[quote="Gxeremio Dimsum":1ps9w6kp]It IS a problem. What if a citizen of Nstadt and a citizen of Community X make their agreement over IMs and pass the notecards without meeting face to face? Or when they do meet, they meet in another government's sim, or on the mainland which has no government? Whose law would be enforced, Nstadt or Community X, or none? Local laws in my proposal are binding to citizens of the locality only (or to create some standards of behavior for people who want to visit) and I don't picture a lot of contract law falling into that category. Under your system of reciprocal recognition, local laws are binding to the people with whom they do business as well. You suggest a "choice of law clause" as a workaround, but what that means in effect is that the enforcement of the law is unclear to the other party, unless they happen to be expert on the local laws of the person they're contracting with. The whole system would become confusing and unenforcable.[/quote:1ps9w6kp]
Ahh, you misunderstood what I suggested - the idea is that there would be [i:1ps9w6kp]default rules[/i:1ps9w6kp] about whose law of contract would apply if citizens of different nations made contracts with each other without stipulating which law should apply. The best way of doing that to ensure that it is very, very easy for anyone to work out which law applies (unless anybody has any brighter ideas) is to have a simple heirachy of nations. Suppose that we have three nations, A, B, and C, and they have the following heirachy of contract law, set by the Commonwealth Council:
A
B
C.
Now, suppose a citizen of A contracts with a citizen of B without a choice of law clause. In that case, the contract law of A would prevail. Similarly if A and C contracted without a choice of law clause. B's law would prevail if B and C contracted, and, if A, B and C contracted together, A's law would prevail. A choice of law clause could, of course, always change the default position.
[quote:1ps9w6kp]Contract law created by a Commonwealth, on the other hand, would be clearer, and how disputes would be arbitrated would be clear too. Such laws necessitate a body to make them (Legislature), and a body to interpret and apply them (Judiciary).[/quote:1ps9w6kp]
If a group joining the commonwealth wants to give this much power to a single legislature, might it not just as well become a CDS franchulate?
[quote="Ashcroft Burnham":1ps9w6kp]I have specified several benefits of my Commonwealth proposal over the unitary CDS under the current Constitution, which I will restate here:
1) Simpler to understand and shorter.[/quote:1ps9w6kp]
This is a very different argument from that which you have presented so far. We must be very clear indeed about what we are discussing. Are you or are you not proposing anything more than "let's scrap the constitution of the CDS and have mine instead"? If not, then your point is not well-made, and has nothing to do with encouraging other nations.
As I have made abundantly clear time and time again, the complexity of the [i:1ps9w6kp]document[/i:1ps9w6kp] is a different thing entirely from the complexity of the [i:1ps9w6kp]practical application[/i:1ps9w6kp] of the law that it creates. The task that law has to do is inherently and unavoidably vastly complicated. A simply drafted piece of legislation is inherently vague. Your constituiton is extremely vague. Vagueness in the source of laws makes the laws more, not less, complex to operate in practice because the complexity has to be resolved ad hoc, rather than having been resolved in advance. Since what law has to do is inherently complex, it does it best by addressing that complexity in advance, rather than by ignoring it and hoping that it will go away, or that somebody else will deal with it later on.
Our present constitution has been developed over a long time, with input from many people, and represents a carefully-constructed, precisely balanced, hard-negotiated instrument that has served us very well in the time that we have been here already. In order to suggest that it is so bad as should be discarded entirely (or relegated to nothing more than the constitution of a local government, forever confined to a single island sim), very, very strong reasons are needed indeed. The mere fact that yours appears simpler (i.e., has fewer words) is most certainly not such a reason. Radical change needs radically strong reasons to support it.
[quote:1ps9w6kp]2) Guaranteed representation of member governments' interests in the Legislature.[/quote:1ps9w6kp]
First of all, you have still not explained why this is desirable, and why this is better than people being represented by each individual citizen having a single vote on who should be elected to the legislature.
Secondly, this can be achieved (in respect of representatives of local government) with the DPU's senate proposal, without radically overhauling our constitution.
Thirdly, under the commonwealth proposal as suggested above, each member nation will have one or more seats on the Council of the Commonwealth, which each may decide how it fills.
[quote:1ps9w6kp]3) Provisions already in place for member governments to be distinct in their applications of democracy (not dependent on some future unspecified act of Chancellor or the RA).[/quote:1ps9w6kp]
This is not something that you achieve with your proposal, since your legislature has no fewer powers than ours (and, indeed, without a Scientific Council, its power is even more unchecked).
[quote:1ps9w6kp]4) Commonwealth not tied to land fees in any way - don't collect them, don't pay them, don't make rules about them. That is a reserved power for member governments.[/quote:1ps9w6kp]
Neither is the intergovernmental commonwealth that I propose. But, if an organisation is to purport to have a strong legislative, executive and judiciary, and to have the powers effectively of a nation, it must have the practical means of enforcing what it orders (by means of a truly national estate owner), or else the national institution becomes impotent and worthless.
As many have said before, in order for any system of government in SecondLife to be effective, the [i:1ps9w6kp]de jure[/i:1ps9w6kp] powers of governments need to be tied as closely as possible to the [i:1ps9w6kp]de facto[/i:1ps9w6kp] realities of control over assets in SecondLife. We have already been heavily criticised for having our governmental institutions too far from the source of [i:1ps9w6kp]de facto[/i:1ps9w6kp] power over banning and asset disposal; your proposal would mean that governmental power would be far, far further away still from real power. More than that, instead of the present position of having a largely neutral EO with no governmental functions, what you propose would (seemingly) involve politically-invested EOs, with great incentive to default on their duties to governments if things did not go their way politically.
Simply put, in your system, the real power is too far from the institutions that have theoretical authority for the system to be safe from abuses of power, [i:1ps9w6kp]coups d'etat[/i:1ps9w6kp], or other such forms of instability.
[quote:1ps9w6kp]5) Provision for at-large citizens, which I can understand you might not want in your local Nstadt government, but which would be beneficial to have in a Commonwealth so that there are more people against whom agreements and law are enforceable.[/quote:1ps9w6kp]
I have already explained why at-large citizens are a bad idea in general, and also that, even if one was to adopt the idea, one would certainly not have to replace the entire constitution of the CDS (or relegate our present constitution forever to be the local government of a single island sim, with all the real power given up to a higher commonwealth legislature) to achieve it: it could be achieved with a realatively straightforward amendment to Article IV of our present constitution.
[quote:1ps9w6kp]Obviously there is still some misunderstanding of what kinds of groups might be member governments. Here are some examples of groups that I could imagine:
A. A directly democratic sim (all legislative, no executive or judicial).
B. A sim governed by a town council (same as above).
C. A sim in which the power to vote was proportional to land held in the sim. (could have all three, or only one or two branches)
D. A sim with only one elected leader who for their term of office governed the sim as they saw fit, with citizen input (only executive, no legislative or judicial)
E. A meritocratic government where successful completion of tests or tasks qualified people for leadership in the government (could have all three or only one or two branches).
And so on. As I have demonstrated, these would be democratic local (member) governments that would not be doing the things you outlined above, yet could benefit from interacting with one another through an overarching Commonwealth. It is unsubstantiated to say that if their systems aren't as complicated as Nstadt's, they can't be considered a government.[/quote:1ps9w6kp]
I have never claimed that, if a government is not as [i:1ps9w6kp]complicated[/i:1ps9w6kp] as that of the CDS then it cannot be a government at all: my point was quite simple. It was that, either a nation is truly independent, in which case it can properly be treated as a member state of a commonwealth, and enjoy all the privelidges and independence that such a status gives it, but, to do so, it must have a fully-fledged government with a legislature, executive and judiciary, and proper constitutional checks and balances (not necessarily in the same way as we have in the CDS), or a group wants a degree of democratic control over its local area, but to leave the broader policymaking up to a central legislature, to leave braoder policy implimentation to a central executive, and to leave all dispute resolution to a central judiciary. The latter group cannot be expected to be treated as fully independent because it is inherently [i:1ps9w6kp]not[/i:1ps9w6kp] independent: it depends for its executive and judiciary, and much of its legislature, on the wider government, although exercises some local freedoms. In that case, it would be most dangerous to treat an organisation that is not truly independent as if it was, since that would create a mismatch (as described above) between actual and purported power great enough to give real cause for concern. If people wanted to have partial government models, such as the legislature-only model that you described above, why should they not instead enfranchulate with the CDS?
[quote="Ashcroft Burnham":1ps9w6kp]Putting aside the issue of at-large citizens for a moment, my proposal would allow anyone who wanted to business with someone in the Commonwealth (say they wanted to do business with me) to clearly and easily see to what degree I was bonded to the government of the Commonwealth. If I was bonded only through owning a microplot in Nstadt, they could ask I increase my bond before doing serious business with me, so they know I am more invested and more liable if I default. This is a huge benefit and would likely be a major factor in the growth of the Commonwealth (it would give a compelling reason for legitimate business people to join, to prove their good intentions to prospective customers).[/quote:1ps9w6kp]
As I stated in the above post, this could quite easily be achieved without the use of your proposed constitution, with all of the institution-power mismatches that it could bring. This could quite readily be achieved under my model of a commonwealth, for example.
[quote:1ps9w6kp]I would submit to you that anything called the "Council of the Commonwealth" would in fact be a legislative branch.[/quote:1ps9w6kp]
In a sense, the Council of the Commonwealth would be a legislature of sorts, but it would not be a [i:1ps9w6kp]national[/i:1ps9w6kp] legislature: it would be more like one of the UN Councils. It would not have power to make laws directly applicable to citizens of the member nations, but rather would be able to set rules that the member nations, qua nations, should follow, on pain of being dismissed or suspended from the commonwealth. That structure more closely reflects the realities of the distribution of power in such circumstances.