cannot be effectively resolved by private action. Those are the very problems I describe as crying out for governmental action. However, I do privilege private action on the margins because private action, as informal, does not tend to produce institutions which take on a life of their own. Private solutions are far less likely than are governmental institutions to outlive their utility, and, all other things being equal, private solutions must be preferred for that reason. However, this observation does not force me to try for private solutions to problems that require governmental intervention. Further, merely because a problem requires governmental intervention, that intervention should be as simple and transparent as possible.

The problem with Ashcroft’s argument is that it asks us to do the impossible. We are not omniscient, or even prescient. We cannot consider all potential problems. Rather, if there is anything we can be sure of, it is that we are missing something – and that the thing we are missing is probably going to cause problems for us later. In the face of this sad reality of human limitation, we should aim towards general solutions to problems because these solutions are easier to understand, implement and monitor.

Perhaps perfect government is better than limited, but effective government in the abstract, but imperfect people cannot create perfect institutions. We are imperfect people, and we must accept our limitations and do the best we can. This means that we should create a government that is good enough and then constantly strive to make it better. This achievement is not merely reasonable and proper for us – it has a nobility of its own in its constant striving to be better despite the knowledge that we will never reach the end of effort.

[Ashcroft Burnham]

Beathan,

a very interesting post. I think that there is probably rather less disagreement between us than it at first appeared. I do not have time to reply at present, alas, because I have another case to prepare (in RL) for to-morrow, and the work on our own judiciary is ongoing, too. However, I do hope to respond before terribly long. If I have counted correctly, there seem to be either two or three main issues, at least one of which may well be more apparant than real. As ever, you write well.