The Scientific Council (publication of transcripts) Bill

[Sudane Erato]

[quote="Ashcroft Burnham":3p6qw976]
The Guildmeister (Kendra) was the estate owner, .... [/quote:3p6qw976]
A very small point of information, to keep the historical record straight. As Gwyn points out, for the first nine months of its life, Neualtenburg was a mainland sim, and therefore there was no Estate Owner. In the spring of 2005, the first sim (then called Neualtenburg and now called Neufreistadt) was purchased by the pooled resources of several members. I volunteered to be EO at that time.

While Kendra remained Guildmaster throughout this period, there was no correlation between Guildmaster and Estate Owner. It was only when Kendra offered me the position of Guildmaster did the two functions co-reside in one person. There remains no necessary connection between the two roles.

Sudane.....

[Ashcroft Burnham]

Ahh, thank you for the ocrrection

[Gwyneth Llewelyn]

Ashcroft said:
[quote="Ashcroft Burnham":1yz9hz3a]Gwyn, as I pointed out in response to Aliasi, it is rather confusing to call it a "court", beucase, while some of the SC's functions are judicial, others are quasi-legislative, and others are administrative.[/quote:1yz9hz3a]

I read Aliasi's post after I posted mine. I agree, it might be better to call it a "Constitutional Council", although, in my eyes, it functions as a Court, although its scope is not Common Jurisdiction laws, but constitutional deliberations.

The issue of the veto as an additional power of a court is not something so terrible; as a matter of fact, some RL legislatures give their Constitutional Courts the right to veto laws (others simply rephrase the word "veto" and imply that "all laws have to be signed and approved by the Constitutional Court").

"Vetoing a law" is not, in my mind, a "quasi-legislative" aspect of any entity, and neither is "impeachment". The Executive also has a veto on laws; but it is not a legislative (nor a quasi-legislative) body, just an executive one. These are ancillary functions (even if powerful ones!) but not the major powers of that branch. Nor are they the reason the branch exists in the first place.

Administrative tasks, similarly, can be placed under any branch's supervision. I remember having argued in the past for a common civil service, under the supervision of a single branch (at that time, the Guild — now, the executive). However, all branches have now their own civil servants to handle administrative tasks. I don't see these as being "powers of a branch", but rather delegation of work to specialised and skilled labourers who can do these more efficiently than the appointed/elected officers.

Finally, it is the very notion of having the rules of procedure being more strict, and imposed and validated by external bodies, that totally disrupts the whole [i:1yz9hz3a]concept[/i:1yz9hz3a] of the Philosophical Branch. The procedures of the SC were sadly lost (or buried) in the old forums. It has a procedure for meeting, for announcing an agenda, for establishing what items are on that agenda, on how to reach decisions, on when there is a quorum, and, vaguely hinted on the Constitution, how to deal with unruly members. All this is what suffices for a body of government that had as a major function to [i:1yz9hz3a]think[/i:1yz9hz3a] about the implications of running a democratic society.

Although I naturally agree that the procedures for establishing courts were lacking — they were hardly less than a few paragraphs (I might concede that they were long paragraphs ) in length. They existed and were enough for the purpose. We have now much better and more detailed procedures — which is great.

But the whole [i:1yz9hz3a]focus[/i:1yz9hz3a] of the Philosophical Branch has shifted, and [i:1yz9hz3a]I[/i:1yz9hz3a] fail to understand why [i:1yz9hz3a]you[/i:1yz9hz3a] can't understand it. In my mind, I can imagine that the major reason — shared, by the way, by many citizens — is that the SC was seen as being a co-legislative body without requirements of being 'democratic'. Instead, it was set up as a [i:1yz9hz3a]philosophical[/i:1yz9hz3a] body, which [i:1yz9hz3a]validated[/i:1yz9hz3a] democratic principles regulating our society, and [i:1yz9hz3a]one[/i:1yz9hz3a] of its functions (allegedly one of the fundamental ones) was having the freedom to discuss the reasons [i:1yz9hz3a]why[/i:1yz9hz3a] a specific law was or not was deemed to be fitting to be a valid one under the principles embodied under the Constitution and Founding Documents. Since all cases are different, a [i:1yz9hz3a]literal[/i:1yz9hz3a] reading of [i:1yz9hz3a]most[/i:1yz9hz3a] of the laws would [i:1yz9hz3a]never[/i:1yz9hz3a] suffice to extract the [u:1yz9hz3a]meaning[/u:1yz9hz3a] and the [u:1yz9hz3a]implications[/u:1yz9hz3a] of a specific law, just by restricting it to a blindfolded reasoning using someone else's specific rules for the effect. In other words, the scope of what it means — in [i:1yz9hz3a]the CDS[/i:1yz9hz3a] — to "defend and uphold the Constitution" was [i:1yz9hz3a]narrowed[/i:1yz9hz3a], not [i:1yz9hz3a]expanded[/i:1yz9hz3a] as you claim. Having less things to pronounce upon, and less freedom to express a binding decision, and rules to limit the types of decisions and the form that these have to take to be binding, is, in my opinion, a [i:1yz9hz3a]narrowing of the focus[/i≠.

In essence, the issue that I have with this new[/i:1yz9hz3a] body is the [i:1yz9hz3a]scope[/i:1yz9hz3a] of the procedural detail that is required to "correctly deem a law to be unconstitutional". It means setting up a set of rules that allow a law to be pronounced unconstitutional, if certain prerequisites are not followed. It also means that the only reasons for deeming a law unconstitutional are set [i:1yz9hz3a]beforehand[/i:1yz9hz3a] in a very meticulous and detailed way, and no other reasons (or procedures) can be employed to pronounce a decision. In essence, it means programming an algorithm where a law is dropped, the system is started, and the resulting "constitutional pronouncement" is an "Aye" or "Nay".

Since both the RA and the Judges will have that very same "algorithm", and thus be able to apply it to their own reasoning, they'll find out, in 99% of the cases, that their pronouncements are, indeed, constitutional. All that remains is an exterior validation to catch those 1% of the cases that might have been missed or that failed validation because the "algorithm" was improperly applied. Again, a very narrow focus, strongly checked to that there are not many possible deviations from the norm.

This has [i:1yz9hz3a]hardly[/i:1yz9hz3a] anything to do with the [i:1yz9hz3a]original[/i:1yz9hz3a] SC, which interpreted the [i:1yz9hz3a]philosophy[/i:1yz9hz3a] behind a certain law, and there was no "rational validation" at the forefront of the process, but an ethical/moral one, as well as one based on traditions, common sense, and reasonability. All these are abstract and subjective concepts, most of them emotional ones, and impossible to establish "formally" in any objective way. Thus there was no attempt to hide this fact, and implement it as policy.

Nevertheless, it was clear that many official pronouncements of the SC were quite "rational" — pinpointing inconsistencies here and there based on perceptual value of certain proposed elements in a specific law that were deemed unreasonable when analysed carefully. There was a methodological and systematic approach — but one that often went in circles, not always with absolute agreement, and very often using a "retrograde" approach: "we feel that this law violates the spirit embodied in our Constitution. Let's see why". Thus, this is much more related to a [i:1yz9hz3a]philosophical[/i:1yz9hz3a] approach to gathering of knowledge, when you might have the answer before you know how to formulate the question itself. This naturally does not lead to a model that can be systematically deployed using logical inference or deductive analysis, because it used mostly an [i:1yz9hz3a]intuitive[/i:1yz9hz3a] approach of validation.

If one fails to [i:1yz9hz3a]understand[/i:1yz9hz3a] the process (the [i:1yz9hz3a]unwritten[/i:1yz9hz3a] process!) of deliberation and reaching of conclusions in the SC, it's quite clear that one will also fail to understand why the Scientific Council has been [i:1yz9hz3a]changed[/i:1yz9hz3a] in its functions and role by the new Judiciary Act. I don't expect that people unite behind a common understanding of what the SC was and what it ought to be; neither can I assume that the fundamental difference between the "now" and the "then" are, in essence, [i:1yz9hz3a]philosophical[/i:1yz9hz3a] differences.

However, they have [i:1yz9hz3a]rational[/i:1yz9hz3a] implications. Your generous offer of help to "educate" the members of the SC shows how important the new role of the SC is deemed to be, to the effect that its current qualifications, skills, and knowledge might, indeed, not be adequate to the new roles. I think your implication is quite consistent with my own understanding of the underlying changes: the SC was qualified to do fulfill a [i:1yz9hz3a]different[/i:1yz9hz3a] role in Government than the one that has been approved now. While naturally I agree that getting training for free is very nice, it also shows that the SC is [i:1yz9hz3a]not[/i:1yz9hz3a] qualified, right now, to fulfill that role.

On the other hand, one could argue that having the Chief Judge of the Common Jurisdiction training the very same people that might, one day, place checks over him, is a failure to ensure neutrality and lack of bias. While education is supposed to be "neutral" — in the sense that either you acquire a set of skills, or you don't — the [i:1yz9hz3a]way[/i:1yz9hz3a] this training is done will most certainly bias the recipients to the training towards the teacher.

One might also argue that a SC that requires training (even from an outsider) to fulfill its role is not a good SC. Thus, the very same arguments that you use for a professional Judiciary would also apply to the SC members — who [i:1yz9hz3a]should[/i:1yz9hz3a] be professionals as well, and not simply "trained citizens" serving on a "best effort" case. Again, two answers seem to emerge from this case: either we will have a bad SC, unable to fullfil its role due to a lack of qualifications of its members, and thus we should abolish it and replace it by a new branch where all members are pre-qualified (obviously, the same requirements as for the rest of the Judges will be needed); or the function of the SC is so worthless that it can fulfill it without special qualification — and thus also strengthening the argument that the SC ,as it stands, is indeed worthless since its functions are worthless.

Thus, in conclusion, there are naturally some points I agree with:
1) The SC needs reform.
2) The SC needs procedures.
3) The current SC needs more overview and supervision.
4) The new Judiciary Act requires from the SC new sets of skills that have to be acquired somehow.

which leads me to affirm that the [i:1yz9hz3a]current[/i:1yz9hz3a] SC was not created to be able to perform the functions that you we now require the SC to perform. It is a branch of government that is inadequate to perform any of the tasks that is now being demanded of it to perform. In a way, this is like taking the cash register employees from their places and send them to Accountancy instead, telling them "now we need more accountants to oversee the expenses and the budget. Since you all have been faithful vcash register operators, we're sure you'll addapt ton the new role of accountants quite easily."

[Gwyneth Llewelyn]

...because something that [i:uxl1fgo7]doesn't[/i:uxl1fgo7] smell like a rose and doesn't look like one would never be recognised for what it was if it was called "a rose"

[quote="Ashcroft Burnham":uxl1fgo7]
Gwyneth remarks that, if the function of the Scientific Council is to change from a council of people who use their own discretion to over-ride the democratic institutions when they believe that they have acted rashly[/quote:uxl1fgo7]
Oooh that was too large a step, I'm afraid

The Scientific Council does [i:uxl1fgo7]not[/i:uxl1fgo7] "over-ride" the democratic institutions when it believes they have acted rashly What it does is to ensure that specific actions taken by the existing institutions, when these conflict with principles and ideals that are [i:uxl1fgo7]contrary[/i:uxl1fgo7] to the ideals of a democratic nation, can be minimised or prevented, even if they comply [i:uxl1fgo7]de facto[/i:uxl1fgo7] with the literal interpretation of the laws and constitution.

A typical example is having a country with no other form of income but raising taxes (not our case, fortunately!) suddenly have their Parliament announce that they would cut the taxes to zero. It would be an immensely popular announcement (ie. all the citizens would stand behind that decision). It would be a fair and just one (ie. all citizens would equally benefit from the decision). It would be a constitutional one (in my mind, no democratic country's constitution defines the amount of tax cuts that can be reduced). It would even be a good PR move for the economy (ie. during a year or so, lots of companies would pop up from scratch, hire previously unemployed labour, create new opportunities and markets, make the economy flourish like never before).

It would also lead the country to bankruptcy after a year. To place these things in check, almost all countries have a mechanism to prevent such things to happen — ie. a way [i:uxl1fgo7]not[/i:uxl1fgo7] to allow that law to be approved. Very likely, someone in that hypothetical country would claim that, while short-term this measure would be immensely beneficial, on the mid-term it would shortcut basic human rights, like the right to social care or good living conditions (ie. imagine a country where there wouldn't be money to pay the police force ).

(Actually, in the CDS, this would be a veto by the still existing Guild, since the SC has no jurisdiction over financial bills; but the example serves to illustrate my point)

[quote="Ashcroft Burnham":uxl1fgo7](I never could work out why all the branches had two names each)[/quote:uxl1fgo7]
It was part of the "cuteness factor" The Branches have names designating their [i:uxl1fgo7]origin[/i:uxl1fgo7]: Representative, Artisanal, Philosophic. Then they have a designation that applies (somehow) to their form of organisation: Assembly (just a gathering where all are equals), Collective (like a trade union), Council (like a, well, council...). And finally, something indicative
of the medieval Bavarian setting, which was enviosioned that could change, without forcing the Branch to change the constitutional name — the RA used to be called the "Senate" (not any more, thanks to yours truly, who requested that this were changed and had it approved by the RA), the Artisanal Collective became the Medieval Guild, and the Scientific Council mostly resembled the way a University's Scientific Council is brought together (a meritocracy).

[quote="Ashcroft Burnham":uxl1fgo7]I doubt that that is necessary. When an institution's function slowly evolves over time, its name does not change.[/quote:uxl1fgo7]
I argue that splitting all powers of a branch and moving these over to other branches, interfering with the way a branch establishes its own procedures, assigning new tasks and roles, and requiring new qualifications from its members (or training for them to adapt to new roles), as well as moving from an "idealistic" body (one that decided by intuition) to a "legalistic" body (one that decides by literal application of logic), all in the space of one RA meeting, is not a "slow change" neither an "evolution", but a total and complete reform.

The same reasoning applied when most powers of the Guild and many of the RA (and one from the SC) were put into the Executive branch. It did not continue to be called "the Guild" because the way it works is completely different from the way the Guild works. Nevertheless, it shares a lot of resemblances with the powers of the Guild: it administrates the money, it oversees buildings, it enforces covenants, and it puts the RA's laws into practice. Clearly it was a [i:uxl1fgo7]new[/i:uxl1fgo7] body. I thus argue that the changes to be applied to the SC are even more radical and well worthy of a name change.

[Ashcroft Burnham]

There are two issues that need to be separated here, I think. Firstly, there is the question of what the constitution says about the Scientific Council. Secondly, there is the question of who is on the Scientific Council.

As to the first, although how it has worked in practice might have changed (although I still believe the change to be more evolutionary than revolutionary; it always [i:snt929u9]was[/i:snt929u9] there, at least in part, to uphold the rule of constitutional law), the current functions of the Council do not require much rewriting of the [i:snt929u9]text[/i:snt929u9] of the constitution: the functions of the insitution are an emergant property of its powers, as far as constituional drafting is concerned, in any event.

Incidentally, I do not agree that legal reasoning is akin to a computerised calculation: it is, in fact, extremely complex, requiring a great deal of abstraction and synthesis, something that nothing other than human minds can do (at least, this century). [i:snt929u9]Interpreting[/i:snt929u9] the (constitutional) law is a highly sophisticated function, and needs all the intelligence that human minds can muster to do it.

The second issue is the nature of the people who serve on the Council. Apart from you, I do not know the others there very well, or have any idea of how skilled that they are at legal reasoning. Anyone who can reason well in general can be taught fairly easily to apply legal reasoning well. I know that, for the most part at least, your ability to reason is good: I imagine, therefore, that you would not have undue difficulties in learning (if you do not know already) the skill of legal reasoning. As to the others, it is a matter for them whether they believe that they are competent to do something that, as far as I can see, was at the very least a subset of their function all along: to interpret and apply the wording of the constitution.

[Diderot Mirabeau]

[quote="Ashcroft Burnham":2i03sgfs]for the most part at least, your ability to reason is good[/quote:2i03sgfs]

Should one feel proud to receive such a compliment?

[Beathan]

[quote:1bevjedu]Ashcroft Burnham wrote:
for the most part at least, your ability to reason is good

Should one feel proud to receive such a compliment?[/quote:1bevjedu]

From Ashcroft, of course. This is the first time I have seen him give such a compliment. The closest he got with me was to indicate that my rhetoric was good -- which is like praising a book for the coverart.

Beathan

[Dianne]

Okay, so it's late where I live and after reading pages and pages of this stuff and being completely depressed by it I am not sure if this is really serious comment or black humour, tongue in cheek or what but I completely disagree with this:

[quote="Gwyneth Llewelyn":3r6p8jhb]... . [b:3r6p8jhb]It's now clear to me that there might be no further point or purpose in the existence of a branch of Government that defends and upholds our ideals[/b:3r6p8jhb], when a better approach is to replace it by a branch that supervises the application of the rule of law. ... it seems to be safer to establish a system that defends and ensures that the [i:3r6p8jhb]rules[/i:3r6p8jhb] are obeyed (which seems to be a more concrete and rational approach), than one that defends and ensures that the [i:3r6p8jhb]ideals[/i:3r6p8jhb] are obeyed (which is naturally a totally subjective and emotional approach, one that is drawn by morals, ethics, and common sense, and not strict rationalism). I guess that the time for idealism is gone ....[/quote:3r6p8jhb]
I don't have much to add other than express a great sadness that things have come to this dead-end scenario so quickly and primarily by the passage of a single ill-conceived (IMO) bill.

Again, I don't know if you are trying to be ironic or whatever Gwyn, but your constant repetition in this and other posts of the idea that the new governmental and constitutional organisation embodied by the Judiciary bill, the abolition of the Artisinal branch and the establishment of the Chancellor position is a *good* thing are just off base IMO. Just becasue the people decide on something doesn't make it good or right. Good people can make awful decisions and anyone can make a mistake or be mis-led.

Even though I could hardly be described as a great fan of our original government, the government we have so rapidly morphed into is most definitely a "bad thing," in fact it's an absolute horror.

To me:

- good government is about a [b:3r6p8jhb]minimum[/b:3r6p8jhb] of rules, not the [i:3r6p8jhb]exponential multiplication[/i:3r6p8jhb] of rules under the judiciary act.

- good government is about a [b:3r6p8jhb]minimum[/b:3r6p8jhb] of bureaucracy, not the [i:3r6p8jhb]huge bureaucratic structure[/i:3r6p8jhb] necessary to erect this monument to the role of the judge.

- good government should [b:3r6p8jhb]grow out of the community it represents[/b:3r6p8jhb] and only exist to solve the problems of that community, not be a gigantic "cure-all" structure envisioned as some kind of hypothetical export to a "justice deprived" marketplace.

Vast, ostensibly democratic structures can, and have many times been erected in the history of civilisation that do not [i:3r6p8jhb]act[/i:3r6p8jhb] democratically nor increase the personal freedom of the citizens, nor necessarily give them "justice." Conversely, most modern governments contain technically non democratic elements that act exactly as governors or safe-guards against good and reasonable people deciding on unreasonable courses of action in good faith.

Finally, IMO "justice" is about what is [i:3r6p8jhb]right[/i:3r6p8jhb] and what is [i:3r6p8jhb]fair[/i:3r6p8jhb] and therefore is all about [b:3r6p8jhb]morals and ideals[/b:3r6p8jhb]. Paying attention to these is also definitely not "completely subjective." The idea that we should no longer be concerned with morals and just focus on "the rules" leaves us looking directly into the face of a Kafkaesque nightmare.

But perhaps I am just tired and that is what you meant to highlight with your own words.

I hope so.

[Ashcroft Burnham]

[quote="Dianne":13rn0aky]Finally, IMO "justice" is about what is [i:13rn0aky]right[/i:13rn0aky] and what is [i:13rn0aky]fair[/i:13rn0aky] and therefore is all about [b:13rn0aky]morals and ideals[/b:13rn0aky]. Paying attention to these is also definitely not "completely subjective." The idea that we should no longer be concerned with morals and just focus on "the rules" leaves us looking directly into the face of a Kafkaesque nightmare. [/quote:13rn0aky]

Do you not also think that justice is necessarily about the rule of law, or that the legislature is capable of being a body that upholds ideals?

[Dianne]

[quote="Ashcroft Burnham":f8oeq9gh][quote="Dianne":f8oeq9gh]Finally, IMO "justice" is about what is [i:f8oeq9gh]right[/i:f8oeq9gh] and what is [i:f8oeq9gh]fair[/i:f8oeq9gh] and therefore is all about [b:f8oeq9gh]morals and ideals[/b:f8oeq9gh]. Paying attention to these is also definitely not "completely subjective." The idea that we should no longer be concerned with morals and just focus on "the rules" leaves us looking directly into the face of a Kafkaesque nightmare. [/quote:f8oeq9gh]

Do you not also think that justice is necessarily about the rule of law, or that the legislature is capable of being a body that upholds ideals?[/quote:f8oeq9gh]

Living by the "rule of law" is just a phrase that means "following the law" or "abiding by the law." I was talking more about the substance or content of the law, and not just that we should follow it (of course we should).

No law or system of laws can ever be perfectly formulated for all conditions and possible occurences. At those times, the "rule of law" fails and we have to fall back on the real purpose of law which is (loosely) those things I named, i.e. - doing the "right" thing (or the moral thing or the fair thing.)

The comment about the "Kafkaesque nightmare" was a reference to those systems that get so concerned with following the law and detailing the law and making complex legal systems and structures that they not only lose sight of the purpose of the law, they actively work against that purpose. A needlessly complex system of law, or simply a needless system of law, obfuscates and conceals the purpose of the law itself and thus works against it's own purpose.

Such complex systems are also "Kafkaesque" in that they make it possible for th0se working within the system who are familiar with it's complexities to bend it to their (perhaps immoral) purposes. The average citizen cannot hope to understand the complexity of the system and is thus at a disadvantage. They need a guide to explain the law to them.

[michelmanen]

Gwyneth wrote:

[quote:22dsqiwn] it seems to be safer to establish a system that defends and ensures that the rules are obeyed (which seems to be a more concrete and rational approach), than one that defends and ensures that the ideals are obeyed (which is naturally a totally subjective and emotional approach, one that is drawn by morals, ethics, and common sense, and not strict rationalism). I guess that the time for idealism is gone — we'll have to assume the mantle of pragmatism and discard the old ways, making way for the new ones. [/quote:22dsqiwn]

I think that the continued existence of an SC as described by Gwyn is essential if CDS is to continue to thrive and expand as a community sharing a common vision. The law has its place and function; but it is pointless without an extra-judicial vision of the values, ideals, morals and ethics of what that community is supposed to stand for and represent. [i:22dsqiwn]Without a vision - people perish; and so do communities[/i:22dsqiwn]. Whilst our modernity iRL may indeed be "disenchanted", even the briefest perusal of the current state of our "3rd rock from the sun" clearly illustrates that this is an argument [b:22dsqiwn]strongly in favor[/b:22dsqiwn], not against, maintaining an independent SC, fully capable of fulfilling its initial mission.

I urge all participants to this forum to think carefully before advocating or supporting the emasculation, disempowering, and silencing of what is and [b:22dsqiwn]must remain[/b:22dsqiwn] the inner voice and enduring conscience of our Confederation of Democratic Simulators.

[Pelanor Eldrich]

I second that, most vigorously. Great Post!

[Ashcroft Burnham]

[quote="michelmanen":2onaaffj]I think that the continued existence of an SC as described by Gwyn is essential if CDS is to continue to thrive and expand as a community sharing a common vision. The law has its place and function; but it is pointless without an extra-judicial vision of the values, ideals, morals and ethics of what that community is supposed to stand for and represent. [i:2onaaffj]Without a vision - people perish; and so do communities[/i:2onaaffj]. Whilst our modernity iRL may indeed be "disenchanted", even the briefest perusal of the current state of our "3rd rock from the sun" clearly illustrates that this is an argument [b:2onaaffj]strongly in favor[/b:2onaaffj], not against, maintaining an independent SC, fully capable of fulfilling its initial mission.

I urge all participants to this forum to think carefully before advocating or supporting the emasculation, disempowering, and silencing of what is and [b:2onaaffj]must remain[/b:2onaaffj] the inner voice and enduring conscience of our Confederation of Democratic Simulators.[/quote:2onaaffj]

Please note that nobody is suggesting emasculating or disenfranchising the SC: the idea is to ensure that the SC performs its function of upholding the rule of constitutional law, whilst at the same time being required to follow the rule of law itself.

[Aliasi Stonebender]

[quote="Ashcroft Burnham":2h2sw85j]
Please note that nobody is suggesting emasculating or disenfranchising the SC: the idea is to ensure that the SC performs its function of upholding the rule of constitutional law, whilst at the same time being required to follow the rule of law itself.[/quote:2h2sw85j]

On the one hand, this is true, and I've certainly felt that the SC needed some kind of modification... but on the other, I've also felt the CDS needs to be an active hotbed of experimentation, and a group that can veto anything that seems to be too unseemly without the constraints of law appealed to me for that reason. I would prefer to keep the SC's former status, and institute other controls such as term limits, an easier vote of no-confidence (as opposed to impeachment proceedings) and so on.

[Ashcroft Burnham]

[quote="Aliasi Stonebender":82eqahsn]On the one hand, this is true, and I've certainly felt that the SC needed some kind of modification... but on the other, I've also felt the CDS needs to be an active hotbed of experimentation, and a group that can veto anything that seems to be too unseemly without the constraints of law appealed to me for that reason. I would prefer to keep the SC's former status, and institute other controls such as term limits, an easier vote of no-confidence (as opposed to impeachment proceedings) and so on.[/quote:82eqahsn]

[i:82eqahsn]Why[/i:82eqahsn] would you prefer to have an unelected body that can veto legislation for any reason that it pleases? Why is such a body preferable to a body that upholds - and is bound by - the rule of constitutional law?