I agree with Claude. Let the SC appoint the Auditor General based on his/her qualifications to do the job. But let the AG remain fully independent from the SC, not part of it, as was proposed.
I think Sudane's arguments are fully in favor od my proposal, not against it. The fact that the AG and Treasurer might work together in a cooperative way so as to minimise any friction and major error is an andvantage in my opinion, not a drawback.
At a first stage, the Treasurer would prepare a draft recommended budget to the RA, on which the AG would informally affer advice. The Treasurer then would finalise the Recommened Budget, having taken none/some/all the AG's comments into consideration. The RA would examine the Recommended Budget and table its own Budget Bill, including none/some/ all of the Treasurer's recommendation. At this point, the AG would issue its budget evaluation of the RA Budget Bill. The RA will chose to modify / not modify its Budget Bill accordingly, and pass it into law. The citizens will support / sanction the budget by their vote at election time.
The AG should be appointed for a long enough period to give the position stability and credibility. I would souggest some time period around the 2 year mark.
I believe the SC should interfere as little as possible in the routine political process of the SC, as long as vision and values of the community are not at stake -or, of course, constitutional issues. I feel particularly strongly on this on the budget issue - a quintessentially political resource-allocation decision whose responsiblity should be shouldered exclusively by the RA in front of the electorate. This will enhance the openness, accuntablity and efficiency of our democracy.
Regarding Desmond's suggestion of fully democratising our budget, I think that having a Treasurer and an AG in no way diminishes the democratic nature of our budget - and in fact, enhances it by keeping the SC out of the process. In the final instance, the RA can do with the budget as it pleases (despite any recommendations from Ttreasurer and AG), subject only to the vote of the electorate at election time. What can be more democractic, accountable, open and efficicient that this?
On a peersonal note, I still have significant issues with Pat's cumulation of functions as both RA and SC member (albeit on leave). I do not question his personal integrity- but from and outside point of view, when an RA member who, upon leaving his RA seat, will again sit in the SC with full voting powers, argues in favor of significantly enhancing the powers of the SC - it looks as a significant conflict of interests. And that is certainly not good for our democracy. It is exactly what happened with the Judiciary - let's not go down that road again with the Treasurry....